All Insurgencies Are Local
Thomas E. Ricks’ article in the November 21, 2006, Washington Post, "Flaws Cited in Effort To Train Iraqi Forces: U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program," refers to multiple sources that state the "U.S. military's effort to train Iraqi forces has been rife with problems…" He points out that officers are poorly prepared and lack everything from interpreters to office materials. It is interesting to note that meanwhile, some military pundits are urging the US government to send more cannons, helicopters, and other conventional military hardware to fight insurgents who have none of these things.
Ricks’ article, based upon reports from numerous officers and collected for the Army’s oral history archives highlights the fact that the Pentagon is rethinking its policies in Iraq and will likely change from a direct combat focus and to a more indirect role of training and advising Iraqi troops. It is absolutely a shame that we have squandered this opportunity and that we will have to work so hard and risk so much to regain progress we might have already had in Iraq.
Counterinsurgency subject matter experts have been advocating vociferously about the "shortcomings" of the overall strategy in Iraq and specifically about the lack of adequate training for Iraqi police and military forces since shortly after the insurgency became apparent. Many predicted the need for such training well before the invasion. How could our generals and administration officials, who were adults at the time of the Vietnam War, not understand that the battle for Iraq must be fought by Iraqis—and not foreign troops? After all, the greatest lesson learned in Vietnam is that a foreign military force cannot defeat a popular insurgency struggling against a government in which it has no faith. This is what led directly to the US limit of 55-Military Advisers at a time during El Salvador’s Marxist insurgency in the 1980’s.
Insurgent warfare is political; and all politics is local, therefore all insurgencies are local.
Establishing a professional and properly paid Iraqi army that is diverse and focused on public service is the key to national security, but the key to internal security is establishing a professional, well equipped, and diverse Iraqi national police force that is well paid, believes in Human Rights, and the rights of the accused. These two forces are the foundation for setting up an environment in which the Iraqi people can have enough faith in their safety and security and their government to begin living and working and bringing Iraq back into the world community as a prosperous state. These forces have a stake in their communities and their nation, and once they are empowered to properly protect them, the US can pull out of Iraq with the realistic expectation that it will not spiral into an even more disastrous civil war.
Ricks’ article, based upon reports from numerous officers and collected for the Army’s oral history archives highlights the fact that the Pentagon is rethinking its policies in Iraq and will likely change from a direct combat focus and to a more indirect role of training and advising Iraqi troops. It is absolutely a shame that we have squandered this opportunity and that we will have to work so hard and risk so much to regain progress we might have already had in Iraq.
Counterinsurgency subject matter experts have been advocating vociferously about the "shortcomings" of the overall strategy in Iraq and specifically about the lack of adequate training for Iraqi police and military forces since shortly after the insurgency became apparent. Many predicted the need for such training well before the invasion. How could our generals and administration officials, who were adults at the time of the Vietnam War, not understand that the battle for Iraq must be fought by Iraqis—and not foreign troops? After all, the greatest lesson learned in Vietnam is that a foreign military force cannot defeat a popular insurgency struggling against a government in which it has no faith. This is what led directly to the US limit of 55-Military Advisers at a time during El Salvador’s Marxist insurgency in the 1980’s.
Insurgent warfare is political; and all politics is local, therefore all insurgencies are local.
Establishing a professional and properly paid Iraqi army that is diverse and focused on public service is the key to national security, but the key to internal security is establishing a professional, well equipped, and diverse Iraqi national police force that is well paid, believes in Human Rights, and the rights of the accused. These two forces are the foundation for setting up an environment in which the Iraqi people can have enough faith in their safety and security and their government to begin living and working and bringing Iraq back into the world community as a prosperous state. These forces have a stake in their communities and their nation, and once they are empowered to properly protect them, the US can pull out of Iraq with the realistic expectation that it will not spiral into an even more disastrous civil war.
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