Non-military Capacity Is the Exit Strategy
According to the Washington Post, “The Army is struggling to retain experienced younger officers [mostly Captains and Majors]…who are leaving partly because…they are alienated from leaders who lack their combat experience.”
"They are leaving because no one is listening to them. They don't trust the people above them," states a two combat tour officer according to the Post.
Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates understands the critical need to retain and promote younger combat veterans, especially those who understand the lessons in irregular warfare that we are relearning and that had been lost after the Vietnam War.
To this end, the Army has summoned General David Petraeus home from Iraq to take part in officer promotion boards and ensure that more unconventional thinkers are given due consideration. These promotion characteristics are vital to the future effectiveness of the Army, given the unconventional threat we will likely face in the foreseeable future.
We at WinTheGWOT applaud the DoD leadership for embracing this change and understand firsthand how hard it is to change paradigms and cultural values that have existed since before the cold war. In our thesis, “Winning the Global War on Terror: Unconventional Warfare is the Exit Strategy,” we have advocated further strategic reorganizations of the DoD in detail. We also advocate that extensive reorganization take place in the political infrastructure that should be predominant during unconventional warfare…namely, in the Department of State.
Recent news stories have reported how senior DoS officials have voiced their concern about serving in Iraq due to the tremendous personal risk they face there. This attitude must be changed. One suggestion for developing more unconventionally minded Army officers has been to create a permanent unconventional warfare advisory corps to help develop the type of leader required in future conflicts.
"The people who would gravitate toward service in an Army advisory corps would be the type of adaptive, flexible leader skilled in unconventional warfare," the Post quotes LTC John Nagl, one of the principle authors of the latest Field Manual on counterinsurgency.
We would argue that the DoS develop a similar advisory and educational system for our ambassadors and other officials since the political component of unconventional warfare is so vital to success. Von Clausewitz notwithstanding, any form of war is the outcome of political failure to deal with the root causes of conflict that occur at all levels of a given society. Government corruption, oppression, and simple neglect create unsatisfied populations with little hope and few alternatives. The longer the oppression and neglect are in place, the more extreme the populations’ feelings of exclusion and the greater the popular support for an insurgency—even one fostered by relative extremist organizations like Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
Beyond attempting to separate the insurgent factions or bolster the military might of the host nation, the global war on terror must include significant investments in eliminating the key socio-political threats that result in popular support for the insurgents. The credibility required to accomplish this comes from long-term relationships at all levels of the society, and through commitment to creating responsive forms of representative government all the way to the grass roots level. In short, the US DoS must be as involved in the resolution of the conflict as the military is.
It is no coincidence that General Petraeus was the officer in charge of the creation of the latest “US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual” (FM 3-24). In the “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition” of that FM it states, in bold lettering and as a sub-section heading, “Non-military Capacity Is the Exit Strategy.”
At best, the military can buy only a temporary advantage and relative stability, as in the case of the “surge” in Iraq. This will last only as long as it takes the enemy to figure out how to change their tactics and reduce its effect. Right now it is a race to see if the Iraqi government can legitimize itself in the eyes of the Iraqi people before our temporary stability dries up. It could still go either way, but having a more unconventionally minded DoS would certainly have increased the odds in favor of success.
"They are leaving because no one is listening to them. They don't trust the people above them," states a two combat tour officer according to the Post.
Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates understands the critical need to retain and promote younger combat veterans, especially those who understand the lessons in irregular warfare that we are relearning and that had been lost after the Vietnam War.
To this end, the Army has summoned General David Petraeus home from Iraq to take part in officer promotion boards and ensure that more unconventional thinkers are given due consideration. These promotion characteristics are vital to the future effectiveness of the Army, given the unconventional threat we will likely face in the foreseeable future.
We at WinTheGWOT applaud the DoD leadership for embracing this change and understand firsthand how hard it is to change paradigms and cultural values that have existed since before the cold war. In our thesis, “Winning the Global War on Terror: Unconventional Warfare is the Exit Strategy,” we have advocated further strategic reorganizations of the DoD in detail. We also advocate that extensive reorganization take place in the political infrastructure that should be predominant during unconventional warfare…namely, in the Department of State.
Recent news stories have reported how senior DoS officials have voiced their concern about serving in Iraq due to the tremendous personal risk they face there. This attitude must be changed. One suggestion for developing more unconventionally minded Army officers has been to create a permanent unconventional warfare advisory corps to help develop the type of leader required in future conflicts.
"The people who would gravitate toward service in an Army advisory corps would be the type of adaptive, flexible leader skilled in unconventional warfare," the Post quotes LTC John Nagl, one of the principle authors of the latest Field Manual on counterinsurgency.
We would argue that the DoS develop a similar advisory and educational system for our ambassadors and other officials since the political component of unconventional warfare is so vital to success. Von Clausewitz notwithstanding, any form of war is the outcome of political failure to deal with the root causes of conflict that occur at all levels of a given society. Government corruption, oppression, and simple neglect create unsatisfied populations with little hope and few alternatives. The longer the oppression and neglect are in place, the more extreme the populations’ feelings of exclusion and the greater the popular support for an insurgency—even one fostered by relative extremist organizations like Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
Beyond attempting to separate the insurgent factions or bolster the military might of the host nation, the global war on terror must include significant investments in eliminating the key socio-political threats that result in popular support for the insurgents. The credibility required to accomplish this comes from long-term relationships at all levels of the society, and through commitment to creating responsive forms of representative government all the way to the grass roots level. In short, the US DoS must be as involved in the resolution of the conflict as the military is.
It is no coincidence that General Petraeus was the officer in charge of the creation of the latest “US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual” (FM 3-24). In the “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition” of that FM it states, in bold lettering and as a sub-section heading, “Non-military Capacity Is the Exit Strategy.”
At best, the military can buy only a temporary advantage and relative stability, as in the case of the “surge” in Iraq. This will last only as long as it takes the enemy to figure out how to change their tactics and reduce its effect. Right now it is a race to see if the Iraqi government can legitimize itself in the eyes of the Iraqi people before our temporary stability dries up. It could still go either way, but having a more unconventionally minded DoS would certainly have increased the odds in favor of success.
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