We Still Need a Better Plan for Afghanistan

What exactly is an exit strategy in the military sense and specifically in Afghanistan? I’ll state that it is simply a set of conditions for deciding that combat operations are no longer required. Before we can end the war in any other way than by totally destroying an enemy we must have as clear objective. Since total destruction is out of the question for a number of reasons, then the US must declare what it is exactly that we hope to accomplish.

An exit strategy implies that we will execute a conditions based plan to some very objective. This plan should be time bound just like any other project/operation, and contrary to popular “political” opinion, the high level plan and time estimate can be published. The risk of enemy exploitation is in the details which do not have to be publicized. If you have a good plan, and you effectively execute it, and your time estimates are correct, you should be able to set a goal for leaving that does not help the enemy. Having said all that, you also have to be able to reasonably adjust for changes in the situation. As long as these changes make sense and you communicate them properly the public support will be there.

Unfortunately, every one of these (and other) military planning and operational principles have been violated by our generals and both the Bush and Obama Administrations. People may take offense that I hold our generals accountable and not just the two presidents, but the truth is clear. We have been at war for 8 years and we are just now figuring out a strategy? As a former counterinsurgent from the 1980’s and 1990’s I find this very hard to understand since a number of officers I worked closely with are now generals. Other senior officers with extensive counterinsurgency experience who have retired from the military have tried to make things clear as well, but to no avail. We lack for leadership and it will be our undoing in Afghanistan.

Good officers will tell you two important things: don’t just throw more and more troops at a problem, and don’t start any military operation without first figuring out what "mission accomplished" means.

It may not be too late to turn things around in Afghanistan, nut it does not appear that the current administration has any better leadership skills than the previous one. Simply doing the opposite of the Bush Administration will not bring success to the Obama Administration. We need better leadership, a clear objective, and a better plan.

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Our Response to General Stanley McChrystal’s Initial Assessment of The War in Afghanistan

September 23, 2009
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director

We at WinTheGWOT.org have been silent for some months now realizing that our protests, exhortations, and other pleas to government stakeholders about the strategies for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued to fall upon deaf ears. One might even declare that we’ve said just about everything that we could in our attempts to convince our government and military planners to fight the wars differently. We have always advocated that the strategy be different if they truly expect to have a positive outcome.

It is understandable that President Obama should want to study the strategy for the war in Afghanistan, but incomprehensible that this did not happen long ago while he was campaigning or soon thereafter. Be that as it may, the fact that General McChrystal is now reviewing the strategy of the 8-year-old war is also completely beyond our understanding. Judging by the unclassified version of General McChrystal’s report leaked to the Washington Post, the current failure of our government and senior military leaders in Afghanistan verges upon dereliction of duty.

General McChrystal’s own words quoted from the report echo exactly what we and other subject matter experts have been saying since 2003; when we felt compelled speak out in response to the inept management of the wars by the Bush Administration. The report is some 60 pages long, but the “Commander’s Summary” is below, along with some specific quotes (complete with spelling errors) further on demonstrating how our government has completely mismanaged this effort to date.

The stakes in Afghanistan are high. NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan and President Obama's strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat at Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan have laid out a dear [dire] path of what we must do. Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or has insufficient capability to counter transnational terrorists - Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional stability.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (lSAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.


The document further details….

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

This is just now being realized? Why are we supporting a military led by Tajik officers when Pashtuns make up 42% of the Afghan population and twice that of the Tajiks (~23%)? Yet the document goes on…

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.

Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I believe to be true. However, this is a 'deeds-based' information environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk our credibility.

This is “counterinsurgency 101,” and the document goes on to explain in great detail how a counterinsurgency should be conducted specifically in Afghanistan. Good stuff, but something that was known and should have been implemented as a strategy shortly after we entered the country.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.

The ancient Greek playwright Aeschylus said it best, “In the Libyan fable it is told, that once an eagle, stricken with a dart; when he saw the fashion of the shaft, said, ‘By our own hand and not by others’ are we undone!”

It is not as though strategic and tactical guidance on how to fight this war have not been available. In 2007 Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James Amos (USMC), and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagel, along with the host of other subject matter experts wrote published the latest Army & Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency.

Unfortunately, as I wrote in my review of the FM “…this manual is technically correct and on target, but...it dives into the weeds quickly and goes into excruciating detail. It is a dry read for even the most enthusiastic counterinsurgents in us….”

However, if General McChrystal needs to educate President Obama and others he would do well to send them a copy of the excellent book on counterinsurgency “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” (also by Colonel Nagel).

In the end, modern information in the subject matter of unconventional warfare and insurgency has been available for more than a century. We do not believe that it is a matter of not knowing how to conduct this war. The real problem is that our government and military leaders simply do not have the political and professional fortitude to stand up and demand that it be done correctly.

Those few of us with firsthand experience in this type of war who’ve done what we can to make our case for conducting this war correctly are now simply standing by, our warnings unheeded, thinking “We told you so.”

Being right is absolutely no consolation considering the loss of life and treasure, and the dismal future that all this portends. In fact, most of us probably wish we hadn’t known. Beyond feeling helpless, I find myself feeling sick and disgusted.

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No Good Choices? Some Choices Are Still Better than Others

By Matt Rowe, February 3, 2009


I was dismayed to read the feature story “No Good Choices” by Lynn Vincent in the January 31, 2009 edition of “World Magazine.” The magazine is a source for conservative Christian thought and discussion. The story centered on a US Army Captain operating in Afghanistan who suspected that some of the local Afghans working with his unit might be working for the enemy too. CPT Hill’s battalion commander apparently dismissed these concerns when CPT Hill brought them to his attention. Obviously concerned for the safety of his troops and frustrated by this lack of response, CPT Hill took it upon himself to determine whether the suspected men were in fact operating with the enemy. Satisfied that his suspicions were correct, CPT Hill allegedly had the men detained and interrogated, which included physical abuse and included the firing of weapons in such a way as to convince them that they were being executed—very unchristian ways to behave even in a war.


Although I certainly agree that CPT Hill was placed in a difficult position, I have to take issue with the tone of the article, which appears to condone his actions. As a US Army Special Forces veteran of insurgent conflicts in Central and South America I can absolutely sympathize with CPT Hill feeling powerless at the likelihood of having spies operating close to and even within his organization. What I cannot condone are the actions he allegedly took and which are clearly in violation of Christian ethics, Human Rights, and military regulations.


Although the article does not provide enough information to determine the reasons for his battalion commander’s apparent inaction, at a minimum an investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 is probably warranted. If appropriate, the battalion commander should be held accountable for his part in not responding to the legitimate concerns and needs of a subordinate commander in the field.


Unfortunately, CPT Hill’s actions work exactly counter to the principles of counterinsurgency and fly in the face of our goal of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Contrary to what the media would have us believe, counterinsurgency is not an “impossible mission” nor is it even hard to understand. What makes it difficult to accomplish is the fact that there is no strategy for victory that can be accomplished by the military alone. This is because people do not pick up a weapon and fight their government without good reason. They typically have legitimate grievances like political, religious, or ethnic discrimination, abuse by government police or military forces, or simply the lack of basic security and social services, like healthcare, education, and meaningful employment.


In a nutshell, they lack hope for the future and for the futures of their children.

Of course, this desperate lack of hope can be exploited by political and/or religious opportunists or extremists, but this type of exploitation is more a matter of emotion or careful propaganda than the actual root causes of a conflict. As it has been made clear by the Army and Marine Corp Field Manual on Counterinsurgency—political capacity is the exit strategy for conflicts like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.


CPT Hill’s position was extremely difficult, but his alleged actions and those of some of his troops serve only to exacerbate the actual and perceived issues at the root cause of the conflict. Terrorizing his prisoners drives more supporters into the arms of our enemies and contributes to the continuation of the war. The only way to counter the propaganda and manipulation by our enemy’s leadership is to be distinctly different—to be better than they are—even at increased risk to ourselves.


We must demonstrate that as Christians and free democratic people human rights, the rights of the accused, and the rule of just laws matter. We must help Afghanistan put political institutions and programs in place that recognize this fact and seek to meet the basic human needs of their constituents and provide realistic hope for their futures. Clearly this is something the US military cannot do by itself. Nonetheless, until we change this we will be just one more foreign occupier that offers nothing better to the oppressed people caught in the middle of the conflict, and we will continue to put soldiers like CPT Hill in the position to make some very bad choices.

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"White Passage Red Sun" by Matt Rowe

Managing Director, Matt Rowe, has published his first novel, "White Passage: Red Sun" about his experience as a US Army "green beret" operating in the "drug war" in Latin America.

Straight from the headlines, "White Passage: Red Sun" details the motivation behind US involvement in the drug war and accurately describes the tenuous relationship between the drug Cartels and various terrorist insurgencies. The exciting story explains the powerful influence of global political events on the “drug war” and exposes the inner workings of one of the most misunderstood conflicts of our time.

About the Story:

February 1989. Captain Brian Halloran and his Special Forces team deploy to a remote jungle valley in Peru to establish a base for training elite Peruvian counter-narcotics police. Not only are they threatened by violent narco-traffickers, but they face possible attack by the ruthless Shining Path insurgents operating in the valley. Making matters worse, they quickly realize that powerful political forces may be conspiring to ensure their mission fails.

A brilliant young guerrilla leader, Comrade Olivario, commands the most lethal force the insurgents have ever fielded. He must establish the Shining Path as the preeminent political power in the valley, and to do this he must eliminate every threat—including the Green Berets. The stakes are high, and Olivario's plan will not only decide who controls the valley, but very likely the fate of the woman he loves.

Reviews (More at Amazon):

“Good historical fiction often depicts reality better than traditional history. Matt Rowe reaches this level of literary excellence...A great read.”
- Colonel Hy S. Rothstein, US Army Special Forces (Ret.), Author of “Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare”

"This book brought back memories of what it was like to participate in Counter Drug Operations...Matt Rowe gets the details right about what it was like for Special Forces to operate against the Drug Cartels in this part of the world.”
- Sergeant First Class Robert Marchesello, US Army Special Forces (Ret.)

"Superb story, told with the authority of a Special Forces soldier who has been there...This exceptional book is highly recommended."

- Colonel Kevin M. Higgins, US Army Special Forces (Ret.), Former Commander 7th Special Forces Group.

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Something New? Teaching military allies how to fight for themselves? Not really.

Interestingly....this story by Peter Spiegel describes exactly how we saw the "drug war" and other insurgent conflicts should be managed in Latin America during the 1980's-90's. It is very much in line with what we've been advocating at WinTheGWOT.org.

It may surprise some of you that SOCOM would have to relearn and refocus on this type of "patient warfare." Nonetheless, keep in mind that two decades ago, only US Army Special Forces truly specialized in this type of conflict, and that they made up only a fraction of a percentage of the military. Add to this equation that 80% of these professionals were enlisted ranks and you should see how our senior generals would not have sufficient practical experience to understand the subtleties of this type of war. They have learned on the job, so to speak, and let's hope the government that controls the military learns the lessons as well. It might help them make better decisions about committing our troops to a particular conflict, as well as realize that it is much more of a political game than simply a force on force operation. -Matt Rowe
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LA Times (Oct 13) discusses new approach Green Berets are implementing. Teaching military allies how to fight for themselves

An amazing idea.

Indirect approach is favored in the war on terror

The U.S.' elite armed forces are still carrying out operations, but they're also using a new tactic: teaching military allies how to fight for themselves.
By Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer October 13, 2008

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLA. -- Weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, a small team of Green Berets was quietly sent to the Philippine island of Basilan. There, one of the world's most virulent Islamic extremist groups, Abu Sayyaf, had established a dangerous haven and was seeking to extend its reach into the Philippine capital.

But rather than unleashing Hollywood-style raids, as might befit their reputation, the Green Berets proposed a time-consuming plan to help the Philippine military take on the extremist group itself. Seven years later, Abu Sayyaf has been pushed out of Basilan and terrorist attacks have dropped dramatically.

"It's not flashy, it's not glamorous, but man, this is how we're going to win the long war," said Lt. Gen. David P. Fridovich, the Army officer who designed the Philippine program.

Fridovich is part of a quiet but significant transformation taking place within the most secret of the U.S. military's armed forces, the Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, which encompasses the Green Berets, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Delta Force and similar units from the Air Force and the Marines.

SOCOM Commander Adm. Eric T. Olson, who was appointed to the post in July 2007, is shifting emphasis away from the high-profile raids that were the hallmark of the early years of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.

Instead, Olson has stressed "indirect action": training friendly militaries to better fight terrorism and violent separatists within their own borders.In his first extended interview since becoming SOCOM leader, Olson acknowledged that secretive "direct action" operations remained "urgent and necessary."

But, he added: "They are not by themselves decisive in the long term."Olson is renowned within the tightly knit SOCOM world as leader of a team that in 1993 led trapped Army units out of a fierce firefight in Somalia's capital of Mogadishu, a rescue retold in the book "Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War." Shortly after that, he headed SEAL Team Six, the Navy's super-secret anti-terrorism unit.

An internal debate

Yet Olson has argued that headline-making U.S.-led attacks can be counterproductive, angering locals and undermining domestic leaders."We pride ourselves, for good reason, on our ability to respond to the sound of guns," Olson said in the interview at his headquarters on a sprawling Air Force base on the outskirts of Tampa, Fla.

"We also pride ourselves on our ability to move ahead of the sound of guns. If we can move ahead of the sound of guns, and prevent them, we're all better off."

The debate over whether American strategy should focus on direct or indirect action is a central point of contention within the Bush administration and among counter-terrorism experts at the Pentagon and the CIA, and the tensions are most acute in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Advocates of more frequent unilateral U.S. action there have bumped up against those urging "strategic patience" when dealing with the new government in Islamabad.

Olson declined to discuss his views on Pakistan, as did his subordinates at SOCOM headquarters who cited ongoing discussions among policymakers.

Pentagon officials familiar with internal debates said that Olson has not shied away from direct action in Pakistan when it is backed by solid intelligence. But he also has advocated for improvements in training and support for Pakistani forces so they could themselves better deal with militants, the officials said.

"He's a realist," said one former senior Pentagon official who worked closely with Olson on Pakistan issues. "Some of these guys are not realists. They want to do something just so it appears we're doing something."

Recent success

Supporters of Olson's approach point to progress in the Philippines and elsewhere. The dramatic rescue of 15 hostages by the Colombian military in July was similarly striking because that military has trained for years under U.S. Special Forces teams to combat the leftist rebel group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC.

The success of indirect action depends on strong, long-term ties to foreign militaries. But the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult to cultivate those relationships. Nearly 80% of Special Operations deployments go to the Middle East or central Asia, representing a "vacuum that's sucked away some of our forces from other countries," Olson said.

Olson also must contend with the fallout from pre-Sept. 11 U.S. sanctions against countries plagued by terrorism that barred the U.S. military from working with local armed forces.
"You can go ahead and figure out where those places might be, but there's opportunity we might have missed there," said Fridovich, who declined to name specific countries.
U.S. officials in the past punished Indonesia for military abuses in East Timor and targeted Pakistan for unauthorized nuclear testing.

Olson's views on strategy are especially significant because SOCOM has been given a central role in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. In a series of directives, culminating in the classified "CONPLAN 7500," the military's contingency plans for the global war on terrorism, SOCOM has become the Pentagon's lead agency for synchronizing planning among the military's regional commanders. (Olson has put Fridovich in charge of the synchronization effort.)

Slow progress

The role does not give SOCOM direct command of troops fighting in war zones; however, Olson and Fridovich help shape Pentagon priorities.In August, for instance, Olson was among a small group of American officers who secretly met on a U.S. aircraft carrier with top Pakistani military officials.

Even with their new power, SOCOM leaders acknowledge that others remain skeptical of the slow, persistent approach. But Olson said those opinions were changing, partly because of the success of new approaches in Iraq."I think there's much less institutional resistance now than there might have been a few years ago," Olson said.

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"Reconcilable Differences" with Iran

This is an interesting article addressing US foreign policy toward Iran written by Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Alterman provides some great food for thought regarding how to actually respond to Iran in a more flexible manner without compromising US interests. I have added a related note of a more historical nature at the end of this posting.
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The Arab Gulf States and the United States are adopting increasingly contradictory positions on Iran. Each side seems bent on undermining the other, potentially leading to precisely the outcome that each side is trying to prevent. Here’s how.

There is a strong tendency in the Gulf Arab states to try to co-opt adversaries. The most famous example may be King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud’s propensity for marrying the daughters of rival tribes of the Arabian Peninsula in the early twentieth century, but there are many others. The United Arab Emirates exists as a country in part because the richest emirate, Abu Dhabi, both subsidizes the other emirates and exercises a light hand over federal rule. The Saudi government responded to radicals’ 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in part by pouring money into the religious establishment, not only despite of, but indeed because of seemingly lukewarm support among leading clerics for the Saudi royal family. Just last spring, when Qatar brokered a Lebanese peace deal, rumors flew that the Qataris had paid off the adversaries. A well-placed Lebanese source told me that wasn’t true at all; instead, the Qataris had created a $5 billion investment fund and offered to let Lebanese leaders become partners—provided that the leaders resolved their differences under Qatari tutelage.

Money is not the Gulf states’ only tool, but it is a powerful one. Vital to its effectiveness is the idea that wealth be used not for a one-time payoff but as the beginning of an annuity. A one-time payment is merely a bribe, but creating a longer-term partnership is an investment in future good behavior—not just for years, but for decades.

This is not to say, of course, that the Gulf Arab states are above coercion. In particular, they have a history of cracking down on their own internal dissent, and they not so privately subsidized Saddam Hussein’s bloody war against Iran for the better part of a decade. But these states keenly appreciate the limits of their power, and the power of their wealth, in shaping the actions of others. Lacking the capacity to coerce Iran, they seek to co-opt it.

The United States often approaches matters differently. With a much broader array of concerns and a broader array of countries with which it is concerned, the U.S. predilection is often to fix problems rather than manage them indefinitely. The United States rarely goes out of its way to make mutual investment attractive; to many Americans, the desirability of economic partnerships with such a large and wealthy country as the United States is self-evident and need not be explained. The incentives are there for all comers, who are invited to compete on a level playing field.

More simply put, for many Americans the idea that every country in the world would want a close relationship with the United States is obvious.

Seen this way, the most powerful tool in the U.S. arsenal is not greater engagement, but the threat of less. The United States put restraints on trade with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War; now Cuba, North Korea, Iran and others remain under sanctions as punishment for their policies. It is with Iran, in particular, that the Gulf strategy and the U.S. strategy come into conflict. Iran has been the Gulf states’ neighbor for hundreds of years, and will be for hundreds more; they see little point in antagonizing such a powerful country so nearby. Rather than isolate Iran, they seek to deepen their ties with Iran so as to protect their interests and increase their leverage. In so doing, they attempt to make Iranian aggression unthinkable, much as the post-war order in Western Europe brought peace to the long bloody continent.

The United States seeks to isolate Iran, holding out the promise of closer ties as an incentive and the threat of warfare as a deterrent. U.S. policy tends to take Iranian unpredictability as a constant; Gulf policy tends to take it as a variable. While each side sees an underlying Iranian hostility and aggression, Iran’s neighbors are more optimistic about the possibility of redemption.

Each approach has its weaknesses. The drawback in the Gulf’s strategy is that, by itself, it creates few reasons for the Iranians to change their overt behavior. The drawback of the U.S. strategy is that as U.S.-Iranian bilateral ties weaken, so too do the incentives for Iran to reverse its behavior.

What is ironic about this growing divergence is that the Gulf states and the United States differ not in their goals, but rather in their means to achieve them. Equally ironic, those differences in means may provoke a crisis, as the United States considers coercing allied governments to adopt the U.S.-led isolation strategy through threats of its own, and those governments seek relief from U.S. pressure by undermining the U.S.-led isolation.

In point of fact, not only is there wisdom in both approaches, but they are far more effective if applied in coordination than if pursued in competition. Iran has not recklessly acted against its own interests, and greater engagement in the Gulf would indeed introduce more stability to the region. At the same time, Iran is in difficult financial straits despite high oil prices, and skillfully conditioning fiscal relief on a less impetuous foreign policy would calm regional fears significantly. The key to making these policies work in tandem is that the United States has to ensure that the offer to engage is credible, and Gulf states need to see their goal as influencing decision- making in Iran rather than merely paying protection money. Not only are the stakes too high for the United States to get this wrong; they are too high for U.S. allies in the Gulf as well.

—Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2008

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With respect to Reconcilable Differences, I find it interesting that a different American attitude is what led to the creation of the first US Navy, and that this attitude has significantly colored the US perspective of foreign relations ever since. The 18th Century Barbary pirates would have been happy to receive some form of tribute from the US just as the European powers had been paying to insure their own shipping from raids. Clearly, the US leaders at the time were not motivated by the thought of everyone wishing to have a relationship with the greatest world power—that would have been the British or French (who often paid tribute). Rather, the upstart Americans were outraged because they understood from experience that any tribute would never be enough.

Rightly or wrongly, the revolutionary Americans predominantly believed that no one should be allowed to push around a free people who had offered them no offense. Tributes were the norm, and have been in many societies for centuries, but flush with independence (internal foreign policy debate notwithstanding) this was simply too much for the new nation to bear. An absolutely terrific book on this subject is "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America and the Middle East 1776 to the Present" by Michael B. Oren.

Given the history of the US and the world since then, Dr. Alterman is right on the mark with regard to our current approach to foreign policy. Self righteousness has been both our greatest strength and our greatest weakness ever since. Unfortunately, we still have not learned when to apply it properly.

-Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director
WinTheGWOT.org

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Winning The GWOT in a Paragraph

People often ask us, "What exactly would you change about the current war on terror?"

Nonetheless, they rarely have the attention span or interest level to listen and discuss the issue in detail, so here is a concise, though admittedly simplified answer for them.

"The essential problems facing the world today are highly unlikely to be resolved by conventional military operations…especially when conventional military leaders imagine themselves to be operating in an unconventional manner. International and local political capacity, robust counterinsurgency operations led by local law enforcement agencies and supported by relatively limited military action is the answer.

Free the oppressed, respond to the needs of those who support the bad guys for lack of a better choice, and destroy those who do not accept rational political discourse as an alternative to violence against society."

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