Basic Principles of Counterinsurgency…“Nonsensical?”

Today’s New York Times article by David S. Cloud quotes Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld as recently saying “…it was impossible to know precisely whether wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were resulting in more terrorists being killed than they were creating.”

The article points out that Secretary Rumsfeld avoided any specific remarks about the declassified version of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate because he wasn’t even sure which parts of the NIE had been declassified due to the fact that he had been traveling.

Apparently, in the midst of a major war, he was unable to access the highly controversial and politically charged, 4-page document available at every media outlet, web site, and blog that could get its hands on it. Of course, he might have just asked his boss for a copy.

Nonetheless, Secretary Rumsfeld did go on to clarify his personal position: “The implication that if you stop killing or capturing people who are trying to kill you, then therefore the world would be a better place, is obviously nonsensical.”

This writer has never heard anyone in a position of significant responsibility advocate letting terrorists go freely about their business. Most rational people agree that once terrorists are properly identified and located they must be quickly captured or killed.

What Secretary Rumsfeld and other key supporters of the Bush Administration even refuse to consider is that their understanding of counterinsurgency is seriously flawed. Rather than intelligently discussing the fact that alienating the populace plays directly into the hands of the enemy, administration supporters attack those who disagree with them as “nonsensical.”

If the US were only killing those people who were trying to kill us (and their direct supporters), and if we were not abusing and alienating so many other innocent people we would be making better progress in the war. A recent poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes from the University of Maryland indicates that we are not.

The poll, taken during the first week of September indicates that the majority of Iraqis believe American forces are provoking more conflict than they are preventing. What’s more, the poll found that support for attacks on American forces is increasing. Some 61% of the respondents now say they approve of attacks. That number was only 47% in January.

It should be obvious that this is a direct result of the flawed US counterinsurgency policy and our badly managed actions in Iraq to date. Some of these new supporters have certainly gone into the ranks of active jihadists—and soon the Bush Administration will have to admit that we are responsible.

“Nonsensical” is an understatement when describing an administration that patently ignores over fifty-years of experience and in-depth counterinsurgency research by subject matter experts in the military, esteemed research institutions, and academia. The Army War College, the Naval Post Graduate School, and other US government-sponsored sources are producing thoughtful criticism and workable alternatives to the current strategy for the war on terror, but the Bush Administration is not listening.

James S. Corum, a 2004 Iraq war veteran and current Professor at the US Army Command & General Staff College, points out that history has shown that rather than a military operation, successful counterinsurgency has predominantly had more in common with large scale policing. This is the exact opposite of the current US approach, which relies on firepower and attrition. In fact, Professor Corum advocates that in order to be successful in counterinsurgency the military still plays a vital role, but that role should be in support of the police.

Other experts like Professor Hy Rothstein, a thirty-year veteran of the army Special Forces and currently at the Naval Post Graduate School are not confident that a counterinsurgency model is enough to stabilize Iraq at this point. It may be too late, or at least exponentially harder to develop a credible relationship with the Iraqi people to draw their sympathies away from the various insurgent, religious, and ethnic factions. At this point Iraq may require the US to maintain a large troop presence for years in order to sustain any semblance of security long enough to rebuild the many burnt bridges with the populace.

One thing they would agree on, however, is that it is never too late to emphasize the humane and moral treatment of the vast majority of people caught in the middle of an insurgency who are not currently a threat. Unfortunately, these people will eventually sympathize with and likely support an insurgent group they don’t even agree with ideologically, simply due to an ill-conceived US military strategy that continues to abuse and humiliate them.

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It May Just be Time to Dust off the “Biden Plan” to End the War in Iraq

Having Another Look at A Way Forward

Some time ago, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (D-DE) proposed a high-level strategy to bring and end to the war in Iraq called Iraq: A Way Forward. In the proposal, he essentially advocated that a lighter overall hand in Iraq might be the key to keeping the country stable and unified. Considering that the heavy-handed tactics of the Bush Administration have produced little progress, perhaps it is time to take another look at Senator Biden’s five-part proposal in light of the current political situation.

Part 1 - One Iraq, Three Regions
The first proposal is to establish (that is maintain) the single nation of Iraq, but with three relatively autonomous and ethnically based regions or states. Each region would have its own government and the departments it needs to meet the local needs of its constituents. A central government would remain in Baghdad and retain responsibility for national needs that transcend the regions, i.e., border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues, etc.

This proposal is workable, but the ethnic and religious based hostility have not been reduced during the US occupation. Given the results of recent intelligence estimates and Iraqi opinion polls, the US presence has likely exacerbated these tensions. Separating the belligerents and establishing a police or military mechanism to keep them from attacking each other may be a lot harder today than earlier in the war, but it is not impossible. The key would be to position US forces in such a way that they stand as a deterrent and a quick reaction force to inter-factional conflict without standing in the way of everyday Iraqi life.

A smaller more nimble force of US unconventional warfare assets could work in a more local, but low key manner to help local security forces deal with the insurgents. The sooner the US reduces the “presence” of its troops—whether on not it actually reduces the numbers—the sooner the average Iraqi can focus attention on other issues.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi central government could recruit more ethnically diverse security forces and provide professional training to its army and police. Having a national police academy with mixed classes of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish trainees would be one-step in teaching ethnic and religious tolerance, as well as promote law enforcement consistency and quality across the country. The same is true for the military and local militias. As Iraqi safety and security forces effectively stand up, the US can draw down the number of its troops.

Part 2 - Shared Oil Reserves
Senator Biden correctly proposes that oil reserves are the key to prosperity in Iraq and that all of the Iraqi regions—especially the minority Sunni’s should be guaranteed their fair share of the wealth. The central government would be responsible for distributing and managing oil revenues, which the regions would use to finance their governments and public works projects. This would also give them incentive to support a central government and interact with the other regions.

Since some of the key drivers of insurgency are government oppression and neglect, corruption, and lack of security and safety, these first two parts of Senator Biden’s proposal make a great deal of sense. They promote consistently trained safety and security forces, local political representation for each of the main interest groups, sources of revenue to run the governments and provide basic services, and incentives for working together and accepting a central government in Baghdad.

However, it also implies that there are civilian administrative, political, and financial advisors available to help establish corruption free governments in Iraq that cooperate at all levels. US troops can keep the peace and train the Iraqi military and police, but they are not able to build whole governments. Most importantly, we must have the political will, diplomacy, and international support to convince and support the current Iraqi government to implement such a plan.

Part 3 – Increase Reconstruction Assistance
Senator Biden proposes more reconstruction assistance be provided to Iraq and that it be conditioned upon the protection of minority and women’s rights. He recognizes the value that other countries can add in terms of reconstruction assistance as well.

Since the high unemployment rate in Iraq and the limited opportunities for economic prosperity are surely generating sympathy and support for the anti-American jihadists, we should take this concept even further. The US and other countries should be pooling their resources to fund and help the central and regional Iraqi governments implement large-scale reconstruction efforts aimed specifically at reducing unemployment and kick starting the Iraqi economy. Even though the US and other contributors should retain some form of oversight, the Iraqi central government, working through the regional governments, must be seen by the Iraqi’s as the source of that economic opportunity and its management.

Nonetheless, funding should come as a condition of the regional government’s cooperation and adherence to a national strategy—but not a centralized plan—for reconstruction. It should require diversity and anti-corruption clauses, and auditing mechanisms for progress, workmanship, and fiscal responsibility. Any agency, official, company, or individual who does not live up to expectations should be held accountable as appropriate.

This part of the plan would offer opportunities for meaningful employment, better standards of living, economic prosperity, and could help replace the humiliation of foreign occupation with personal, regional, and national pride for having rebuilt local communities and the nation in a way that meets the desires of the Iraqi people.

Of course this would be very expensive, but most people would much rather the US used its wealth in the form of a positive economic investment in the region as opposed to a non-recoverable military expenditure.

Part 4 – Maintain Iraq’s Territorial Integrity
Senator Biden proposes that the United Nations, supported by influential member states and some of Iraq’s key neighbors, could help the new government establish national and regional stability. It is actually in the best interest of Iraq’s neighbors to support this initiative.

Iran
Iran does not gain anything from Iraqi instability and probably prefers a relatively moderate Iraqi national government. Otherwise a Shiite dominated government or theocracy in Iraq simply creates competition for Iranian Shiite political-religious preeminence in the region. Furthermore, the Shiites of Iraq are not as closely linked to the Shiites of Iran as is commonly believed. They will work together against a common enemy, but there is still lingering mistrust from the Iran-Iraq war and differences of ideology that matter. Furthermore, the Iranians are predominantly ethnic Persians and not Arabs as in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has a significant interest in a stable Iraq because of its ties to the Sunni minority in Iraq and because the stable production of oil is the basis for the Saudi economy and government stability. Increased competition from oil production in Iraq is not a threat to the Saudi’s since overall global demand for oil remains high. A larger civil conflict in Iraq could easily pull in Sunni’s from Saudi Arabia and embroil that country in a conflict that destabilizes the Saudi economy and government.

Turkey
Turkey benefits from a territorially stable Iraq as long as the northern Iraqi Kurds remain a legitimate and stable regional government within the country. More severe civil conflict in Iraq could tempt the Iraqi Kurds to establish their own independent nation, which could stir up the aspirations for independence for Kurdish populations living in Turkey and Iran.

Of course, all the nations in the region would eventually benefit from a more robust Iraqi economy and stable government in terms of trade and security, especially a government that no longer invades or embroils its neighbors in major wars.

Part 5 – Drawdown US Troops
Senator Biden proposes that the President set an objective for US troops to be out of Iraq by 2008 or sooner, and that the US maintain a smaller force of some 20,000 US troops in or near Iraq as a quick reaction force.

This proposal is fine as long as realistic and manageable conditions for troop withdrawal are established ahead of time. However, more than one set of conditions must be set. One set must assume that we will leave after accomplishing some clearly defined Iraqi stabilization and security objectives. The other must be based upon some set of failure criteria—in other words, if we do not see the progress we require by a certain point we would cut our immediate losses and withdraw.

Once the withdrawal conditions are set, US commanders can establish a realistic operational plan with meaningful milestones for exiting the country. Contrary to the Bush Administration’s claims, a publicized plan for withdrawal and active reporting and management to that plan does not work to enemy’s advantage. For example, the US plan could call for the creation of a certain number of operational infantry brigades by a certain date in order for a specified number of US troops to withdraw. Public knowledge of progress and any adjustments to the plan does not provide the insurgents with any information they could not already get. Furthermore, reportable progress is exactly what every stakeholder—from Iraqi citizens to foreign aid organizations—require to continue to support that plan. Reportable and meaningful progress is exactly what it takes to erode the popular sympathy and support for the enemy.

In conclusion, it is clearly time to consider alternatives like Senator Biden’s because staying the course of the Bush Administration continues to work against our victory and Iraq’s future. Sadly, even if the Biden plan was to work perfectly and we were to leave Iraq completely it will require many years and even more precious lives.

Sadder still, “victory” in Iraq will not bring us victory in the broader global war on terror, but it might bring us a step closer. Oppression and injustice will continue to thrive throughout the Islamic world and radical organizations like Al-Qaeda will continue to garner just enough popular support to maintain their anti-American and anti-democracy ideals. Al-Qaeda and its supporters desire an Islamic Theocratic Region with no outside influence from the West. Nonetheless, even after a victory in Iraq, the US and the West will continue to have political and economic interests in the region, so the root cause of the conflict with Al-Qaeda remains. As long as any popular support for Al-Qaeda is in place, the threat of continued terrorist attacks on the US and the West remain very real.

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US Legislature’s Focus is Too Narrow on Terrorism Trials

The September 28, 2006, New York Times posits that “Congress took major steps…toward establishing a new system for interrogating and trying terror suspects as the House approved legislation sought by President Bush and the Senate defeated efforts to alter the measure.” Unfortunately, the majority of our Legislators and other government leaders are looking at the issue through an overly focused lens.

As far as the Global War on Terror is concerned, it is vitally important that any judicial steps taken with terror suspects and detainees are strictly in accord with our traditional constitutional principles and ideals. The only way to truly defeat terrorism is to eliminate the oppression and neglect endured by the people of the world who are subsequently driven to support extremist beliefs and actions.

Only the radical extremists benefit from violations of our constitutional principles and the Geneva Conventions. It allows them to claim truthfully that the self-described US liberators are actually oppressing people and treating them differently than the US would have its own people treated. This clearly works against US credibility and the credibility of democracy in general, and interferes with alliance building while arguably driving supporters into the ranks of the enemy.

We should support and applaud the efforts of Legislators like John McCain (R-AZ), who knows what oppression and torture are first hand. His eloquent position is worth quoting at length as he points out that torture and inhumane treatment, “…not only offend our values as Americans, but undermine our war effort, because abuse of prisoners harms – not helps – us in the war on terror. First, subjecting prisoners to abuse leads to bad intelligence, because under torture a detainee will tell his interrogator anything to make the pain stop. Second, mistreatment of our prisoners endangers U.S. troops who might be captured by the enemy – if not in this war, then in the next. And third, prisoner abuses exact on us a terrible toll in the war of ideas, because inevitably these abuses become public. When they do, the cruel actions of a few darken the reputation of our country in the eyes of millions. American values should win against all others in any war of ideas, and we can’t let prisoner abuse tarnish our image.”

Our success in the Global War on Terror is directly affected by our treatment of detainees, prisoners, and innocent bystanders. We are in a political competition with the extremists of the world and the constituents we are competing for are judging our merits by watching our every action.

In the Times article, Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) is quoted as saying, “We are dealing with the enemy in war, not defendants in our criminal justice system…In time of war it is not practical to apply the same rules of evidence that we apply in civil trials or courts martial for our troops.”

It is interesting to note that 43 retired generals and admirals have felt compelled by their moral outrage to challenge President Bush's proposed legislation on interrogating terrorist suspects.

Many subject matter experts in counterinsurgency would also beg to differ with the Bush Administration. They would even argue that never is it more important to uphold the principles of democracy, justice, and the Geneva Conventions than when dealing with an insurgency.

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) has labeled our current and proposed treatment of detainees and prisoners as “un-American, unconstitutional, and contrary to American interests…”

He couldn’t be more right.

Some policy makers claim that anyone who doesn’t agree with the Bush Administration’s view, that is, anyone who agrees that we should provide just and humane treatment for enemy prisoners of war—followed by reasonable and fair trials, is giving into the enemy and potentially increasing the terrorist threat.

They couldn’t be more wrong.

Our Legislators on both sides of the isle must rethink what the end state of the Global War on Terror should be. It should be an end state in which the rest of the world—especially the oppressed and neglected, view the United States as the beacon of justice that we claim. These people should be flocking to our side, and not just to our borders, and certainly not to the ranks of our enemies. However, in order to do that we must redefine our global strategy and adjust the tools we use accordingly.

We must remember that our decisions affect an increasingly globalized constituency. Unlike the coming US mid-term elections, every constituent we lose in the socio-political war on terror becomes a potential supporter of the brutal enemy we face, and that is exactly what puts our troops in harm’s way and jeopardizes victory in the war on terror.

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Bush Administration Denies Iraq War is Catalyst for Insurgency and Terrorism

Same Old Hubris in Spite of the Evidence?
A declassified version of the controversial National Intelligence Estimate dated April 2006 and released last night states that jihadism is growing and likely to continue doing so in significant part because of the war in Iraq. This point is in stark contrast to the claims of the Bush Administration.

John Negroponte, the National Intelligence Director whose office created the report stated prior to its public release that viewing the document “…through the narrow prism of a fraction of judgments distorts the broad framework they create."

According to various newspaper reports, the National Intelligence Estimate is an analysis that represents a consensus view of all 16 US intelligence agencies. Interestingly, the first bullet point in the 4-page declassified document states “…a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.”

This hardly sounds like a narrow prism of distorted judgments, and if it is, why then is it even going to the President?

The document goes on to state “…that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives: perceived jihadists success there [in Iraq] would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.” The authors point out that jihadists consider the war in Iraq as their “cause celebre.”

White House statements of the recent past have suggested that even Osama Bin Laden believes the central front of the war is in Iraq, implying that this legitimizes President Bush’ s order to invade. If Bin Laden wants to fight the US in Iraq it is because he knows that as long as we continue fighting the way we are he enjoys a strategic advantage. He believes that Al-Qaeda and others can bled us dry and he can rely on support resulting from anti-American popular support. In reality, most Muslims would not support him in any of his other causes.

Richard Serrano of the LA Times notes that “The White House…sharply disagreed with a new U.S. intelligence assessment that the war in Iraq is encouraging global terrorism,” and that “…Bush administration officials stressed that anti-American fervor in the Muslim world began long before the Sept. 11 attacks.”

Emphasizing this point, White House spokesman, Peter Watkins, added that much of what Islamic extremists “rage” about the United States and Israel goes back generations and is not linked to the US occupation of Iraq. "Their hatred for freedom and liberty did not develop overnight…Those seeds were planted decades ago."

These points are only correct if interpreted in an exceptionally narrow way. The Bush Administration’s continued denial of the key point of this intelligence estimate defies common sense.

In essence, the Administration is arguing that the increased US presence in Iraq after a violent invasion that failed in its objective to find weapons of mass destruction and improve the lives of the average Iraqi has not driven more people into the ranks of the extremists. It also implies that neither did the harsh CPA de-Baathification policies that added over a million trained Iraqi security forces and other civilian leaders (and their dependents) to the unemployment lines. Further, they imply that the mass detention of military age boys and men and that the abuses at Abu Ghraib have not inspired significant growth in the anti-American jihadist ranks. Not to mention the occasional violent military confrontation that has taken place since our arrival.

The NIE also points out that the root causes fueling the spread of jihadism are “…corruption, injustice and fear of Western domination…the Iraq jihad…the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social and political reforms…and pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims.”

What actions have we taken in Iraq that don’t exacerbate these issues?

The presence of foreign powers, high unemployment rates, the lack of consistent utilities and other basic health, security, and social services create enough motivation in and of themselves to drive people to insurgency. In fact, they are the classic root causes for past and present insurgencies around the world. There is little doubt that they have directly contributed to the US war of liberation spinning out of control and into an occupation, and finally into the insurgency we face today.

The Administration ignored many experts who predicted an insurgency well before the invasion. Many of these same experts identified the active insurgency as soon as it presented itself on the battlefield, but again Administration officials denied it existed until it was absolutely too obvious to ignore.

Are we seeing more of the same denial with respect to this national intelligence estimate? Should the American people be surprised that the administration is reacting to bad news as it always has, that is, by flatly denying it? Especially when the bad news is the direct result of its earlier bad decisions?

Any increase of western interaction in the region is a significant threat to radical Islamic groups and is bound to provoke a reaction from them. They believe they have nothing to gain from interaction with the western world, which represents a threat to their political control and core religious beliefs by its mere existence. An Islamic Theocratic Region, absolutely devoid of outside non-Islamic influence, and the elimination of Israel as a state are the goals of Al-Qaeda and their supporters. These goals are unlikely given the West’s traditional support for Israel and our continued need for resources from the region. Significantly, the Islamic extremists represent only small portion of the overall society they claim to represent.

Considering the poor treatment that many Iraqis have suffered at the hands of the US occupation forces, which is the direct result of poor leadership and planning well before the invasion, how can anyone deny that the increase in regional jihadism is not significantly attributable to the war in Iraq? If the war in Iraq hasn’t driven this growth in jihadism, then what has? It certainly didn’t occur on any comparable scale during the first Gulf War and in spite of the fact that the “seeds of hatred for freedom and liberty” were planted decades prior to that time too.

Removing Saddam Hussein from power and attempting to root out potential Iraqi hotbeds of terrorism are certainly great intentions. Nonetheless, the reckless and overconfident nature of the Administration’s Global War on Terror, and specifically its management of the war in Iraq have backfired tremendously. This has caused the exact opposite result. Although we are much safer from Saddam Hussein, we are in much more danger from the spreading jihadist ranks.

The sooner the administration learns to admit this, the sooner we can do something about it.

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