How We Should Be Winning in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Terry Daly
Writing in the October 5, 2006 USA TODAY from Doab, Afghanistan, Paul Wiseman describes a textbook example of insurgents in northern and western Afghanistan taking control of the people through violence and coercion. Although the insurgents are not Communists, their tactics are right out of Vietnam in 1963 when the Viet Cong were expanding their control of the countryside by intimidating or killing local officials, and authorities.
In Afghanistan, most media attention today is on spectacular suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents, and large US and NATO “offensives” to kill insurgents. Wiseman describes the real danger: our failure to identify the people as the true objective and to make their protection our overriding goal. The people’s situation, therefore, is summed up in this anecdote (which also made the rounds in Vietnam!):
A US officer arrives in a remote village and asks, “When were the insurgents last here?”
“A week ago,” responds a villager.
“When will they be back?” the officer inquires.
“As soon as you leave.”
Regardless of the desires of the people, when the insurgents threaten them, and they know no one will protect them, least of all the government or the corrupt and out-gunned police, they are left with little real choice. In the single best book on the subject ever written, David Galula in his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice writes:
"The population's attitude … is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand."
It doesn’t make any difference how many soccer balls you try to hand out if the would-be recipients know they will have their throats cut that night if they accept them.
Download the text only version (.pdf) of the USA Today article here or go directly to it at the USA Today web site.
LTC Terence J. Daly USAR (Ret.) is a counterinsurgency, national security, and foreign policy specialist with over 30 years experience in many of the world’s critical political arenas, including time spent as a province level advisor to counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam.
Writing in the October 5, 2006 USA TODAY from Doab, Afghanistan, Paul Wiseman describes a textbook example of insurgents in northern and western Afghanistan taking control of the people through violence and coercion. Although the insurgents are not Communists, their tactics are right out of Vietnam in 1963 when the Viet Cong were expanding their control of the countryside by intimidating or killing local officials, and authorities.
In Afghanistan, most media attention today is on spectacular suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents, and large US and NATO “offensives” to kill insurgents. Wiseman describes the real danger: our failure to identify the people as the true objective and to make their protection our overriding goal. The people’s situation, therefore, is summed up in this anecdote (which also made the rounds in Vietnam!):
A US officer arrives in a remote village and asks, “When were the insurgents last here?”
“A week ago,” responds a villager.
“When will they be back?” the officer inquires.
“As soon as you leave.”
Regardless of the desires of the people, when the insurgents threaten them, and they know no one will protect them, least of all the government or the corrupt and out-gunned police, they are left with little real choice. In the single best book on the subject ever written, David Galula in his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice writes:
"The population's attitude … is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand."
It doesn’t make any difference how many soccer balls you try to hand out if the would-be recipients know they will have their throats cut that night if they accept them.
Download the text only version (.pdf) of the USA Today article here or go directly to it at the USA Today web site.
LTC Terence J. Daly USAR (Ret.) is a counterinsurgency, national security, and foreign policy specialist with over 30 years experience in many of the world’s critical political arenas, including time spent as a province level advisor to counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam.
1 Comments:
I experienced a similar situation in various Latin American countries, but one that sticks out as most interesting was one in which a modus vivendi had been struck between the FARC guerrillas and an extremely isolated outpost of Colombian counter-narcotics police I was advising.
The police were there to deny the guerrillas and narco-traffickers access to a remote jungle airstrip originally built by American companies to transport rubber. The strip then became a marijuana transport point after natural rubber was no longer farmed, and finally a stopover for cocaine smugglers.
During the day, the police handled all law enforcement duties and did their usual thing, but at night it was simply too dangerous for them to venture outside of their firebase, which also housed the only bank and the local church.
Per agreement between the town’s mayor and the local guerrilla chief, the FARC provided the law enforcement duties in town at night. The police would often find the town’s jail cell containing a drunk, a common thief, or a wife beater when they arrived the next morning.
We referred to this town as “Fort Apache,” and sadly, a number of the officers and men I knew there were killed by guerillas or other criminal elements. The army had recently redeployed a platoon of jungle infantry from the area due to heavy casualties.
In the end, the people supported the police by day and the guerrillas by night.
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home