Marine Unit Implementing Clever Counterinsurgency Tactics Still Too Thin for Success
By Terry Daly, Staff Contributor
The Detroit Free Press article by Joel Swickard in the December 10, 2006, “In Iraq, their weapon is data” describes the futility of even a clever, sophisticated unit trying to do counterinsurgency when it is too thin on the ground to have complete military dominance.
The 1/24 Marine Battalion is doing some very smart stuff: using homegrown talent to set up a data analysis shop; taking a census, which is a basic population control technique and should be one of the first things a counterinsurgency program does; and generally taking advantage of the flexibility and willingness to use their imaginations and be creative that citizen-warriors bring to the fight.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is about controlling the population, though, not fighting in the midst of it. The Marines of 1/24 are fighting for their lives, not to win the support of the populace. This is not COIN, it is fighting a guerrilla war and that's a war we will never win.
What we have here is a command failure, at division or higher, to use the military principle of Economy of Force to Mass enough troops in the contested area so that it is no longer contested. COIN's first step is to move in with overwhelming military force to kill, capture, or expel the insurgents—only then can control of the population can be gained and kept.
That is why classic COIN doctrine calls for dividing the country into easy (white areas) which we do first, difficult (Gray) areas which we move into next, and the most contested (Black) areas, which we leave until last. Otherwise you see what we are seeing in Iraq now.
Our soldiers and Marines never mass in overwhelming force, so they keep playing whack-a-mole with the guerrillas over the same terrain as the guerrillas are continually able to bring new fighters in from outside areas or grow them locally. Sadly, our generals still don't understand COIN so we keep wasting time, money and American lives using tactics that will never win.
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LTC Terence J. Daly USAR (Ret.) is a counterinsurgency, national security, and foreign policy specialist with over 30 years experience in many of the world’s critical political arenas, including serving as a province level advisor to counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam.
The Detroit Free Press article by Joel Swickard in the December 10, 2006, “In Iraq, their weapon is data” describes the futility of even a clever, sophisticated unit trying to do counterinsurgency when it is too thin on the ground to have complete military dominance.The 1/24 Marine Battalion is doing some very smart stuff: using homegrown talent to set up a data analysis shop; taking a census, which is a basic population control technique and should be one of the first things a counterinsurgency program does; and generally taking advantage of the flexibility and willingness to use their imaginations and be creative that citizen-warriors bring to the fight.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is about controlling the population, though, not fighting in the midst of it. The Marines of 1/24 are fighting for their lives, not to win the support of the populace. This is not COIN, it is fighting a guerrilla war and that's a war we will never win.
What we have here is a command failure, at division or higher, to use the military principle of Economy of Force to Mass enough troops in the contested area so that it is no longer contested. COIN's first step is to move in with overwhelming military force to kill, capture, or expel the insurgents—only then can control of the population can be gained and kept.
That is why classic COIN doctrine calls for dividing the country into easy (white areas) which we do first, difficult (Gray) areas which we move into next, and the most contested (Black) areas, which we leave until last. Otherwise you see what we are seeing in Iraq now.
Our soldiers and Marines never mass in overwhelming force, so they keep playing whack-a-mole with the guerrillas over the same terrain as the guerrillas are continually able to bring new fighters in from outside areas or grow them locally. Sadly, our generals still don't understand COIN so we keep wasting time, money and American lives using tactics that will never win.
************************************************
LTC Terence J. Daly USAR (Ret.) is a counterinsurgency, national security, and foreign policy specialist with over 30 years experience in many of the world’s critical political arenas, including serving as a province level advisor to counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam.
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