War Czar? Why Build Even More Bureaucracy?
According the April 13th Washington Post, the Bush Administration is developing the position of Execution Manager, aka the “War Czar,” which “would be empowered to cut through the bureaucracy and talk directly with…the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, and other key figures to figure out what is needed to make progress on the ground.” Ostensibly, this new position would help counter the “slowness and ineffectiveness of the American bureaucracy," according to Newt Gingrich who supports the idea. Unfortunately, the creation of this single position is not going to lead to the type of efficiency that the administration anticipates and will likely lead to a whole new level of bureaucracy and red tape.
Reportedly, the Bush Administration has primarily approached former senior military officers for the job, at least five of whom have declined the offer. The major flaw in this thinking is that it must be a military officer. There are enough officers in the chain of command between General Petraeus and the President as it is. This post is specifically supposed to facilitate support for the political, civil, and non-governmental issues facing our military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wouldn’t the post be better filled by a professional State Department officer who has spent his or her career managing highly complex, cross-functional, and cross-cultural projects?
Beyond the “War Czar” the position would need a staff of inter-agency representatives from just about every civil department we have. Furthermore, the required subject matter experts would range from cultural experts and logistics managers, to health care providers, education experts, and professional public administrators. The office of the War Czar would balloon into a huge bureaucracy in no time, assuming it actually tries to tackle the scope of the challenges it faces. Wouldn’t it be better to create a civilian staff from our existing federal departments to report to General Petraeus (and another staff to report to his immediate boss, the CENTCOM Commander) to manage the issues that they are already trained for? These staff members would have the years of government experience and specifically the relationships and know how within their own departments required to cut through much of the red tape. They would also have experience with the myriad of non-governmental agencies that are also so crucial to success. All they need is strategic direction from the senior leader at their level of operations.
But who is the senior leader? One might argue that since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are predominantly civil and political challenges, General Petraeus should be a member of the staff that I propose. Perhaps a civilian should be in charge of the strategies we are attempting in these countries. In truth, I am a huge supporter of Petraeus, who is not only a general, but who also holds a Masters of Public Administration and happens to be one of our most experienced and highly trained generals in counterinsurgency.
The point of civil or military primacy is an interesting debate for another time, but as long as it is primarily the military leading the effort— it is going to primarily be a military effort. I’ll bet my paycheck that General Petraeus agrees.
Reportedly, the Bush Administration has primarily approached former senior military officers for the job, at least five of whom have declined the offer. The major flaw in this thinking is that it must be a military officer. There are enough officers in the chain of command between General Petraeus and the President as it is. This post is specifically supposed to facilitate support for the political, civil, and non-governmental issues facing our military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wouldn’t the post be better filled by a professional State Department officer who has spent his or her career managing highly complex, cross-functional, and cross-cultural projects?
Beyond the “War Czar” the position would need a staff of inter-agency representatives from just about every civil department we have. Furthermore, the required subject matter experts would range from cultural experts and logistics managers, to health care providers, education experts, and professional public administrators. The office of the War Czar would balloon into a huge bureaucracy in no time, assuming it actually tries to tackle the scope of the challenges it faces. Wouldn’t it be better to create a civilian staff from our existing federal departments to report to General Petraeus (and another staff to report to his immediate boss, the CENTCOM Commander) to manage the issues that they are already trained for? These staff members would have the years of government experience and specifically the relationships and know how within their own departments required to cut through much of the red tape. They would also have experience with the myriad of non-governmental agencies that are also so crucial to success. All they need is strategic direction from the senior leader at their level of operations.
But who is the senior leader? One might argue that since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are predominantly civil and political challenges, General Petraeus should be a member of the staff that I propose. Perhaps a civilian should be in charge of the strategies we are attempting in these countries. In truth, I am a huge supporter of Petraeus, who is not only a general, but who also holds a Masters of Public Administration and happens to be one of our most experienced and highly trained generals in counterinsurgency.
The point of civil or military primacy is an interesting debate for another time, but as long as it is primarily the military leading the effort— it is going to primarily be a military effort. I’ll bet my paycheck that General Petraeus agrees.
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home