Most Recent NIE Report Warns of Increasing Civil Conflict in Iraq

According to the Washington Post, the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq charts an increasingly risky situation over the next 18 months “in which the United States has little control.” The still classified NIE also concludes that it is very likely that the decline will continue, and though experts are not sure whether to classify the situation as a civil war they point out that there is still hope for improvement. Various politicians and media pundits have stated that it is time for the Iraqi government to “step up” and be the driving force behind that improvement.

The NIE also points out that “…Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence as the primary source of conflict and the most immediate threat to U.S. goals.” This is exactly the situation that Al-Qaeda has hoped for.

The Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, even referred to the NIE in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently, stating that "Iraq is at a precarious juncture” and “that the situation could deteriorate, but there are prospects for increasing stability."

Unfortunately, the prospects to which he referred were apparently dependent upon the commitment of Iraqi government to figure out how to end Sunni-Shiite violence and “the willingness of Iraqi security forces to pursue extremist elements of all kinds." These are requirements that the Iraqis are simply not capable of at this time.

We at WinTheGWOT.org do not believe that this improvement is likely to come from the Iraqi military and police forces as they are constituted today. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters are simply incapable of pulling it off—at least, not without continued and significantly refocused US support.

As we have pointed out in past commentaries, the US post-invasion purging of any functioning police and military command and control via de-Baathification means that it is not likely that their new leaders will effectively rise above sectarian interests. They are considerably infiltrated by extremists and have too high a percentage of poorly trained and inexperienced personnel to re-establish effective national institutions and end internal corruption—this is especially so given the intensity of the civil conflict.

We do not advocate an open ended commitment, but we do call for the publishing of an understandable strategy that is supported by a realistic timeline with relevant milestones and deliverables. The US must first create an environment of basic civil safety and security while at the same time properly vetting, stabilizing, and closely monitoring the Iraqi police and military to ensure that they can—and do—live up to their public responsibilities. This may or may not require more US troops, but it will require more time. Only then can Iraq return to a more normal situation in which the average Iraqi has prospects for decent work and reasonable prosperity and much less motivation to risk all of that by turning violently upon his neighbors and US troops.

This would also greatly reduce the effectiveness of both Al-Qaeda in Iraq and hinder the meddling of Iranian and other forces as well and positively impact on the overall Global War on Terror. It would be a major set back to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and erodes its base of support, and it could even lead to the development of a first-class Iraqi-Arab counterinsurgency/counter terrorism force that would be a tremendously effective ally in the region going forward.

One thing is certain—the Iraqis are not yet ready to step up and this is directly the fault of US policies to date. However dark it may seem today, the majority of Iraqis are growing exhausted by the violence and they are likely to embrace any reasonable security effort that finally starts to put an end to it.

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Stop denying seriousness of Afghan threat

By Anthony Cordesman

The situation in Afghanistan is still far from grim, but Nato may well be on a track that will cost both it and the Afghan government victory.

The Taliban and other extremist groups have increased their area of operations by more than four times between 2005 and 2006, acting as the de facto government once again in parts of the south and east. Direct fire attacks increased from 1,347 in the first 11 months of 2005 to 3,824 during a similar period in 2006. Suicide attacks increased from 18 to 116. Attacks on Afghan forces increased by more than 300 per cent. Attacks on Nato forces increased by over 270 per cent. A big offensive against Nato and Afghan forces is expected this spring.

Nato's current forces would be inadequate even if all Nato countries were fully in the fight. There are roughly 30,000 Nato troops in Afghanistan, plus some 12,000 remaining US troops that still operate independently. Compare this to the total of 162,000 coalition troops in Iraq. Yet Afghanistan, in many ways, poses as big a challenge. It has a population of more than 31m, compared with some 27m in Iraq, its territory is 50 per cent larger and its transportation and communications infrastructure is far more primitive. The enemy in Iraq has no major sanctuary outside the country; al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin all use sanctuaries in Waziristan in eastern Pakistan.

To make matters worse, only US, Canadian, British, Danish, Estonian and Dutch forces are really in the fight. Important Nato partners such as France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Italy do not provide troops, except for French special forces.

Elsewhere, British weakness in the south has forced a political compromise that has allowed a big increase in the Taliban presence. Britain needs substantial additional forces to hold the south and prevent the slow growth of a Taliban presence that could end in the loss of Kandahar. Much of Helmand and Kandahar provinces are already at risk. Canada, the Netherlands and Romania play an important role in combat and Poland is coming. All these forces need heavier equipment and weapons. Indeed, Canada is introducing main battle tanks, the first country to do so. US commanders recognise that US troop strength is too weak in the east. America needs to increase forward deployed infantry battalions from two to at least three and probably four; more special forces are needed, too.

Moreover, studies by the International Security Force, the Nato command in Afghanistan, indicate that the Nato force needs six more battalions - especially another battalion in the south; a rapid expansion of military trainers for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police; and extra troops and specialists in other areas.

Nato needs integrated operations with common rules of engagement. It needs a truly integrated command with continuity of service and adequate tour lengths. Countries need to provide adequate armour, artillery, tactical mobility and air support. More effort is needed to integrate US advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets into Nato and Afghan operations. Nato also needs an integrated structure for using advanced US air and IS&R assets in the Combined Air Operation Center in Qatar, and a comprehensive, workable strategy for dealing with battlefield detainees.

Nato needs to put pressure on Pakistan to end the sanctuary it gives to the enemy. Nato has not addressed the weakness of the Afghan government and the scale of the problems created by a dependence on a narco-economy. It will be years before the central government in Kabul can create an effective presence and services in most local areas, particularly those under threat.

All Nato countries need to make a commitment to provide sustained military and economic aid at the required levels. Stronger efforts are needed to create effective military and police forces. The Afghan army is just beginning to be effective and has big pay, equipment and morale problems. Some key battalions have less than a quarter of authorised strength and retention is low. Germany wasted years training the wrong kind of police at inadequate levels. Effective police now have to be created virtually from the ground up and Nato/International Security Assistance Force aid is needed to build the capacity of the ministry of interior and in training, equipping and basing the Afghan National Police.

At the same time, Nato needs to restructure counter-narcotics efforts to focus on near-term economic development, anti-corruption and law enforcement, and phased eradication. It needs to broaden its aid efforts to support the government and help provide education, clinics and other local services.

It is time to stop denying how serious the threat has become, stop issuing empty political assurances and stop saying that far too little is enough. Nato needs realistic and honest assessments, it needs urgent short-term reinforcements. All of its forces must be in the fight all over the country. It needs to make immediate increases in aid and to create a fully resourced long-term plan to fight a long war.
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The writer holds the Burke Chair in Strategy at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and has recently returned from a visit to the military forces in Afghanistan
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007.

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Comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam: Inevitable, But Often Slipshod and Politically Motivated

We at WinTheGWOT realize that comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam are inevitable and even necessary. The two wars definitiely have some issues in common, but the more imminent threat to global security presented by Al-Qaeda's terrorist actions is the biggest distinction between the two conflicts. As Helle Dale points out in the article below we seem to be ignoring the important distinctions that would facilitate our success, while emphasizing the commonalities that will foster another defeat.

Iraq is no 'Nam
By Helle Dale
First Published January 31, 2007 in the Washington Times

Comparisons between Vietnam and Iraq have long been a staple of critics of the Bush administration. The Washington Post, for instance, recently adorned the wide expanse of the top half of the Sunday Outlook section with the famous photo of the last U.S. helicopter to leave the rooftop of the embassy in Saigon. Is that how the United States is going to leave Iraq? Ignominious and defeated? That is certainly the implication and maybe even the hope of too many here in Washington.

The differences with Vietnam are too many to enumerate. We do, for instance have a clearer mission than in Vietnam, an indigenous population that is far more friendly and nothing like the domestic opposition to the war and the troops themselves that helped undermine the effort in Vietnam. An important distinction is that succeeding Iraq may be even more important, as at least the Vietcong did not have the potential for committing terrorism on U.S. soil.

At any rate, there is, unfortunately, an emerging similarity between Vietnam and Iraq the willingness of politicians here to declare defeat and start the withdrawal of U.S. troops posthaste. The use of phrases like "phased redeployment" are the harbingers of self-inflicted defeat.

Enemies of the United States will take heart from several resolutions currently under consideration in the Senate, which may be voted on as early as today. Two of them oppose President Bush's proposal for a 20,000 troop strong "surge" of U.S. troops into Iraq, the cornerstone of Mr. Bush's newly unveiled plan for dealing with the sectarian violence in Baghdad and for securing the country's stability and democratic future.

Mr. Bush complained recently that critics of his plan are rushing to judgment without ever giving it a try. In fact, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden has charged that the White House is injecting more U.S. troops without any plan at all, which means he cannot have been watching any of Mr. Bush's recent speeches as detailed and specific as they have been.

A bipartisan resolution introduced by Sens. Biden and Chuck Hagel with 13 co-sponsors (including Sen. Hillary Clinton) expresses the entirely contradictory sentiment that "whereas maximizing chances of success in Iraq should be our goal, and the best chance of success requires a change in current strategy" at the same time it states that "it is not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its military involvement in Iraq." Given that the Iraqi government by its own admission is not able as yet to contain that violence without further help from the United States, this juxtaposition makes no sense.

Another resolution by Sens. John Warner and Ben Nelson with eight co-sponsors recognizes the president's authority as commander in chief to deploy U.S. armed forces, but at the same time "disagrees with the 'plan' to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the president instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below with reduced levels than proposed [sic]." Why the word "plan" is in quote marks is a mystery, unless it is to question that the administration has produced one, a stable of Democratic opposition to the war. Yet another resolution by Sen. Robert Byrd reaffirms the obvious point that according to the U.S. Constitution, only the Congress may declare war, obligating the president to seek its approval. Of course, this was exactly what Mr. Bush did before invading Iraq and received resounding support.

Only Sens. John McCain and Joe Lieberman have produced something helpful for the effort in Iraq in the form of a resolution that proposes to give Gen. Petraeus what he needs to do the job, including support for the troops already there and all the additional troops he believes he needs. The Senate of course unanimously confirmed Gen. Petraeus last week as commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, the very man whose plan for Iraq many of the Senators now criticize in an act of supreme self-contradiction.

Unfortunately, at stake in the struggle here in Washington is positioning for the next presidential election, both among Democrats and Republicans. It is the worst possible way to fashion U.S. foreign policy, and the shortsightedness it reflects could very seriously damage U.S. national interest and global leadership and the future of the Middle East. This grave responsibility is what senators ought to be contemplating as they cast their votes.

Copyright © 2007 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.

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