Rumsfeld’s Guillotine: The Myth Behind the Timeline Debate

There has been much debate over the proper strategy for the war on terror, and more specifically what the US should do in Iraq. What may be surprising is the fact that figuring out a counterinsurgency strategy is not as hard to do as one might think, once you accept the principle that violence committed by conventional armies cannot defeat an insurgency. In fact, conventional tactics will simply prolong the war and the longer it goes on the more likely the insurgents are to win. Many people who study this subject have been warning of this outcome for years and I doubt that after all the events in Iraq to date there are many Americans who disagree. Yet, even under the most ideal of circumstances, counterinsurgency strategies take a decade (or few) to achieve genuine victory, but that does not imply that 140,000 U.S. troops need to be there for the duration.

Contrary to Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent statement, "You're looking for some sort of a guillotine to come falling down if some date isn't met,” it may also be surprising to know that a counterinsurgency strategy does not necessarily have to be secret. Nor does publishing a timeline and milestones for execution pose any real risk. In fact, a properly defined timeline actually enhances the likelihood of success by establish a healthy sense of urgency by all participants to meet their specific objectives.

The most surprising thing is that with all the subject matter experts, military leaders, and “retired military” analysts pontificating via the media, there is still very little in the way of an understandable timeline that has been widely presented to the American people. President Bush has stated that he does not believe that a timeline will help, so his generals have not produced or publicized one. Had President Bush asked for a timeline I can assure you that our generals would have promptly presented him with one.

When we speak of a timeline, we are actually discussing the amount of time it should take to accomplish a given set of specific tasks and in some logical order. A timeline does not imply picking an arbitrary date by which something should be completed, as the Bush Administration often accuses those who propose the idea. A timeline is a “good faith estimate” made by professionals and subject matter experts as to how long it will take to achieve a specific set of end conditions.

This begs the question, “What are the desired end conditions?” The best planning and timelines in the world will not work without clear objectives. For example, let’s assume that the minimum objective for Iraq at this point is a way to get US troops out of the country while leaving behind a government that is supported by its own security forces. Let’s also assume that these Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) should be able to prevent an all out civil war and partition of the country into separate nations.

In order to do this, the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to figure out what the minimum number, types, and quality of Iraqi forces must be for the U.S. to be able to leave. This sounds fairly straightforward, but subtler issues complicate this significantly, i.e., managing the diversity and inculcating ethnic and religious tolerance into those security forces. Ensuring that the security forces are loyal to the government and operate in a spirit of genuine service is required as well. It implies complementary strategies of offering honorable amnesty opportunities to some insurgents willing to lay down their arms, while engaging other militias to help turn the situation back into an operation in which they can take pride and help achieve Iraqi success. It also implies that there is significant political and reconstruction support for the fledgling democratic government, and includes help and support from neighboring countries. These issues plainly demonstrate that the task involves much more than the military simply determining the organizational make-up of the ISF, hence the earlier statement that this takes some decades to accomplish.

Nonetheless, a realistic timeline can be produced. Simply publicizing the timeline does not give the enemy any real advantage if one assumes that similarly trained and equipped Iraqi units replace the U.S. troops. No weakening of the overall security forces takes place that the insurgents can exploit.

Most significantly, a published timeline and high-level plan allow the U.S. and Iraqi Administrations and their generals to monitor, adjust, and report on progress. Surely, every project manager understands that no project goes exactly as planned, so realistic adjustments are made periodically and explained to stakeholders. If those adjustments make sense and the plan is generally progressing, then the people responsible or affected allow its continuation. If not, then change that is more significant is called for.

Interestingly, had the Bush Administration published its plan and timeline and demonstrated to the American people that they were actually making progress the imminent mid-term elections might not be in such doubt. More importantly, assuming we are making progress, the support of the American people and the rest of the world would be greater. Most importantly, the tolerance of the Iraqi people would currently be stronger instead of eroding as dramatically as it has.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld recently stated that while benchmarks for security, political and economic progress are valuable, "…it's difficult. We're looking out into the future. No one can predict the future with absolute certainty."

Statements like these may be true at a superficial level, but the management philosophy driving them appears to be superficial as well, and this is exactly why we are losing the support of the world. It is also exactly what our enemies have counted on from the very beginning.