Afghan Trust Requires Better Security Commitment: Not Just Bricks and Bulldozers

NATO forces have deployed bulldozers, construction materials, and cash to hire local men to repair war damage in Panjwai, Afghanistan. A renovated high school recently reopened and a new road is under construction to connect a number of bomb-damaged grape-growing villages—this according to Pamela Constable’s article in the November 27, 2006 Washington Post, “A NATO Bid to Regain Afghans' Trust: Reconstruction Projects Follow Airstrikes .”

Ms. Constable reports that NATO forces have committed $8 million to improve the southern Afghan farming town of Panjwai and the district of Zhari after NATO combat actions against the Taliban had inflicted severe damage and civilian loss of life. Their goal is to create “…a Taliban-proof development zone and a model for other post-conflict areas.”

Good intentions aside, the likelihood of success is slim at best.

Although the “hearts and minds” concept is honorable, and the reconstruction should take place on principle alone, NATO’s action will do nothing to substantially heal the wounds suffered by the local civilians or stem future attacks from the Taliban. Simply rebuilding the homes you have just destroyed is not counter-insurgency and does nothing for the innocent lives you took—especially since the only security that NATO will provide going forward is from a base that Canadian troops have established above the town and from which they will patrol in armored convoys.

Successful counterinsurgency requires active daily involvement with a local population that actually has faith in the counterinsurgent force—a force that must know the community, its history, culture, and its most intimate needs. This is something that no foreign military force can do. It is really a role for the local police who have a stake in their community and who have a network of friends and family for information purposes, and the intimate knowledge of the region to know when something is amiss. Having the Canadians ready to support them should the Taliban attack in force or their hideout be discovered would be ideal.

Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that local elders and district officials are selecting new police recruits and the local police commander is vetting them for suitability, they will receive only two weeks of police training, which the commander admits is far from adequate for a policeman. It is even less adequate for a local counterinsurgent force—assuming the Canadians are even trained in counterinsurgency and plan on working with the police in this way.

As for local opinions on the situation, Abdul Jan Mohammed, a grape farmer states, "The coalition forces have brought us nothing but problems. They enter our houses and mosques without permission. The Taliban don't want to fight. They are just tired of all the corruption, as we are." His vineyards were destroyed during past air strikes.

Nonetheless, the air strikes of the past, and threatened future bombing does not stop Taliban attacks. Two insurgents on a motorcycle ambushed a man taking his daughter for medical care in Kandahar. The man pointed out that "The local Taliban are sons of our soil, but the Taliban trained by al-Qaeda see all Afghans as infidels and Americans. They do not want any reconciliation." Taliban forces attacked a clinic at a refugee camp and briefly kidnapped the only doctor. The clinic sits abandoned now. No trained police are there to keep it secure and operating.

Until NATO begins managing the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the local manner that counterinsurgency requires, they will not achieve lasting security for the locals. The new roads, the high school, and the other construction projects will likely end up as expensive targets for both sides.