New US Strategy to "Safeguard and Secure" Iraq?
As retired Army General Jack Keane has prominently stated, the post invasion strategies for the war in Iraq have failed. The first strategy, that of capturing or killing Al-Qaeda and anti-government insurgents did not work, and the subsequent strategy of transitioning the fight over to the woefully unprepared Iraqis has failed even worse. During this transition, the level of Iraqi civil violence has increased exponentially.
The Iraq Study Group failed to offer any real world alternatives and the three main strategies as they are discussed in the media today are too superficial to succeed. Rapid US withdrawal, the increased embedding of US trainers, or hoping that Iraq’s neighbors can settle the issue, are all doomed to short sighted failure.
Now some pundits in the media are calling for a shift in our strategy to one of "safeguarding and securing" the Iraqis. They believe that we can buy the Iraqis enough time to establish their own political response to the insurgency. Having said all this, we must not go too far into this "political" direction and forget that it is still a war, with very real enemies that require a military—or more appropriately—a paramilitary component.
The next strategy in Iraq must certainly provide for safety and security, but at the same time it must include efforts to establish justice and equality. This means that Iraq must have a reliable and police force and supporting judicial system. Police forces also happen to be one of the best sources for potential counterinsurgent forces. Nobody can manage an insurgency better than local cops that have a stake in their communities. Foreign military forces and even Iraqis from other parts of the country simply do not have the family and friendship ties necessary to really understand what is going on in the local area.
Herein lays the dilemma. The Iraqi National Police as an institution is broken. The police are believed to be heavily infiltrated by sectarian extremists who use their access to police information and resources as a means to actively and violently promote their causes. At the very least, they can look the other way as independent militias for which they have sympathies do the dirty work for them.
A viable alternative to the police is to rely upon local "home guard units" to provide security and operate as counterinsurgents, but the recent history of militias in Iraq is as bad as or worse than that of the police.
We face a choice. It is not an easy one, but it must be made. We can either rebuild the Iraqi National Police from scratch while the US army provides the bulk of the safety and security, or we can train up local home guard units during that time. Simultaneously, we can refit and prepare the Iraqi army for its real mission—protecting Iraqi sovereignty and national security from external threats.
In the end, since Iraq will always need reliable police forces, the US should focus its strategy on providing security while a new National Police force is recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed. These new and modern police need to be better paid, respect Human Rights, tolerate diversity, promote equality, and protect the rights of the accused. They need national direction from a better organized Ministry of the Interior and the support of a functional judicial system.
This can be done much more easily than one might think. All of the training facilities are available as we speak in the US and abroad. Subject matter experts are available from the US Departments of Justice, State, and Defense. An initial corps of police professionals can be created at the FBI academy, for example, or some other large metropolitan police training center in the world. This initial group can then be deployed as leaders throughout Iraq who have consistent training, similar equipment and operating principles, and the support of US and other allied police and military advisors. They can spearhead the transition to Iraqi provided safety and security while being advised by professional counterinsurgents that are embedded with them full time.
Getting the police out of the environment might be a challenge since these men will want to protect their families in Iraq, but by working with local leaders we should be able to find the initial group willing to take the risk. While they train abroad in a safe environment, we can continue upgrading the Iraqi National Police Training Center and the police senior leadership. The same can be done to create better Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, and others.
This first cohort of newly professionalized Iraqi police must be integrated in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Some of these officers will be cadre at the Iraqi Police Academy. Others must get back into their hometowns patrolling and interacting with the locals from all backgrounds to create the networks we need to better deal with the insurgents. As more and more professional police are generated the security load will naturally shift off of the US forces, but US forces will be in Iraq for a number of years yet.
Purely from the police perspective, this implies that the US and the world must provide adequate advisors and resources to reorganize and even create the supporting Interior Ministry and judicial branches required to make the system work. Providing the resources, time, security, and personnel for a strategy like this would turn the US expenditures in Iraq into a long term investment rather than an unrecoverable short term expense.
Contrary to popular belief, an operational plan to support this strategy can be developed with meaningful, manageable, and measurable milestones. Most surprising of all, a rough timeline for completion of this mission can be estimated as well, though it may run as long as a decade with some level of US forces on the ground. Publishing, monitoring, and managing to this plan and timeline pose no threat to Iraqi security and offer no real advantage to the enemy either, but would go a long way toward building credibility and generating support for the plan in the US, Iraq, and elsewhere.
If safety, security, and justice become more predominant in Iraq, and the Iraqi government works to keep it that way, international development, employment, and prosperity will follow.
The Iraq Study Group failed to offer any real world alternatives and the three main strategies as they are discussed in the media today are too superficial to succeed. Rapid US withdrawal, the increased embedding of US trainers, or hoping that Iraq’s neighbors can settle the issue, are all doomed to short sighted failure.
Now some pundits in the media are calling for a shift in our strategy to one of "safeguarding and securing" the Iraqis. They believe that we can buy the Iraqis enough time to establish their own political response to the insurgency. Having said all this, we must not go too far into this "political" direction and forget that it is still a war, with very real enemies that require a military—or more appropriately—a paramilitary component.
The next strategy in Iraq must certainly provide for safety and security, but at the same time it must include efforts to establish justice and equality. This means that Iraq must have a reliable and police force and supporting judicial system. Police forces also happen to be one of the best sources for potential counterinsurgent forces. Nobody can manage an insurgency better than local cops that have a stake in their communities. Foreign military forces and even Iraqis from other parts of the country simply do not have the family and friendship ties necessary to really understand what is going on in the local area.
Herein lays the dilemma. The Iraqi National Police as an institution is broken. The police are believed to be heavily infiltrated by sectarian extremists who use their access to police information and resources as a means to actively and violently promote their causes. At the very least, they can look the other way as independent militias for which they have sympathies do the dirty work for them.
A viable alternative to the police is to rely upon local "home guard units" to provide security and operate as counterinsurgents, but the recent history of militias in Iraq is as bad as or worse than that of the police.
We face a choice. It is not an easy one, but it must be made. We can either rebuild the Iraqi National Police from scratch while the US army provides the bulk of the safety and security, or we can train up local home guard units during that time. Simultaneously, we can refit and prepare the Iraqi army for its real mission—protecting Iraqi sovereignty and national security from external threats.
In the end, since Iraq will always need reliable police forces, the US should focus its strategy on providing security while a new National Police force is recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed. These new and modern police need to be better paid, respect Human Rights, tolerate diversity, promote equality, and protect the rights of the accused. They need national direction from a better organized Ministry of the Interior and the support of a functional judicial system.
This can be done much more easily than one might think. All of the training facilities are available as we speak in the US and abroad. Subject matter experts are available from the US Departments of Justice, State, and Defense. An initial corps of police professionals can be created at the FBI academy, for example, or some other large metropolitan police training center in the world. This initial group can then be deployed as leaders throughout Iraq who have consistent training, similar equipment and operating principles, and the support of US and other allied police and military advisors. They can spearhead the transition to Iraqi provided safety and security while being advised by professional counterinsurgents that are embedded with them full time.
Getting the police out of the environment might be a challenge since these men will want to protect their families in Iraq, but by working with local leaders we should be able to find the initial group willing to take the risk. While they train abroad in a safe environment, we can continue upgrading the Iraqi National Police Training Center and the police senior leadership. The same can be done to create better Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Finance, and others.
This first cohort of newly professionalized Iraqi police must be integrated in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Some of these officers will be cadre at the Iraqi Police Academy. Others must get back into their hometowns patrolling and interacting with the locals from all backgrounds to create the networks we need to better deal with the insurgents. As more and more professional police are generated the security load will naturally shift off of the US forces, but US forces will be in Iraq for a number of years yet.
Purely from the police perspective, this implies that the US and the world must provide adequate advisors and resources to reorganize and even create the supporting Interior Ministry and judicial branches required to make the system work. Providing the resources, time, security, and personnel for a strategy like this would turn the US expenditures in Iraq into a long term investment rather than an unrecoverable short term expense.
Contrary to popular belief, an operational plan to support this strategy can be developed with meaningful, manageable, and measurable milestones. Most surprising of all, a rough timeline for completion of this mission can be estimated as well, though it may run as long as a decade with some level of US forces on the ground. Publishing, monitoring, and managing to this plan and timeline pose no threat to Iraqi security and offer no real advantage to the enemy either, but would go a long way toward building credibility and generating support for the plan in the US, Iraq, and elsewhere.
If safety, security, and justice become more predominant in Iraq, and the Iraqi government works to keep it that way, international development, employment, and prosperity will follow.
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