Sunnis Cannot Be Excluded in the New Iraq: How to Really Win the War in Iraq and Positively Impact the Global War on Terror

Anne Gearan’s Associated Press article on December 2, 2006 “US rethinking Iraqi unification goal” indicates that President Bush is stepping up his personal role in the Iraqi political situation in an attempt to bring stability there. The article also hints at something quite ominous that other media sources have begun discussing of late. That is, the potential for the US choosing factional sides and the possible exclusion of Sunnis from further political attempts at bringing them into a more cooperative and diverse government. This would be a strategic mistake with tragic consequences. Fortunately, President Bush intends to meet with the Sunni Vice President next month to ensure that no such signal is officially sent—at least not yet.

Excluding the minority Sunnis would be a mistake for many reasons. First, regardless of past events and their minority status, it would further legitimize them as enemies to the majority groups and leave them even more vulnerable to oppression and neglect from the new government and their fellow Iraqis. Not all Sunnis are enemies of the new Iraqi government today, but if excluded they would likely become so when lacking any alternative.

Conversely, not all Shiite (and other) groups are friendly to the Iraqi government, so granting them some sort of blanket political status in comparison to a Sunni rejection would create a dangerous environment for some of our key allies in the region. Sunnis in Jordan and the majority Sunni population in Saudi Arabia, which does not necessarily support its own Wahhabist rulers, could interpret this action as an attack on Sunnis as a whole. This would compel them actively support their brethren in Iraq and expand the conflict and possibly destabilize other countries. External aid to Sunnis would increase Iran’s motivation to support the Shiites and a regional conflict could spin out of control, necessitating further US military involvement.

Rather, the US and Iraqi governments must identify the areas of support they already have, regardless of ethic or religious faction, and work to provide safety and security in those locations. This may only be a small portion of the country at first, but it is easiest to start there and build a legitimate working system that demonstrates how the government can effectively work for all groups in Iraq. The emphasis should be to build local police who are not corrupt and who respect diversity and Human Rights—that is, police who have a stake in the success of the local community. They are the primary counterinsurgents. Iraqi military forces should be used to help protect them and the people in these select areas and to fight the insurgents elsewhere whenever practical. It is critical that investments be made in these areas to increase employment and public services, and that are available to all members of the community.

The US and Iraqi governments should work with Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria, to obtain overall support and a commitment to reduce the amount of external arms and influence entering Iraq and bolstering the anti-government forces. It will not be easy, but it must occur.

As the protected and properly governed areas begin to prosper and the new Iraqi government builds relationships of trust within the general population, it can then begin expanding its influence outward and reduce the effectiveness and popularity of the anti-government forces and insurgents. To attempt to do this to the entire country at once is folly—the current Iraqi forces bolstered by 140,000 US troops have demonstrated that much already.

Once these “protected” areas are identified and troops are put into position, the US can reduce its forces by about 80%, leaving approximately 28,000 troops or 9 carefully chosen brigades to support the Iraqi led effort. US Special Forces advisor/trainers could work to help professionalize the police and military while US brigades capable of rapid deployment and reaction to specific crises could be stationed outside of the main population centers. This would reduce the US presence without completely eliminating our ability to protect our own troops and support the Iraqi government.

This is the true definition of the “long war” we have been hearing about for so long, and one can only hope that the Iraq Study Group presents some similar plan that the Bush Administration buys into. It will take decades to complete, but would cost the US a lot less in terms of non-recoverable military expenses and turn our effort into a genuine investment in the future of world stability. It would also reduce the incentive and popular support for local terrorists and lead to a genuine victory in Iraq as well as a victory in the global war on terror.
The sooner we get started the sooner we can stabilize Iraq and create a long term ally with a relatively prosperous people who have no reason to hate the US and support the anti-American jihadist terrorists, which was our goal in the first place.

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Shifting Blame Will Lead To Yet Another Long Term Crisis

The article in the November 29, 2006 Washington Post “As Iraq Deteriorates, Iraqis Get More Blame: U.S. Officials, Lawmakers Change Tone” by Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wright is very accurate in its portrayal of how US leaders are shifting the blame for the situation in Iraq upon the Iraqis themselves. The important implication is that this is the first step toward rationalizing a US withdrawal without accepting responsibility for the situation. The negative consequences of the “shifting blame game” are surprisingly understated considering Mr. Ricks book, “Fiasco”, which so eloquently details the folly of US policy in Iraq over the last decade and a half.

Certainly, people are responsible for their own actions, but their actions are significantly affected by the environment in which they find themselves. The current environment in Iraq is in large part the result of the US mishandling of the entire affair and the result will be an even larger number of people in a critical region of the world who will vehemently hold the negative consequences against the US. We’ll pay for it later—just like we have been paying for our poor political interaction with Iran prior to its revolution in 1979.

Recall that it was Saddam Hussein and not the Iraqi people who hated the US prior to our invasion. Shortly thereafter it was clear that the Iraqis were not happy about being overrun by a foreign power, but they understood why for the most part and were generally glad to be rid of Hussein. The Iraqi environment systematically deteriorated to one of fear and violence for a combination of reasons—most of them the direct result of US policies, some of which were in place even before the Invasion.

The first Bush Administration had encouraged an Iraqi revolt against Saddam and then did not support it. We inexplicably sat by while Saddam’s “defeated” military brutally crushed it. The result was a strong signal to all Iraqis that the US would not back up its words for the sake of “the people” and reinforced their belief that we would, however, back up our words with military might for the sake of oil.

The inept de-Baathification policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority and unemployment of half a million police, military, and middle class politicians and administrators all but eliminated any chance of effective security or basic public services in Iraq. The burgeoning Sunni insurgency took advantage of this situation and the US and new Iraqi regime’s failure to improve security only encouraged more Iraqis to take the situation into their own hands. Militias and death squads—some supported by radicals and outsiders from Al-Qaeda, Iran, and others resulted in a growing number of people killing each other over grievances both modern and ancient.

Harsh and inappropriate counterinsurgency tactics by US forces—by this time blatantly calling themselves “occupiers,” and the patent disregard by the Bush Administration for the principles of the Geneva Conventions only exacerbated the situation. Indiscriminately rounding up young men and sending them to Abu-Ghraib, condoning and even legitimizing torture, holding people prisoner without sufficient rights, and threatening them with secret tribunals having the authority to execute them did nothing to increase Iraqi esteem and trust for the US and what it stands for.

The recent political shift in the US, the talk of “cut and run,” the very need for the Iraq Study Group, and even the Israeli “defeat” in Southern Lebanon have all resulted in exactly what Osama Bin Laden predicted. “Our experience in guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers…bled Russia for ten years…and [it] was forced to withdraw in defeat…we are continuing this policy in bleeding America.”

To date we have done nothing but increase the number of US enemies in the region and amplify their reasons for waging a war of terror against us.

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Afghan Trust Requires Better Security Commitment: Not Just Bricks and Bulldozers

NATO forces have deployed bulldozers, construction materials, and cash to hire local men to repair war damage in Panjwai, Afghanistan. A renovated high school recently reopened and a new road is under construction to connect a number of bomb-damaged grape-growing villages—this according to Pamela Constable’s article in the November 27, 2006 Washington Post, “A NATO Bid to Regain Afghans' Trust: Reconstruction Projects Follow Airstrikes .”

Ms. Constable reports that NATO forces have committed $8 million to improve the southern Afghan farming town of Panjwai and the district of Zhari after NATO combat actions against the Taliban had inflicted severe damage and civilian loss of life. Their goal is to create “…a Taliban-proof development zone and a model for other post-conflict areas.”

Good intentions aside, the likelihood of success is slim at best.

Although the “hearts and minds” concept is honorable, and the reconstruction should take place on principle alone, NATO’s action will do nothing to substantially heal the wounds suffered by the local civilians or stem future attacks from the Taliban. Simply rebuilding the homes you have just destroyed is not counter-insurgency and does nothing for the innocent lives you took—especially since the only security that NATO will provide going forward is from a base that Canadian troops have established above the town and from which they will patrol in armored convoys.

Successful counterinsurgency requires active daily involvement with a local population that actually has faith in the counterinsurgent force—a force that must know the community, its history, culture, and its most intimate needs. This is something that no foreign military force can do. It is really a role for the local police who have a stake in their community and who have a network of friends and family for information purposes, and the intimate knowledge of the region to know when something is amiss. Having the Canadians ready to support them should the Taliban attack in force or their hideout be discovered would be ideal.

Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that local elders and district officials are selecting new police recruits and the local police commander is vetting them for suitability, they will receive only two weeks of police training, which the commander admits is far from adequate for a policeman. It is even less adequate for a local counterinsurgent force—assuming the Canadians are even trained in counterinsurgency and plan on working with the police in this way.

As for local opinions on the situation, Abdul Jan Mohammed, a grape farmer states, "The coalition forces have brought us nothing but problems. They enter our houses and mosques without permission. The Taliban don't want to fight. They are just tired of all the corruption, as we are." His vineyards were destroyed during past air strikes.

Nonetheless, the air strikes of the past, and threatened future bombing does not stop Taliban attacks. Two insurgents on a motorcycle ambushed a man taking his daughter for medical care in Kandahar. The man pointed out that "The local Taliban are sons of our soil, but the Taliban trained by al-Qaeda see all Afghans as infidels and Americans. They do not want any reconciliation." Taliban forces attacked a clinic at a refugee camp and briefly kidnapped the only doctor. The clinic sits abandoned now. No trained police are there to keep it secure and operating.

Until NATO begins managing the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the local manner that counterinsurgency requires, they will not achieve lasting security for the locals. The new roads, the high school, and the other construction projects will likely end up as expensive targets for both sides.

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