Afghanistan: Does Any of this Sound Familiar?

According to the October 26 article by Rachel Morarjee and Daniel Dombey in London’s The Financial Times, NATO “…sought to dismiss fears that its operation in Afghanistan was in disarray…” after a clash in the southern region of the country that may have killed dozens of civilians. Exactly like the strategy in Iraq, NATO leaders are prosecuting the war in Afghanistan using conventional military tactics of firepower and attrition against an unconventional threat. Once again, the political and military forces should be more concerned with separating the insurgents from the rest of the populace via classic counterinsurgency techniques. Instead, they are driving support directly to our enemies.

Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the British army has stated that NATO troops are in a much better position to manage the fighting in Afghanistan than equivalent forces in Iraq. Of course, the US forces in Iraq were once in a better position to deal with the insurgents there. That is, until the unrestrained and harsh treatment of the civilian populace drove up recruitment for the insurgents.

According to the article by Jason Motlagh in today’s Asia Times Online, military officials insist that at least 155 Afghan civilians have been killed and remain the most common victims in what appears as purely indiscriminate violence.

Nonetheless, Mark Laity, a NATO spokesman in Afghanistan recently stated, “We have demonstrated that we are strong enough on the combat side to be the winners. After 30 years of fighting, people in the south are nervous of being on the wrong side.”

A nervous populace is not conducive to winning an insurgency. This simply indicates that the population is not sure who to be more afraid of, the government and NATO, the local warlords, or the Taliban insurgents.

Sam Zarifi of Human Rights Watch has pointed out “The Soviets tried and failed to defeat Afghan guerrillas by using massive firepower so we know clearly that that is not the way to win in Afghanistan. You have to win the populace over, not kill it.”

Our radical Islamic enemies understand that as long as the population is not on our side—even if they are not on the Taliban or extremist side—then the western powers are on the defensive regardless of how much firepower they unleash.

Of course, NATO leaders will imply that since the insurgents are hitting and running from western and government forces, they are on the defensive and that we are winning or somehow making progress in the war on terror. Once again they are fooling themselves and trying to convince the rest of us.

Does any of this sound familiar?

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Rumsfeld’s Guillotine: The Myth Behind the Timeline Debate

There has been much debate over the proper strategy for the war on terror, and more specifically what the US should do in Iraq. What may be surprising is the fact that figuring out a counterinsurgency strategy is not as hard to do as one might think, once you accept the principle that violence committed by conventional armies cannot defeat an insurgency. In fact, conventional tactics will simply prolong the war and the longer it goes on the more likely the insurgents are to win. Many people who study this subject have been warning of this outcome for years and I doubt that after all the events in Iraq to date there are many Americans who disagree. Yet, even under the most ideal of circumstances, counterinsurgency strategies take a decade (or few) to achieve genuine victory, but that does not imply that 140,000 U.S. troops need to be there for the duration.

Contrary to Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent statement, "You're looking for some sort of a guillotine to come falling down if some date isn't met,” it may also be surprising to know that a counterinsurgency strategy does not necessarily have to be secret. Nor does publishing a timeline and milestones for execution pose any real risk. In fact, a properly defined timeline actually enhances the likelihood of success by establish a healthy sense of urgency by all participants to meet their specific objectives.

The most surprising thing is that with all the subject matter experts, military leaders, and “retired military” analysts pontificating via the media, there is still very little in the way of an understandable timeline that has been widely presented to the American people. President Bush has stated that he does not believe that a timeline will help, so his generals have not produced or publicized one. Had President Bush asked for a timeline I can assure you that our generals would have promptly presented him with one.

When we speak of a timeline, we are actually discussing the amount of time it should take to accomplish a given set of specific tasks and in some logical order. A timeline does not imply picking an arbitrary date by which something should be completed, as the Bush Administration often accuses those who propose the idea. A timeline is a “good faith estimate” made by professionals and subject matter experts as to how long it will take to achieve a specific set of end conditions.

This begs the question, “What are the desired end conditions?” The best planning and timelines in the world will not work without clear objectives. For example, let’s assume that the minimum objective for Iraq at this point is a way to get US troops out of the country while leaving behind a government that is supported by its own security forces. Let’s also assume that these Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) should be able to prevent an all out civil war and partition of the country into separate nations.

In order to do this, the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to figure out what the minimum number, types, and quality of Iraqi forces must be for the U.S. to be able to leave. This sounds fairly straightforward, but subtler issues complicate this significantly, i.e., managing the diversity and inculcating ethnic and religious tolerance into those security forces. Ensuring that the security forces are loyal to the government and operate in a spirit of genuine service is required as well. It implies complementary strategies of offering honorable amnesty opportunities to some insurgents willing to lay down their arms, while engaging other militias to help turn the situation back into an operation in which they can take pride and help achieve Iraqi success. It also implies that there is significant political and reconstruction support for the fledgling democratic government, and includes help and support from neighboring countries. These issues plainly demonstrate that the task involves much more than the military simply determining the organizational make-up of the ISF, hence the earlier statement that this takes some decades to accomplish.

Nonetheless, a realistic timeline can be produced. Simply publicizing the timeline does not give the enemy any real advantage if one assumes that similarly trained and equipped Iraqi units replace the U.S. troops. No weakening of the overall security forces takes place that the insurgents can exploit.

Most significantly, a published timeline and high-level plan allow the U.S. and Iraqi Administrations and their generals to monitor, adjust, and report on progress. Surely, every project manager understands that no project goes exactly as planned, so realistic adjustments are made periodically and explained to stakeholders. If those adjustments make sense and the plan is generally progressing, then the people responsible or affected allow its continuation. If not, then change that is more significant is called for.

Interestingly, had the Bush Administration published its plan and timeline and demonstrated to the American people that they were actually making progress the imminent mid-term elections might not be in such doubt. More importantly, assuming we are making progress, the support of the American people and the rest of the world would be greater. Most importantly, the tolerance of the Iraqi people would currently be stronger instead of eroding as dramatically as it has.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld recently stated that while benchmarks for security, political and economic progress are valuable, "…it's difficult. We're looking out into the future. No one can predict the future with absolute certainty."

Statements like these may be true at a superficial level, but the management philosophy driving them appears to be superficial as well, and this is exactly why we are losing the support of the world. It is also exactly what our enemies have counted on from the very beginning.

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The Changing Nature of US Power

In Sebastian Mallaby’s October 23rd Washington Post Op-Ed piece, "A Nadir of U.S. Power," he points out that the United States has reached significantly low points both militarily and diplomatically. He states that adding more troops to our military problem "…seems tragically futile," and that "tough-talk diplomacy" and even our traditional methods of diplomacy are faltering. Mallaby is absolutely correct, but his well-written piece would be more aptly titled "A Change in the Nature of U.S. Power." Change implies that we as a nation and especially our political leadership must learn to function geopolitically given an entirely new set of operating principles.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has enjoyed being the dominant partner in world politics whether it involved the U.N., N.A.T.O., or other political, trade, or military associations. The driving forces behind that were the strong U.S. post-war economy, our primacy in conventional and nuclear warfare, and the presence of the global threat of communism.

Nations with weaker economies and smaller militaries felt pressure to ally themselves with one side or the other during the cold war. Many chose to take advantage of the resource hungry U.S. and its incredibly powerful consumer economy that could buy their local products and natural resources.

It was during this period that the U.S. diplomatic culture developed into that of what we believed was a benevolent, though considerably shortsighted, world power. Our diplomats were relatively immature in how they dealt with the rest of the world because they had been able to rely more upon economic and military strength and less upon negotiation to achieve their end goals. Most U.S. diplomats will certainly argue that negotiation has always been foremost in U.S. foreign policy, but the point here is that it has usually been from a position of significant dominance, which by definition changes the nature of any negotiation.

True diplomacy requires leaders who can work with competing stakeholders to build consensus to resolve a given issue, and by necessity, that has been the predominant diplomatic culture of most of the other nations of the world. They have had to figure out ways to maneuver the superpowers into taking positions that are to their own advantage and this takes much more diplomacy, positioning, and consensus building skill. It is a serious weakness in the managers of U.S. foreign policy and it has come to its zenith during the Bush Administration.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, smaller countries with weaker militaries no longer look to the U.S. for as much protection and support. The rise of globalization and international trade implies that more countries now have—or at the very least—are beginning to have more leverage over the resource dependant and consumer driven United States. The capability of a few determined people to cause immense destruction and political chaos render our large, nuclear backed military relatively impotent in certain situations.

Recent world events provide ample evidence that tough talk and an overly U.S.-centric worldview are no longer as effective as they once were. Our military as it is currently structured and employed is not capable of dealing with the predominant threats we now face. We are virtually alone in our war on terror in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations. There is support from some of our traditional allies, but even the hardy Brits are growing weary of flawed U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. Tough talk has driven nations like Iran and North Korea deeper into their own tough stances against us, and our extremist enemies are by definition willing to use much more violence to achieve their aims than our own society will allow us. We must now use that power differently.

No one advocates letting rogue states, terrorists, or other entities get away with criminal behavior. Rather, the U.S. should put more effort into building a genuine case for political support, and decisive military action as appropriate by collaborating with the more reasonable nations of the world.

It is time for U.S. leaders and policy makers to realize that we can no longer define what is right for everyone else. We must now ensure that whatever we negotiate for the benefit of the U.S. is not detrimental to our international neighbors because it will come back to haunt us. We must realize that we are now negotiating from of a position of relative equality compared to just 15-years ago.

It is time for us to mature diplomatically and collaborate with the world community in order to put an end to our growing political isolation, and it is time to redefine our understanding and use of military power to increase the likelihood of success against our enemies.

Mallaby asks "…has there been a worse moment for American power since Ronald Reagan celebrated morning in America almost a quarter century ago?" Probably not, but it certainly is not the end to U.S. power. We simply need to learn what our new powers are and use them in more globally astute ways than we have in the past.

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