What Could Joe Donnelly Really Know?
Tom Coyne’s AP article “Rep. Donnelly says Iraq situation better” published in the December 19, 2007 Indianapolis Star quotes Representative Joe Donnelly (D-IND) as stating "I feel we've made progress, and the other part is I feel we can see an end game in sight…It isn't we just keep plugging away in the hopes something will turn out right. General Petraeus is working a plan and we seem to be heading toward a place where the Iraqis can be self-sustaining and we'll have a smaller presence in the background."
The article goes on to point out that “Donnelly's findings were in stark contrast to his visit to Iraq last July…” Just exactly how does Representative Donnelly know all this? What unconventional military experience does he bring to the table to make so bold an independent assessment? All he can realistically do is agree with General Petraeus’s opinions, and don’t get me wrong, General Petraeus is high on my list of heroes, but even he had to learn this type of warfare On-The-Job. Where is the independent and informed assessment supported by experts on unconventional warfare not within General Petraeus’s and the Bush Administration’s sphere of influence?
Here are some interesting facts. The US military trains only about 5-7,000 Special Forces and other troops in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency who make careers out of this type of warfare. Out of a military of roughly 1.5 million, this means that less than 1% of our military forces know the subject in depth. Only about 2-4% of these soldiers consist of officers, so it should surprise no one that very, very few of them become general officers. This would seemingly explain many of our earlier blunders in the war.
These blunders were greatly compounded by a US State Department that has virtually no understanding of unconventional warfare. They simply do not get that the key factors in this type of war are its highly political nature and that it must be managed at the local level.
Now I offered my decade of unconventional warfare experience to Joe Donnelly about the time of his recent election and never even received so much as a polite, “No thank you.” Apparently my independent expertise and that of other respected authorities I can put Representative Donnelly in touch with were not necessary.
The AP also reports that Representative Donnelly would “…like to see the number of troops down to about 100,000 by the end of 2008, and by the end of 2009 be down to 30,000 to 45,000 troops working mostly as trainers and advisers.”
All that would be very nice, but just how did he come up with these numbers given that he has no real experience, and apparently no subject matter experts to guide him in his estimates?
The article goes on to point out that “Donnelly's findings were in stark contrast to his visit to Iraq last July…” Just exactly how does Representative Donnelly know all this? What unconventional military experience does he bring to the table to make so bold an independent assessment? All he can realistically do is agree with General Petraeus’s opinions, and don’t get me wrong, General Petraeus is high on my list of heroes, but even he had to learn this type of warfare On-The-Job. Where is the independent and informed assessment supported by experts on unconventional warfare not within General Petraeus’s and the Bush Administration’s sphere of influence?
Here are some interesting facts. The US military trains only about 5-7,000 Special Forces and other troops in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency who make careers out of this type of warfare. Out of a military of roughly 1.5 million, this means that less than 1% of our military forces know the subject in depth. Only about 2-4% of these soldiers consist of officers, so it should surprise no one that very, very few of them become general officers. This would seemingly explain many of our earlier blunders in the war.
These blunders were greatly compounded by a US State Department that has virtually no understanding of unconventional warfare. They simply do not get that the key factors in this type of war are its highly political nature and that it must be managed at the local level.
Now I offered my decade of unconventional warfare experience to Joe Donnelly about the time of his recent election and never even received so much as a polite, “No thank you.” Apparently my independent expertise and that of other respected authorities I can put Representative Donnelly in touch with were not necessary.
The AP also reports that Representative Donnelly would “…like to see the number of troops down to about 100,000 by the end of 2008, and by the end of 2009 be down to 30,000 to 45,000 troops working mostly as trainers and advisers.”
All that would be very nice, but just how did he come up with these numbers given that he has no real experience, and apparently no subject matter experts to guide him in his estimates?
posted by Matt Rowe at 1:10 PM
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