Recovering the Support of Iraqi Populace
We at WinTheGWOT.org have noticed that there has been relatively limited debate in the media regarding the application of a “classic” counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Remarkably, even after all the blunders and time already spent this is the one strategy that could still work. A proper counterinsurgency strategy, often called COIN, stands the very best chance of bringing back the support of the majority of the Iraqis, which is what we must have if we decide to maintain our troops there. In COIN, the war is not between competing conventional militaries consisting of ground and air forces. Rather, it is a struggle to win over popular support, or at least prevent or erode their support for the insurgents. Massed firepower, tanks, artillery, and air forces are not the primary weapons in a war of this sort. Many people have heard the phrase “winning the hearts and minds” of course, and this is a good start, but the strategy and tactics required to win over control of the populace involve quite a bit more.
People do not fight each other without good reason. They fight against threats that are real or perceived, and in an insurgency, the war of perceptions is as critical as the physical battle between government and enemy forces. Ideally, people fight for what they believe in, but during an insurgency most people end up fighting for what they feel they have to. Much like a political election where no candidate fits the exact needs of every individual voter, an insurgent often ends up choosing the side that he believes stands the best chance of success or the least threat to him. Extreme left or right wing voters tend to be die-hard party supporters, and there are die-hard supporters on either side of the insurgency as well, but the vast majority of popular sympathy and support for either side of the conflict comes from people looking to make the best choice for their own long-term interests. They seek the best personal outcome for themselves and their local social network (family, friends, town, religion, etc.), but they may have little else in common with the hard corps insurgents.
Al-Qaeda has done a marvelous job of managing its end of the war of perceptions to the point that a significant portion of the world believes the conflict in Iraq is only about the West controlling Islam and the oil supply. Clearly, Al-Qaeda’s radical Islamic terror is a factor—as is the dependable flow of oil for the global economy, but focusing on Islam and oil is an overgeneralization that works extremely well for Al-Qaeda. What really motivates people to support one side of the insurgency or the other is what takes place at the local level. Typically, it is not what occurs in some overly generalized international struggle.
Research and history have shown that an insurgency—though it may present a national threat and may enjoy international support is actually a highly localized problem. It is best defeated by counterinsurgents that operate in a similarly local manner. For the counterinsurgent to be successful, he must drill down to the most manageable local issues that drive people to support the insurgency and eliminate them. Once a given portion of the population has no reason to continue supporting the insurgents—that is, their legitimate grievances have been addressed, then some portion of these people cease to be a threat. Other portions may have to be coerced into dropping their support (incarceration, relocation, etc.), and others may be enticed via amnesty, compensation, and re-employment programs. The most hardened insurgents will most likely have to be captured or killed.
The principles are straightforward, but the realities and perceptions on the ground require the counterinsurgent to be flexible and operate at the local level where tactical decisions by relatively low ranking leaders have the potential for tremendous strategic impact. For example, when a captain in the army calls for an air strike on a house from which a number of insurgents are shooting at her troops and that air strike kills a local child she has won a tactical victory, but lost a strategic battle. The loss of that one child will do more to infuriate the populace and destroy popular support to a far greater extent than what might have been gained as a result of eliminating a few insurgents. This is especially so when the people may have little else in common with the insurgents beyond their growing hatred of the army and the air force.
The immediate post-invasion policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and ongoing US policies continue to work in exactly the counterproductive manner as in the air strike example above. The severe US de-Baathification policies that created as many as five-hundred-thousand to a million additional unemployed people, and the relatively indiscriminant population management techniques (think—Abu Ghraib) worked exactly against the creation of allies in the Iraqi populace. The US allowed Iraqi society to descend into chaos based upon survival of the best armed and most ruthless. Now that the US is clearly a foreign occupier as opposed to a liberator, the problem of winning back the support of the Iraqi population appears insurmountable.
However, this perception can be deceiving too.
The potential stakes in Iraq are much higher than what we see today, and most Iraqis and their neighbors intuitively understand this. A precipitous US withdrawal could lead to a conflagration of the war that draws in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and others that would lead to much more bloodshed, greater personal difficulty for every Iraqi citizen, and possibly even a global economic crisis resulting from decreased oil production. Like any other human being, the average Iraqi is growing tired of the local fighting, loss of life, and the diminishing safety and standard of living. The Iraqis have no real desire to see it get any worse. As bad as the situation may seem now, there is still hope of wining back a portion of the populace and starting a proper strategy to eliminate the insurgents and the terrorists.
Of course, this is exactly what our extremist enemies do not want us to do, though they are in the absolute minority of Muslims. As long as the violence and suffering is blamed on someone else, and as long as US strategy and policies appear to justify this blame in the eyes of the more moderate Muslim, the extremists will succeed in obtaining sympathy and support and in dragging out the conflict.
The real question is how do we change the strategy and demonstrate its value to the Iraqis and gain their support?
The US must change its focus to the extremists, whether they are Al-Qaeda in Iraq, foreign jihadists, or local sectarians. A plan has to be developed specifically for each group/area since they do not all share the same end goals, beliefs, or tactics. Local forces must be recruited from the area and trained in counterinsurgency. Once supported by the proper military and civilian resources they are the only ones who can win this war.
The ideal forces for this type of struggle are local police or home guard units because these Iraqi counterinsurgents have a stake in their neighborhoods. Their families, their homes, and their friends are at risk in the war. If they can trust the government and its institutions to be reasonably free of corruption and if they receive decent pay and proper support, they will gain the confidence and motivation required to support the government and the counterinsurgency plan.
In essence, winning the hearts and minds of the populace requires more than just safety and security—it requires justice, tolerance, economic opportunity, and a general sense of hope for the future. COIN is much, much more than a military strategy. An entire socio-political and military strategy must be in place that requires the coordinated and cooperative actions of all the departments and resources available to the government. This is still possible in Iraq, albeit gradually, and beginning only in those areas of Iraq that still support the end objectives.
On the other hand, the insurgent need only create enough doubt in the minds of the moderate portion of the population to ensure their sympathy and support go to him. The insurgent can even terrorize the populace in order to simply prevent it from supporting the government. They often use spectacular terrorist tactics, which in turn cause most people to look at the situation as a predominantly military threat, which is exactly what they want. Overreacting governments that apply military force almost always cause unintended casualties and destruction that works in the favor of the insurgents.
Our military cannot readily achieve these COIN objectives by itself. After years of expensive and bloody war, our enemies and the people of the region believe that US resolve is now wavering. They know that the American people are growing tired of the conflict and the manner in which we are fighting it today. As a result, we will soon lose the confidence and support of those people who still believe we can make a difference—both at home and in Iraq.
Unless the US presents a proper COIN strategy that allows us to address the genuine local needs of the people we cannot win over the populace. The US and Iraqi governments cannot have any hidden agendas, must be able to admit the mistakes they have made, and attempt to make reasonable reparations where possible. Most importantly, the US forces must learn the Iraqi culture and demonstrate respect for the Iraqi people. If we do not have the support of the people we cannot focus on the real enemy—the radical extremists that hide among them. A temporary surge in US troops by itself, or our continued “Iraqification” strategy are likely to fail without the majority of Iraqis supporting a strategy that is based upon the classic principles of counterinsurgency.
People do not fight each other without good reason. They fight against threats that are real or perceived, and in an insurgency, the war of perceptions is as critical as the physical battle between government and enemy forces. Ideally, people fight for what they believe in, but during an insurgency most people end up fighting for what they feel they have to. Much like a political election where no candidate fits the exact needs of every individual voter, an insurgent often ends up choosing the side that he believes stands the best chance of success or the least threat to him. Extreme left or right wing voters tend to be die-hard party supporters, and there are die-hard supporters on either side of the insurgency as well, but the vast majority of popular sympathy and support for either side of the conflict comes from people looking to make the best choice for their own long-term interests. They seek the best personal outcome for themselves and their local social network (family, friends, town, religion, etc.), but they may have little else in common with the hard corps insurgents.
Al-Qaeda has done a marvelous job of managing its end of the war of perceptions to the point that a significant portion of the world believes the conflict in Iraq is only about the West controlling Islam and the oil supply. Clearly, Al-Qaeda’s radical Islamic terror is a factor—as is the dependable flow of oil for the global economy, but focusing on Islam and oil is an overgeneralization that works extremely well for Al-Qaeda. What really motivates people to support one side of the insurgency or the other is what takes place at the local level. Typically, it is not what occurs in some overly generalized international struggle.
Research and history have shown that an insurgency—though it may present a national threat and may enjoy international support is actually a highly localized problem. It is best defeated by counterinsurgents that operate in a similarly local manner. For the counterinsurgent to be successful, he must drill down to the most manageable local issues that drive people to support the insurgency and eliminate them. Once a given portion of the population has no reason to continue supporting the insurgents—that is, their legitimate grievances have been addressed, then some portion of these people cease to be a threat. Other portions may have to be coerced into dropping their support (incarceration, relocation, etc.), and others may be enticed via amnesty, compensation, and re-employment programs. The most hardened insurgents will most likely have to be captured or killed.
The principles are straightforward, but the realities and perceptions on the ground require the counterinsurgent to be flexible and operate at the local level where tactical decisions by relatively low ranking leaders have the potential for tremendous strategic impact. For example, when a captain in the army calls for an air strike on a house from which a number of insurgents are shooting at her troops and that air strike kills a local child she has won a tactical victory, but lost a strategic battle. The loss of that one child will do more to infuriate the populace and destroy popular support to a far greater extent than what might have been gained as a result of eliminating a few insurgents. This is especially so when the people may have little else in common with the insurgents beyond their growing hatred of the army and the air force.
The immediate post-invasion policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and ongoing US policies continue to work in exactly the counterproductive manner as in the air strike example above. The severe US de-Baathification policies that created as many as five-hundred-thousand to a million additional unemployed people, and the relatively indiscriminant population management techniques (think—Abu Ghraib) worked exactly against the creation of allies in the Iraqi populace. The US allowed Iraqi society to descend into chaos based upon survival of the best armed and most ruthless. Now that the US is clearly a foreign occupier as opposed to a liberator, the problem of winning back the support of the Iraqi population appears insurmountable.
However, this perception can be deceiving too.
The potential stakes in Iraq are much higher than what we see today, and most Iraqis and their neighbors intuitively understand this. A precipitous US withdrawal could lead to a conflagration of the war that draws in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and others that would lead to much more bloodshed, greater personal difficulty for every Iraqi citizen, and possibly even a global economic crisis resulting from decreased oil production. Like any other human being, the average Iraqi is growing tired of the local fighting, loss of life, and the diminishing safety and standard of living. The Iraqis have no real desire to see it get any worse. As bad as the situation may seem now, there is still hope of wining back a portion of the populace and starting a proper strategy to eliminate the insurgents and the terrorists.
Of course, this is exactly what our extremist enemies do not want us to do, though they are in the absolute minority of Muslims. As long as the violence and suffering is blamed on someone else, and as long as US strategy and policies appear to justify this blame in the eyes of the more moderate Muslim, the extremists will succeed in obtaining sympathy and support and in dragging out the conflict.
The real question is how do we change the strategy and demonstrate its value to the Iraqis and gain their support?
The US must change its focus to the extremists, whether they are Al-Qaeda in Iraq, foreign jihadists, or local sectarians. A plan has to be developed specifically for each group/area since they do not all share the same end goals, beliefs, or tactics. Local forces must be recruited from the area and trained in counterinsurgency. Once supported by the proper military and civilian resources they are the only ones who can win this war.
The ideal forces for this type of struggle are local police or home guard units because these Iraqi counterinsurgents have a stake in their neighborhoods. Their families, their homes, and their friends are at risk in the war. If they can trust the government and its institutions to be reasonably free of corruption and if they receive decent pay and proper support, they will gain the confidence and motivation required to support the government and the counterinsurgency plan.
In essence, winning the hearts and minds of the populace requires more than just safety and security—it requires justice, tolerance, economic opportunity, and a general sense of hope for the future. COIN is much, much more than a military strategy. An entire socio-political and military strategy must be in place that requires the coordinated and cooperative actions of all the departments and resources available to the government. This is still possible in Iraq, albeit gradually, and beginning only in those areas of Iraq that still support the end objectives.
On the other hand, the insurgent need only create enough doubt in the minds of the moderate portion of the population to ensure their sympathy and support go to him. The insurgent can even terrorize the populace in order to simply prevent it from supporting the government. They often use spectacular terrorist tactics, which in turn cause most people to look at the situation as a predominantly military threat, which is exactly what they want. Overreacting governments that apply military force almost always cause unintended casualties and destruction that works in the favor of the insurgents.
Our military cannot readily achieve these COIN objectives by itself. After years of expensive and bloody war, our enemies and the people of the region believe that US resolve is now wavering. They know that the American people are growing tired of the conflict and the manner in which we are fighting it today. As a result, we will soon lose the confidence and support of those people who still believe we can make a difference—both at home and in Iraq.
Unless the US presents a proper COIN strategy that allows us to address the genuine local needs of the people we cannot win over the populace. The US and Iraqi governments cannot have any hidden agendas, must be able to admit the mistakes they have made, and attempt to make reasonable reparations where possible. Most importantly, the US forces must learn the Iraqi culture and demonstrate respect for the Iraqi people. If we do not have the support of the people we cannot focus on the real enemy—the radical extremists that hide among them. A temporary surge in US troops by itself, or our continued “Iraqification” strategy are likely to fail without the majority of Iraqis supporting a strategy that is based upon the classic principles of counterinsurgency.
1 Comments:
great post, a real service - keep swinging!
Greg
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home