Failure in Iraq: Implications for the Global War on Terror
Various politicians, military leaders, and Middle East experts believe that an even greater disaster will befall Iraq and the region should the US and the fledgling Iraqi governments fail to stabilize the situation. The worst case scenario includes a ruthless civil war in which the minority Sunnis fall victim to the violent wrath of the majority Shiites. Neighboring countries with predominantly Sunni populations like Saudi Arabia have already warned that they are prepared to support their Sunni cousins. The intense rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran will pressure the Iranians to step up their own support of the Shiites. In northern Iraq the Kurds could take advantage of the chaos to declare their national sovereignty, which would embolden separatist Kurds in other countries like Turkey to step up their own insurgencies. Turkey also happens to be a predominantly Sunni state. According to the World Energy Council these countries represent approximately half of the world’s proven oil and natural gas reserves. Oil company profits aside, a disruption in the global oil supply of this magnitude as a result of a regional conflict could produce a global economic crisis on par with the Great Depression.
Regardless of the legitimacy or the reasoning for the initial US invasion of Iraq we have nonetheless unleashed the dogs of war in that country and have legitimized and driven more people in the region to hate and fear us. Over time, our mismanaged policies have actually increased the number of Iraqis who believe US troops should be attacked and we have drawn more people into the conflict who are willing to risk their own lives against us. We have allowed civil chaos via the almost complete disruption of civil authority in Iraq in the name of de-Baathification, and by extension the increased sectarian violence. Experts and pundits alike debate whether the scale of the conflict reaches the level of "civil war."
As if this scenario were not tragic enough the implications for the war on terror are even worse.
Make no mistake—we are losing the Global War on Terror in an appalling and irresponsible way. Debate at home and abroad regarding the treatment of "enemy combatants," domestic spying, the legitimization of torture, and the defiance of the principles of the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions have sealed our global reputation as an invader and oppressor for the sake of oil. We "liberated" Kuwait and protected Saudi Arabia for the sake of global oil supplies, but when we subsequently incited Iraqis to revolt against Saddam we left them to be destroyed by his "defeated" and vengeful military. Even moderate Muslims in the world have no more illusions about the conflict—this is exactly what they had feared and precisely what Al-Qaeda has hoped for. How can anyone expect the Iraqis (or anyone else) to rally around the concept of some form of central and representative government when the US is no longer even attempting to look like the ideals of democracy, justice, and hope that we have traditionally advocated?
Ironically, Al-Qaeda itself is not a popular insurgency, but a terrorist organization using legitimate popular grievances at the local and regional levels as a shield and source of support. This shield can only be eliminated by eroding Al-Qaeda’s ability to keep their supporters hostile to their various governments and US policies. It is highly probable that Al-Qaeda will never attain its extremist Islamic goals once its true objectives become the central focus of the conflict. Most Muslims simply do not want a world as envisioned by Osama Bin Laden or the Taliban. Nonetheless, as long as US foreign and military policies continue to obfuscate the extremist’s true intentions and generate the anger that draws attention away from those issues, the wars will continue.
A premature pullout of Iraq by US forces will almost certainly escalate the scale of violence in the region and have global repercussions. It would signify a tremendous strategic victory for Al-Qaeda and other jihadist extremists by proving that they can defeat the Western super power. If they can defeat us they can defeat any unpopular local governments as well. Israel’s recent folly in Southern Lebanon has also demonstrated that Israel is not as powerful as once popularly believed. The idea that the US could effectively come to Israel’s rescue has also been greatly reduced—especially if the bulk of the US army is tied up elsewhere.
In short, global terrorists are now emboldened by the fact that they can defeat the US just like they did the Russians in Afghanistan. As one Soviet General pointed out early on in the US conflict—the Soviets did very well in Afghanistan in the first year of their invasion too. A premature exit from Iraq will only prove that point beyond a doubt.
Nonetheless, remaining in Iraq and continuing our current strategy will only prolong our struggle and further increase the misery of the Iraqi people. The same is true in Afghanistan. A temporary "surge" in troops in either country is not likely to have the effect that their supporters claim. You cannot pacify or break the will of the entire region via force without first unleashing a level of violence unseen since World War II—and that is simply not going to happen.
As many people are finally coming to understand, the Global War on Terror is a socio-political struggle that has more in common with large scale policing than massed firepower or simply searching for and destroying terrorists. If the root causes of the conflict are not addressed, new terrorists will quickly step up to replace the few we eliminate. This is especially true if we continue to alienate the rest of the world as we have in the last few years.
The only way we should be fighting this war is via the classic principles of counterinsurgency that seek to reduce the root causes of war—fear, oppression, and neglect. In essence, our strategy should be to take the popular support away from Al-Qaeda and their allies by offering a genuinely better alternative. It is an alternative that we must first legitimize by demonstrating it ourselves. Once we do that, the terrorist extremists will have nowhere to hide and can be effectively dealt with. Only then can we claim victory. You cannot defeat the idea of terrorism, but you can defeat the legitimate and tangible socio-political disparities that give rise to it.
Regardless of the legitimacy or the reasoning for the initial US invasion of Iraq we have nonetheless unleashed the dogs of war in that country and have legitimized and driven more people in the region to hate and fear us. Over time, our mismanaged policies have actually increased the number of Iraqis who believe US troops should be attacked and we have drawn more people into the conflict who are willing to risk their own lives against us. We have allowed civil chaos via the almost complete disruption of civil authority in Iraq in the name of de-Baathification, and by extension the increased sectarian violence. Experts and pundits alike debate whether the scale of the conflict reaches the level of "civil war."
As if this scenario were not tragic enough the implications for the war on terror are even worse.
Make no mistake—we are losing the Global War on Terror in an appalling and irresponsible way. Debate at home and abroad regarding the treatment of "enemy combatants," domestic spying, the legitimization of torture, and the defiance of the principles of the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions have sealed our global reputation as an invader and oppressor for the sake of oil. We "liberated" Kuwait and protected Saudi Arabia for the sake of global oil supplies, but when we subsequently incited Iraqis to revolt against Saddam we left them to be destroyed by his "defeated" and vengeful military. Even moderate Muslims in the world have no more illusions about the conflict—this is exactly what they had feared and precisely what Al-Qaeda has hoped for. How can anyone expect the Iraqis (or anyone else) to rally around the concept of some form of central and representative government when the US is no longer even attempting to look like the ideals of democracy, justice, and hope that we have traditionally advocated?
Ironically, Al-Qaeda itself is not a popular insurgency, but a terrorist organization using legitimate popular grievances at the local and regional levels as a shield and source of support. This shield can only be eliminated by eroding Al-Qaeda’s ability to keep their supporters hostile to their various governments and US policies. It is highly probable that Al-Qaeda will never attain its extremist Islamic goals once its true objectives become the central focus of the conflict. Most Muslims simply do not want a world as envisioned by Osama Bin Laden or the Taliban. Nonetheless, as long as US foreign and military policies continue to obfuscate the extremist’s true intentions and generate the anger that draws attention away from those issues, the wars will continue.
A premature pullout of Iraq by US forces will almost certainly escalate the scale of violence in the region and have global repercussions. It would signify a tremendous strategic victory for Al-Qaeda and other jihadist extremists by proving that they can defeat the Western super power. If they can defeat us they can defeat any unpopular local governments as well. Israel’s recent folly in Southern Lebanon has also demonstrated that Israel is not as powerful as once popularly believed. The idea that the US could effectively come to Israel’s rescue has also been greatly reduced—especially if the bulk of the US army is tied up elsewhere.
In short, global terrorists are now emboldened by the fact that they can defeat the US just like they did the Russians in Afghanistan. As one Soviet General pointed out early on in the US conflict—the Soviets did very well in Afghanistan in the first year of their invasion too. A premature exit from Iraq will only prove that point beyond a doubt.
Nonetheless, remaining in Iraq and continuing our current strategy will only prolong our struggle and further increase the misery of the Iraqi people. The same is true in Afghanistan. A temporary "surge" in troops in either country is not likely to have the effect that their supporters claim. You cannot pacify or break the will of the entire region via force without first unleashing a level of violence unseen since World War II—and that is simply not going to happen.
As many people are finally coming to understand, the Global War on Terror is a socio-political struggle that has more in common with large scale policing than massed firepower or simply searching for and destroying terrorists. If the root causes of the conflict are not addressed, new terrorists will quickly step up to replace the few we eliminate. This is especially true if we continue to alienate the rest of the world as we have in the last few years.
The only way we should be fighting this war is via the classic principles of counterinsurgency that seek to reduce the root causes of war—fear, oppression, and neglect. In essence, our strategy should be to take the popular support away from Al-Qaeda and their allies by offering a genuinely better alternative. It is an alternative that we must first legitimize by demonstrating it ourselves. Once we do that, the terrorist extremists will have nowhere to hide and can be effectively dealt with. Only then can we claim victory. You cannot defeat the idea of terrorism, but you can defeat the legitimate and tangible socio-political disparities that give rise to it.
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