Sunnis Cannot Be Excluded in the New Iraq: How to Really Win the War in Iraq and Positively Impact the Global War on Terror
Anne Gearan’s Associated Press article on December 2, 2006 “US rethinking Iraqi unification goal” indicates that President Bush is stepping up his personal role in the Iraqi political situation in an attempt to bring stability there. The article also hints at something quite ominous that other media sources have begun discussing of late. That is, the potential for the US choosing factional sides and the possible exclusion of Sunnis from further political attempts at bringing them into a more cooperative and diverse government. This would be a strategic mistake with tragic consequences. Fortunately, President Bush intends to meet with the Sunni Vice President next month to ensure that no such signal is officially sent—at least not yet.
Excluding the minority Sunnis would be a mistake for many reasons. First, regardless of past events and their minority status, it would further legitimize them as enemies to the majority groups and leave them even more vulnerable to oppression and neglect from the new government and their fellow Iraqis. Not all Sunnis are enemies of the new Iraqi government today, but if excluded they would likely become so when lacking any alternative.
Conversely, not all Shiite (and other) groups are friendly to the Iraqi government, so granting them some sort of blanket political status in comparison to a Sunni rejection would create a dangerous environment for some of our key allies in the region. Sunnis in Jordan and the majority Sunni population in Saudi Arabia, which does not necessarily support its own Wahhabist rulers, could interpret this action as an attack on Sunnis as a whole. This would compel them actively support their brethren in Iraq and expand the conflict and possibly destabilize other countries. External aid to Sunnis would increase Iran’s motivation to support the Shiites and a regional conflict could spin out of control, necessitating further US military involvement.
Rather, the US and Iraqi governments must identify the areas of support they already have, regardless of ethic or religious faction, and work to provide safety and security in those locations. This may only be a small portion of the country at first, but it is easiest to start there and build a legitimate working system that demonstrates how the government can effectively work for all groups in Iraq. The emphasis should be to build local police who are not corrupt and who respect diversity and Human Rights—that is, police who have a stake in the success of the local community. They are the primary counterinsurgents. Iraqi military forces should be used to help protect them and the people in these select areas and to fight the insurgents elsewhere whenever practical. It is critical that investments be made in these areas to increase employment and public services, and that are available to all members of the community.
The US and Iraqi governments should work with Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to obtain overall support and a commitment to reduce the amount of external arms and influence entering Iraq and bolstering the anti-government forces. It will not be easy, but it must occur.
As the protected and properly governed areas begin to prosper and the new Iraqi government builds relationships of trust within the general population, it can then begin expanding its influence outward and reduce the effectiveness and popularity of the anti-government forces and insurgents. To attempt to do this to the entire country at once is folly—the current Iraqi forces bolstered by 140,000 US troops have demonstrated that much already.
Once these “protected” areas are identified and troops are put into position, the US can reduce its forces by about 80%, leaving approximately 28,000 troops or 9 carefully chosen brigades to support the Iraqi led effort. US Special Forces advisor/trainers could work to help professionalize the police and military while US brigades capable of rapid deployment and reaction to specific crises could be stationed outside of the main population centers. This would reduce the US presence without completely eliminating our ability to protect our own troops and support the Iraqi government.
This is the true definition of the “long war” we have been hearing about for so long, and one can only hope that the Iraq Study Group presents some similar plan that the Bush Administration buys into. It will take decades to complete, but would cost the US a lot less in terms of non-recoverable military expenses and turn our effort into a genuine investment in the future of world stability. It would also reduce the incentive and popular support for local terrorists and lead to a genuine victory in Iraq as well as a victory in the global war on terror.
The sooner we get started the sooner we can stabilize Iraq and create a long term ally with a relatively prosperous people who have no reason to hate the US and support the anti-American jihadist terrorists, which was our goal in the first place.
Excluding the minority Sunnis would be a mistake for many reasons. First, regardless of past events and their minority status, it would further legitimize them as enemies to the majority groups and leave them even more vulnerable to oppression and neglect from the new government and their fellow Iraqis. Not all Sunnis are enemies of the new Iraqi government today, but if excluded they would likely become so when lacking any alternative.
Conversely, not all Shiite (and other) groups are friendly to the Iraqi government, so granting them some sort of blanket political status in comparison to a Sunni rejection would create a dangerous environment for some of our key allies in the region. Sunnis in Jordan and the majority Sunni population in Saudi Arabia, which does not necessarily support its own Wahhabist rulers, could interpret this action as an attack on Sunnis as a whole. This would compel them actively support their brethren in Iraq and expand the conflict and possibly destabilize other countries. External aid to Sunnis would increase Iran’s motivation to support the Shiites and a regional conflict could spin out of control, necessitating further US military involvement.
Rather, the US and Iraqi governments must identify the areas of support they already have, regardless of ethic or religious faction, and work to provide safety and security in those locations. This may only be a small portion of the country at first, but it is easiest to start there and build a legitimate working system that demonstrates how the government can effectively work for all groups in Iraq. The emphasis should be to build local police who are not corrupt and who respect diversity and Human Rights—that is, police who have a stake in the success of the local community. They are the primary counterinsurgents. Iraqi military forces should be used to help protect them and the people in these select areas and to fight the insurgents elsewhere whenever practical. It is critical that investments be made in these areas to increase employment and public services, and that are available to all members of the community.
The US and Iraqi governments should work with Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to obtain overall support and a commitment to reduce the amount of external arms and influence entering Iraq and bolstering the anti-government forces. It will not be easy, but it must occur.
As the protected and properly governed areas begin to prosper and the new Iraqi government builds relationships of trust within the general population, it can then begin expanding its influence outward and reduce the effectiveness and popularity of the anti-government forces and insurgents. To attempt to do this to the entire country at once is folly—the current Iraqi forces bolstered by 140,000 US troops have demonstrated that much already.
Once these “protected” areas are identified and troops are put into position, the US can reduce its forces by about 80%, leaving approximately 28,000 troops or 9 carefully chosen brigades to support the Iraqi led effort. US Special Forces advisor/trainers could work to help professionalize the police and military while US brigades capable of rapid deployment and reaction to specific crises could be stationed outside of the main population centers. This would reduce the US presence without completely eliminating our ability to protect our own troops and support the Iraqi government.
This is the true definition of the “long war” we have been hearing about for so long, and one can only hope that the Iraq Study Group presents some similar plan that the Bush Administration buys into. It will take decades to complete, but would cost the US a lot less in terms of non-recoverable military expenses and turn our effort into a genuine investment in the future of world stability. It would also reduce the incentive and popular support for local terrorists and lead to a genuine victory in Iraq as well as a victory in the global war on terror.
The sooner we get started the sooner we can stabilize Iraq and create a long term ally with a relatively prosperous people who have no reason to hate the US and support the anti-American jihadist terrorists, which was our goal in the first place.
2 Comments:
Matt,
Here's an alternative POV (which you'll probably hate):
We've already wasted enough time and money and lost far too many lives in Iraq. Your vision that would "stabilize Iraq and create a long term ally with a relatively prosperous people who have no reason to hate the US and support the anti-American jihadist terrorists" is something WE will never see -- we'll be long dead and the fighting will continue.
There are too many factions over there who do not want peace in Iraq they want dominance over Iraq and the entire Middle-East -- peace is not a position they understand or are comfortable with; and Pease with any country even remotely allied with the United States is not even a question. (Ref. my only slightly optimistic posts: Quixotic Aspirations: Freedom and Democracy in Iraq and Middle-Eastern Problems Require Middle-Eastern Solutions.
Regards,
Whym
It does not matter who is right or who is wrong—the Sunnis or the US military. As long as the flawed conventional strategy of applying firepower and brute force to an insurgency continues it allows the insurgents to play on the appearance of indiscriminate destruction and collateral deaths to maintain popular support.
According to the Associated Press on December 9, 2006: “Iraq's influential Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and the country's largest Sunni Arab political party on Saturday condemned a deadly U.S. military attack they say killed civilians…The U.S. command said Friday's raid and airstrike killed 20 insurgents, but the association and the Iraqi Islamic Party joined a village mayor who alleged that the attack killed at least 19 civilians, including women and children.”
AP photos of the scene showed one man uncovering the body of what appeared to be a 10-year-old boy.
After a similar scenario in March in which the AMS claimed 32 civilians were killed by US air strikes to cover their murder by US ground forces, the AMS stated: "The association condemns the massacre and urges international organizations and the media to show the world the reality of the fake slogans about human rights and freedom used by the Americans."
It is a travesty that we have put ourselves into this corner. Our very method of fighting is one of the main reasons that the war continues unabated and obfuscates the real conflict when the world focuses on incidents like these. As soon as we stop operating in ways that appear to be against all Iraqis, and as soon as we start being a source of security we can build the relationships we need go after the terrorists and insurgents much more effectively.
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