Iraq Study Group Report: Easy Way Out for the US
Besides the fact that the long awaited report from the Iraq Study Group (ISG) headed up by James Baker and Lee Hamilton has produced absolutely nothing new or enlightening about our strategy in Iraq, there are a number of ways in which it is just plain wrong. It advocates 79 specific recommendations, provides a partial list of milestones (some rather poorly defined) and offers a “draft” timeline for execution that obviously does not take into account any of the implied deliverables or subtasks that must be completed in order to meet the milestones.
It appears that the ISG’s goal is to support the Bush Administration’s well intentioned objectives in Iraq, but with the caveat that the US should not indefinitely support the effort to establish them—a conclusion that most Americans have already come to. The group also advocates that the primary driver of these changes should be the Iraqi government and their people who must rely much less directly upon US forces. Finally, the group advocates broadening the political and diplomatic efforts to include all of Iraq’s neighbors, which is a sound idea since they all have a significant stake in the outcome.
Although these goals and many of the recommendations in the report sound good—especially during a 30-second news brief or sound bite, the detailed document is not backed up by a realistic set of timelines, tactics, or a plausible strategy.
For example, anyone can create a list of 79 general recommendations, but without a detailed strategy and project plan to execute it how can a realistic timeline be set? How will we judge the quality of the work and report on progress? Most importantly, what are the professional estimates from experienced political and military counterinsurgents for how long it will take to achieve the deliverables and the implied tasks required to meet the milestones?
The report does not offer a new strategy for accomplishment of the goals we have set out for ourselves and the Iraqis. We still plan on creating a military—that is, an Iraqi army in the image of our own. Why? If our own professional military is so poorly able to manage an insurgency why would Iraq’s US trained army be able to do it any better—especially given the level of sectarian strife in the streets, the parliament, and the military?
The report discusses the lack of ability in the Iraqi military to operate at higher levels of organization like the Division level. This is important, but counterinsurgency is a small unit war relying upon local leaders of relatively junior rank to make important tactical decisions that have strategic political impact.
Worse yet, the ISG has simply ignored the fact that contrary to popular conventions the army is not necessarily the force of choice for countering an insurgency. There is no discussion on the possibility of reconstituting the Iraqi police or creating local home guard units for the role of counterinsurgents.
Insurgency is political. All politics is local. Therefore all insurgency is local.
Police or home guard units who have a stake in their local community (family, friends, home, etc.) make the best counterinsurgents. They should be backed up by the conventional military, but the conventional military’s primary role is national, not local defense.
The report reiterates that the Iraqi National Police—as an institution—is very broken, but rather than advocating that we recreate it from scratch and develop a premier counterinsurgent force in the region, it recommends placing two of the three major police divisions under the control of Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
The need to separate governmental powers is obvious for any free country, but it is especially so in one as torn by ethnic and religious rivalries as Iraq. Not to mention Iraq’s terrible history under Saddam Hussein who controlled all of these agencies himself.
It is also interesting that the ISG advocates that the new Iraqi government must make more concrete steps toward unification in order to continue receiving US support. Certainly the Iraqis have a responsibility to make things right in their own country, but their actions are significantly affected by the environment in which they currently find themselves. This environment is in large part the result of the US mishandling of the entire affair to date and the result will be an even larger number of people in a critical region of the world who will hold the negative consequences of our actions against us.
Inexplicably, the ISG expects that within a year or so, the fledgling and hardly united Iraqi government must fix every possible aspect of their broken socio-political system—from safety and security to utilities, healthcare, education, corruption, infrastructure, banking, and of course the production of oil and the transparent accounting for and distribution of its revenues—this in a country with no history of, or inherent faith in democracy, and with a Prime Minister who has been in office for less than a year.
Contrast these lofty goals to the time it has taken the US to get the Department of Homeland Security up and running efficiently. If it were that easy, everyone in the US would have affordable healthcare.
The report notes that Moqtada al Sadr controls the ministries of Transportation, Health, and Agriculture and is a supporter of Prime Minister al-Maliki. However, al-Sadr who even has his own army refuses to work with US forces to help stabilize his country. The report implies that Prime Minister al-Maliki feels his hands are tied in that he needs al-Sadr’s support to get anything done in parliament. He cannot press al-Sadr to make the necessary moves to help stabilize the country for fear of losing that support.
Since the report also points out that 2,900 precious US lives have been lost to date it is clearly time for the Bush Administration to apply some tough diplomacy with respect to Minister al-Sadr and others of his sort. In a shooting war they are either with us or against us. It’s that simple.
Another point made in the report is that Iraq requires much more international investment support for public works projects to decrease unemployment and stimulate the economy. However, the specific recommendation is to simply “encourage” international investment in Iraq. Nothing encourages investment like safety, security, and political stability. Given that the black market is thriving in Iraq today, there are plenty of capitalists inside and outside of Iraq waiting to take advantage of the economic opportunities that a large country with vast natural resources has to offer—once it is safe to do so, of course.
Members of the ISG have been on television expressing how pleased they are that a truly bi-partisan commission was able to come up with a set of recommendations that they could all support. There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the need to politically unify the US and that this unity is critical to success in Iraq. Nothing could be further from the truth.
What we need is a true counterinsurgency strategy with an executable and relevant set of deliverables. From these a realistic timeline can be developed, followed, reported on, and modified as required to get the job done. If the plan makes sense Americans from all parties will support it. Contrary to popular belief, the counterinsurgency strategy does not have to be secret.
Sadly, the ISG has simply given the Bush Administration and its successor the rationalization for a face saving way out of our folly in Iraq. All we have to do is follow the ISG’s recommendations to the letter. When the Iraqis do not make “sufficient progress” we can pull out our troops. When the situation deteriorates even further—perhaps into the regional war that the ISG warns about in its report—the President at the time will be able to point out that he or she followed the bi-partisan recommendations and absolve us all of responsibility. Or maybe we can just blame the Bush Administration and the Iraqis. Either way we will lose in the long run.
Let’s hope that President Bush, Secretary Gates, and their successors see through all of this and develop a real strategy for long term success.
It appears that the ISG’s goal is to support the Bush Administration’s well intentioned objectives in Iraq, but with the caveat that the US should not indefinitely support the effort to establish them—a conclusion that most Americans have already come to. The group also advocates that the primary driver of these changes should be the Iraqi government and their people who must rely much less directly upon US forces. Finally, the group advocates broadening the political and diplomatic efforts to include all of Iraq’s neighbors, which is a sound idea since they all have a significant stake in the outcome.
Although these goals and many of the recommendations in the report sound good—especially during a 30-second news brief or sound bite, the detailed document is not backed up by a realistic set of timelines, tactics, or a plausible strategy.
For example, anyone can create a list of 79 general recommendations, but without a detailed strategy and project plan to execute it how can a realistic timeline be set? How will we judge the quality of the work and report on progress? Most importantly, what are the professional estimates from experienced political and military counterinsurgents for how long it will take to achieve the deliverables and the implied tasks required to meet the milestones?
The report does not offer a new strategy for accomplishment of the goals we have set out for ourselves and the Iraqis. We still plan on creating a military—that is, an Iraqi army in the image of our own. Why? If our own professional military is so poorly able to manage an insurgency why would Iraq’s US trained army be able to do it any better—especially given the level of sectarian strife in the streets, the parliament, and the military?
The report discusses the lack of ability in the Iraqi military to operate at higher levels of organization like the Division level. This is important, but counterinsurgency is a small unit war relying upon local leaders of relatively junior rank to make important tactical decisions that have strategic political impact.
Worse yet, the ISG has simply ignored the fact that contrary to popular conventions the army is not necessarily the force of choice for countering an insurgency. There is no discussion on the possibility of reconstituting the Iraqi police or creating local home guard units for the role of counterinsurgents.
Insurgency is political. All politics is local. Therefore all insurgency is local.
Police or home guard units who have a stake in their local community (family, friends, home, etc.) make the best counterinsurgents. They should be backed up by the conventional military, but the conventional military’s primary role is national, not local defense.
The report reiterates that the Iraqi National Police—as an institution—is very broken, but rather than advocating that we recreate it from scratch and develop a premier counterinsurgent force in the region, it recommends placing two of the three major police divisions under the control of Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
The need to separate governmental powers is obvious for any free country, but it is especially so in one as torn by ethnic and religious rivalries as Iraq. Not to mention Iraq’s terrible history under Saddam Hussein who controlled all of these agencies himself.
It is also interesting that the ISG advocates that the new Iraqi government must make more concrete steps toward unification in order to continue receiving US support. Certainly the Iraqis have a responsibility to make things right in their own country, but their actions are significantly affected by the environment in which they currently find themselves. This environment is in large part the result of the US mishandling of the entire affair to date and the result will be an even larger number of people in a critical region of the world who will hold the negative consequences of our actions against us.
Inexplicably, the ISG expects that within a year or so, the fledgling and hardly united Iraqi government must fix every possible aspect of their broken socio-political system—from safety and security to utilities, healthcare, education, corruption, infrastructure, banking, and of course the production of oil and the transparent accounting for and distribution of its revenues—this in a country with no history of, or inherent faith in democracy, and with a Prime Minister who has been in office for less than a year.
Contrast these lofty goals to the time it has taken the US to get the Department of Homeland Security up and running efficiently. If it were that easy, everyone in the US would have affordable healthcare.
The report notes that Moqtada al Sadr controls the ministries of Transportation, Health, and Agriculture and is a supporter of Prime Minister al-Maliki. However, al-Sadr who even has his own army refuses to work with US forces to help stabilize his country. The report implies that Prime Minister al-Maliki feels his hands are tied in that he needs al-Sadr’s support to get anything done in parliament. He cannot press al-Sadr to make the necessary moves to help stabilize the country for fear of losing that support.
Since the report also points out that 2,900 precious US lives have been lost to date it is clearly time for the Bush Administration to apply some tough diplomacy with respect to Minister al-Sadr and others of his sort. In a shooting war they are either with us or against us. It’s that simple.
Another point made in the report is that Iraq requires much more international investment support for public works projects to decrease unemployment and stimulate the economy. However, the specific recommendation is to simply “encourage” international investment in Iraq. Nothing encourages investment like safety, security, and political stability. Given that the black market is thriving in Iraq today, there are plenty of capitalists inside and outside of Iraq waiting to take advantage of the economic opportunities that a large country with vast natural resources has to offer—once it is safe to do so, of course.
Members of the ISG have been on television expressing how pleased they are that a truly bi-partisan commission was able to come up with a set of recommendations that they could all support. There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the need to politically unify the US and that this unity is critical to success in Iraq. Nothing could be further from the truth.
What we need is a true counterinsurgency strategy with an executable and relevant set of deliverables. From these a realistic timeline can be developed, followed, reported on, and modified as required to get the job done. If the plan makes sense Americans from all parties will support it. Contrary to popular belief, the counterinsurgency strategy does not have to be secret.
Sadly, the ISG has simply given the Bush Administration and its successor the rationalization for a face saving way out of our folly in Iraq. All we have to do is follow the ISG’s recommendations to the letter. When the Iraqis do not make “sufficient progress” we can pull out our troops. When the situation deteriorates even further—perhaps into the regional war that the ISG warns about in its report—the President at the time will be able to point out that he or she followed the bi-partisan recommendations and absolve us all of responsibility. Or maybe we can just blame the Bush Administration and the Iraqis. Either way we will lose in the long run.
Let’s hope that President Bush, Secretary Gates, and their successors see through all of this and develop a real strategy for long term success.
1 Comments:
The Iraq Study Group [ISG] report fails to address genuine alternatives for what is required to avert a defeat for the new Iraqi government, and it does not adequately report on the long term implications of such a defeat.
The Iraq Study Group, by its own admission, seeks a "political" compromise designed to "resolve" the bitter discord in the US over the Iraq war in the next 15 months.
The report, like the Administration and most US political leaders, fails to consider an overhaul of military practices in Iraq based on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). We have fought on the ground in Iraq like our fathers and grand fathers fought on the ground in Europe in WWII. We have failed to adjust for a totally different environment. We have failed to apply proven COIN techniques.
Lastly, the ISG report fails to lay out the costs of defeat for the American people and the implications for the ongoing Global War on Terror.
-Knut A. Rostad & Matt Rowe
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