“The Elephant in the War Room”
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director of WinTheGWOT.org
Originally published in the September 13th Washington Times.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are providing testimony on progress in the war in Iraq even as significant debate continues regarding just how to assess developments in the war. Supporters and anti-war activists alike have plenty of information from reasonable sources to support their given positions. One major issue that appears to be lacking in most discussions is the disposition of sectarian militias, like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and their potential next steps.
According to various sources, the Mahdi Army consists of anywhere from to 10,000 to 60,000 fighters. The Iraq Study Group more than doubled that number. Even though al-Sadr and the US have signed a cease fire, some sources have quoted recent Department of Defense reports as indicating that the Mahdi Army has “replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq."
Al-Sadr has recently called for his militia to cease its operations for six months in order reorganize, and ostensibly for him to regain control of the more radical elements in which he has had lesser influence. He may be able to do exactly that by justifying his call for a cease fire as a means to accelerate the US drawdown of forces in Iraq. Any US withdrawal is clearly conditioned upon increased security and stability. In other words, a significant reduction in sectarian combat operations against each other, and against US and Iraqi government forces.
Should other belligerents do likewise—such as the Badr Corps, which opposes the Mahdi Army—a very false sense of security and success could motivate a premature US withdrawal. This would provide sectarian forces with the maneuver room they need to conduct combat operations against each other and throw Iraq into greater chaos.
Even if the Iranians and other neighboring countries do not become “directly” involved, they will continue to provide supplies, funds, fighters, and safe havens to the militias of their choice. This will ensure that the conflict continues indefinitely and force Iraq’s 22 million citizens—most of whom are not currently combatants—to choose sides and become much more involved than the relatively small proportion that makes up the current militias.
Although General Petraeus’s safeguard and secure strategy has likely done what he said it would, it has not addressed the underlying root causes of the civil conflict in Iraq. If the single largest “unified” military force withdraws, Iraq will no longer have the very limited safety and security it appears to have today. General Petraeus is the first to say that the social and political root causes must be addressed in order for any success to sustain itself. To paraphrase him, the military alone cannot win the war in Iraq.
Until the US and the rest of the world begin applying as many resources to addressing these non-military root causes as they have to the overt military challenges, the war in Iraq will continue. Although the Iraqis are certainly responsible for their own social justice, the enormous level of US involvement means that it is clearly the responsibility of Ambassador Crocker and the US State Department to see that these root causes are addressed. This is where any assessment of progress in Iraq must truly focus. Unfortunately, most indications are that we are failing here, and in an appalling manner. Today, safety and security of any appreciable level in Iraq are only as certain as the US military’s ability to provide them—and that clearly has its operational and political limits.
Originally published in the September 13th Washington Times.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are providing testimony on progress in the war in Iraq even as significant debate continues regarding just how to assess developments in the war. Supporters and anti-war activists alike have plenty of information from reasonable sources to support their given positions. One major issue that appears to be lacking in most discussions is the disposition of sectarian militias, like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and their potential next steps.
According to various sources, the Mahdi Army consists of anywhere from to 10,000 to 60,000 fighters. The Iraq Study Group more than doubled that number. Even though al-Sadr and the US have signed a cease fire, some sources have quoted recent Department of Defense reports as indicating that the Mahdi Army has “replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq."
Al-Sadr has recently called for his militia to cease its operations for six months in order reorganize, and ostensibly for him to regain control of the more radical elements in which he has had lesser influence. He may be able to do exactly that by justifying his call for a cease fire as a means to accelerate the US drawdown of forces in Iraq. Any US withdrawal is clearly conditioned upon increased security and stability. In other words, a significant reduction in sectarian combat operations against each other, and against US and Iraqi government forces.
Should other belligerents do likewise—such as the Badr Corps, which opposes the Mahdi Army—a very false sense of security and success could motivate a premature US withdrawal. This would provide sectarian forces with the maneuver room they need to conduct combat operations against each other and throw Iraq into greater chaos.
Even if the Iranians and other neighboring countries do not become “directly” involved, they will continue to provide supplies, funds, fighters, and safe havens to the militias of their choice. This will ensure that the conflict continues indefinitely and force Iraq’s 22 million citizens—most of whom are not currently combatants—to choose sides and become much more involved than the relatively small proportion that makes up the current militias.
Although General Petraeus’s safeguard and secure strategy has likely done what he said it would, it has not addressed the underlying root causes of the civil conflict in Iraq. If the single largest “unified” military force withdraws, Iraq will no longer have the very limited safety and security it appears to have today. General Petraeus is the first to say that the social and political root causes must be addressed in order for any success to sustain itself. To paraphrase him, the military alone cannot win the war in Iraq.
Until the US and the rest of the world begin applying as many resources to addressing these non-military root causes as they have to the overt military challenges, the war in Iraq will continue. Although the Iraqis are certainly responsible for their own social justice, the enormous level of US involvement means that it is clearly the responsibility of Ambassador Crocker and the US State Department to see that these root causes are addressed. This is where any assessment of progress in Iraq must truly focus. Unfortunately, most indications are that we are failing here, and in an appalling manner. Today, safety and security of any appreciable level in Iraq are only as certain as the US military’s ability to provide them—and that clearly has its operational and political limits.
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home