We Must Fight the War on Two Popular Fronts
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
When a foreign military force attempts to mitigate an insurgent conflict abroad it faces two major fronts in terms of popular support. The first is obvious—the host nation populace most affected by the conflict. The second front is back home where its underlying moral, political, economic, and material support comes from.
By now most Americans are familiar with the phrases “winning the hearts-and-minds” or “winning over the popular support of the people” as they pertain to counterinsurgency. These are absolute truisms and go to the heart of the challenge. Insurgents can only operate effectively if they enjoy some significant measure of active or passive support from the local populace; or if they can exploit issues like important political, ethnic, or religious tensions. Counterinsurgents can only be successful if they somehow deny that support to the enemy. Unfortunately, a foreign force cannot mitigate the root causes of someone else’s civil conflict. Only the host nation belligerents can do that—assuming they are capable and willing.
Unfortunately, in Iraq and Afghanistan, indiscriminate military and political actions by coalition forces have mostly served to alienate the populace rather than embrace it, and the ability of the militant and political factions to work out some sort of modus vivendi is in doubt. The amount of violence Iraqis have so far endured and perpetrated upon each other makes it fairly clear that much more is required than a foreign imposed and likely temporary “security” zone.
On the home front, the foreign military force can only continue its effort if the people paying for and fighting in the conflict believe that it is a worthy and winnable cause. American popular and political support is waning after four unproductive years of war. This is especially the case since some of our most senior military commanders have acknowledged that we were not institutionally prepared for this type of war and the reasons for going in the first place are so questionable.
Further, there is the grave absence of non-military and non-governmental support in theater for the effort to restore effective Iraqi government and social services. Human Rights violations at home and abroad and morally questionable decisions and legal interpretations by the current administration continue to destroy our nation’s credibility. This is all resulting in the significant loss of vital popular support from the home front.
Assuming that it is not yet too late, the US must change how it strategically manages the “war on terror,” both in the theater of operations and back home in the theater of perceptions. Until we and our allies begin applying the right tactical principles in both theaters we will not be any more successful. This is a tremendous shame, because General Petraeus understands all of this, but he has inherited two extremely challenging fronts for which he simply does not have the level of support required. Nor is he likely to receive it anytime soon.
By now most Americans are familiar with the phrases “winning the hearts-and-minds” or “winning over the popular support of the people” as they pertain to counterinsurgency. These are absolute truisms and go to the heart of the challenge. Insurgents can only operate effectively if they enjoy some significant measure of active or passive support from the local populace; or if they can exploit issues like important political, ethnic, or religious tensions. Counterinsurgents can only be successful if they somehow deny that support to the enemy. Unfortunately, a foreign force cannot mitigate the root causes of someone else’s civil conflict. Only the host nation belligerents can do that—assuming they are capable and willing.
Unfortunately, in Iraq and Afghanistan, indiscriminate military and political actions by coalition forces have mostly served to alienate the populace rather than embrace it, and the ability of the militant and political factions to work out some sort of modus vivendi is in doubt. The amount of violence Iraqis have so far endured and perpetrated upon each other makes it fairly clear that much more is required than a foreign imposed and likely temporary “security” zone.
On the home front, the foreign military force can only continue its effort if the people paying for and fighting in the conflict believe that it is a worthy and winnable cause. American popular and political support is waning after four unproductive years of war. This is especially the case since some of our most senior military commanders have acknowledged that we were not institutionally prepared for this type of war and the reasons for going in the first place are so questionable.
Further, there is the grave absence of non-military and non-governmental support in theater for the effort to restore effective Iraqi government and social services. Human Rights violations at home and abroad and morally questionable decisions and legal interpretations by the current administration continue to destroy our nation’s credibility. This is all resulting in the significant loss of vital popular support from the home front.
Assuming that it is not yet too late, the US must change how it strategically manages the “war on terror,” both in the theater of operations and back home in the theater of perceptions. Until we and our allies begin applying the right tactical principles in both theaters we will not be any more successful. This is a tremendous shame, because General Petraeus understands all of this, but he has inherited two extremely challenging fronts for which he simply does not have the level of support required. Nor is he likely to receive it anytime soon.
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