Repeating the Defense of Saigon in Baghdad
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
Recent press reports indicate that the full contingent of US forces—the "surge" of troops in Baghdad—is now complete with some 28,500 additional US troops in country. US military spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver has been quoted as saying, "Now that the force is here, we'll see the counterinsurgency start in full swing, and we'll be able to execute the strategy as it was designed."
What exactly does a counterinsurgency in “full swing” look like?
It certainly does not look like a lot of troops since an insurgency is specifically an effort by a weaker force to destabilize a stronger force. Simply having larger numbers of troops does nothing to eliminate the root causes for popular support for the insurgents or popular discontent with the government in power. This is why we think of insurgency as guerrilla warfare and “hit and run” and terrorist type attacks. If the most powerful army on the planet cannot protect the populace, then the insurgents can still win the war, and this is exactly what happened in Viet Nam. The old story goes that a US Colonel met a North Vietnamese Colonel during the final peace talks and pointed out that the North Vietnamese Army never won a single decisive battle against US troops. The North Vietnamese Colonel basically agreed with that statement, and then pointed out that it really made no difference. The North had still won the war.
The Soviets learned the same lesson in Afghanistan.
The press also reports that most of the new US troops are posted in “high-visibility positions” around Baghdad in an effort to decrease violence and increase the sense of local security. The strategy is supposed to create enough security in Baghdad that the various Iraqi political and factional leaders can come to some sort of agreement on reconciliation and power and resource sharing. How this sense of security would motivate such a response is not clear.
Some pundits and observers are still promoting the idea that Iraq is still only “on the brink” of civil war as opposed to actually in the middle of one. The fact that we require 165,000 of the best trained and equipped forces on the planet to be in Iraq might indicate otherwise. The sooner our political and military leaders admit that a civil war is fully underway, the sooner they can begin to develop and execute plans to put an end to it. The interesting point here is that if the key factional leaders in Iraq still feel secure enough to hold their current political positions in spite of the levels of internecine violence they’ve experienced to date, what possible benefit will come from providing them even more security? Won’t they simply hold out for their particular needs even longer? Worse yet, they are not even being forced to provide that security—some 165,000 US forces are.
This is the exact same scenario that played out in Viet Nam in 1968 during the “Tet” New Year offensive. The US had all but replaced the South Vietnamese Army as the provider of security and the significant force battling both the Communist guerrillas and the North Vietnamese Army. The Viet Cong launched a suicidal assault on the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon and surrounding areas, which was put down in about a week. It also resulted in a tremendous loss and the weakening of Communist guerrilla forces that subsequently took them years to recover from. Nonetheless, many Americans still vividly remember seeing the US Military Police and other “rear echelon” troops defending the Capitol and took this as a sign of our imminent defeat. Many historians believe that this was the psychological “beginning of the end” of the war for the US that culminated with our complete withdrawal. Many people will remember the subsequent images of the panicked evacuation by helicopter of the US Embassy in Saigon.
The current surge in Baghdad began in February and the levels of violence in the city soon appeared to be dropping. One might take this as a sign that the surge is working, but this is more likely the result of Shiite, Sunni, and al-Qaeda strategists assessing the surge and quite possibly waiting for the optimal time to launch their own version of “Tet.” Surely, they will do this when they judge US popular support for the war to be at its lowest point. When else would a smaller weaker army attack a stronger and bigger army?
I am a huge fan of General Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, but his argument that the surge strategy should not be judged until all 28,500 additional troops are in place and have had time to exert their influence on the ground seems out of place with his otherwise very clear understanding of counterinsurgency. How long can we keep the US troop levels this high while the enemy simply waits us out? Providing more security for the Iraqi government does not encourage them to work toward a compromise. On the contrary, it protects them while they hold out for their own more immediate interests.
On the other hand, actually reducing their sense of security in Baghdad may prove a more effective means of getting them to move toward peace in the shorter term, though the violence levels would likely increase during that time as well. We cannot sustain this “surge” force indefinitely. Our resources will eventually run dry, but it is much more likely that US patience will run out well before that time. Once this happens, the Iraq civil war will escalate further and various factions will be forced to fight to the end—or work toward an eventual compromise. If outside forces, like Iranian Shiites use that time to build up their own strength, they will sweep in and decide the war once and for all. Just like the North Vietnamese Army did in 1975. The biggest mistake in Viet Nam was the transition of responsibility for safety and security and the conduct of the war from the South Vietnamese to predominantly US troops fighting on their behalf.
So what should we do in Iraq?
To end the war, we must pressure the Iraqi government to create the political reconciliation measures that will appeal to the various factions and get them to come to the peace table. The country’s oil revenues must be fairly distributed, a workable constitution is required, and bringing more of the banned Baath political party back into public sector jobs would be major movement in the right direction. We must also deny them the safety and security from which they are dragging out the current conflict. The level of internal violence may actually increase in the near term, but the current level of US troops can work to contain the war in Iraq and prevent neighboring countries from supporting their own interests or getting more involved.
Once the level of violence affects the Iraqi political leaders that are currently holding out in the “Green Zone” and other safe areas provided by US troops, they will feel the pressure to work toward a livable compromise. The same threat of greater violence and risk would work against the will of the insurgents and pressure them to compromise as well. Then it becomes a race to see whether the US can keep troops in country long enough to contain the civil war, or whether the Iraqis can sustain their internecine fighting until the US pulls out.
My own bet is that the US and its forces can outlast the Iraqi factions. However, if all we do is station our military in Iraq and allow them to fight indefinitely, the US populace will grow sufficiently weary and call for our withdrawal. It will be another instance of the US never losing a major decisive battle to the enemy, and it will be another instance in which it really didn’t matter.
Read more...
Recent press reports indicate that the full contingent of US forces—the "surge" of troops in Baghdad—is now complete with some 28,500 additional US troops in country. US military spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver has been quoted as saying, "Now that the force is here, we'll see the counterinsurgency start in full swing, and we'll be able to execute the strategy as it was designed."
What exactly does a counterinsurgency in “full swing” look like?
It certainly does not look like a lot of troops since an insurgency is specifically an effort by a weaker force to destabilize a stronger force. Simply having larger numbers of troops does nothing to eliminate the root causes for popular support for the insurgents or popular discontent with the government in power. This is why we think of insurgency as guerrilla warfare and “hit and run” and terrorist type attacks. If the most powerful army on the planet cannot protect the populace, then the insurgents can still win the war, and this is exactly what happened in Viet Nam. The old story goes that a US Colonel met a North Vietnamese Colonel during the final peace talks and pointed out that the North Vietnamese Army never won a single decisive battle against US troops. The North Vietnamese Colonel basically agreed with that statement, and then pointed out that it really made no difference. The North had still won the war.
The Soviets learned the same lesson in Afghanistan.
The press also reports that most of the new US troops are posted in “high-visibility positions” around Baghdad in an effort to decrease violence and increase the sense of local security. The strategy is supposed to create enough security in Baghdad that the various Iraqi political and factional leaders can come to some sort of agreement on reconciliation and power and resource sharing. How this sense of security would motivate such a response is not clear.
Some pundits and observers are still promoting the idea that Iraq is still only “on the brink” of civil war as opposed to actually in the middle of one. The fact that we require 165,000 of the best trained and equipped forces on the planet to be in Iraq might indicate otherwise. The sooner our political and military leaders admit that a civil war is fully underway, the sooner they can begin to develop and execute plans to put an end to it. The interesting point here is that if the key factional leaders in Iraq still feel secure enough to hold their current political positions in spite of the levels of internecine violence they’ve experienced to date, what possible benefit will come from providing them even more security? Won’t they simply hold out for their particular needs even longer? Worse yet, they are not even being forced to provide that security—some 165,000 US forces are.
This is the exact same scenario that played out in Viet Nam in 1968 during the “Tet” New Year offensive. The US had all but replaced the South Vietnamese Army as the provider of security and the significant force battling both the Communist guerrillas and the North Vietnamese Army. The Viet Cong launched a suicidal assault on the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon and surrounding areas, which was put down in about a week. It also resulted in a tremendous loss and the weakening of Communist guerrilla forces that subsequently took them years to recover from. Nonetheless, many Americans still vividly remember seeing the US Military Police and other “rear echelon” troops defending the Capitol and took this as a sign of our imminent defeat. Many historians believe that this was the psychological “beginning of the end” of the war for the US that culminated with our complete withdrawal. Many people will remember the subsequent images of the panicked evacuation by helicopter of the US Embassy in Saigon.
The current surge in Baghdad began in February and the levels of violence in the city soon appeared to be dropping. One might take this as a sign that the surge is working, but this is more likely the result of Shiite, Sunni, and al-Qaeda strategists assessing the surge and quite possibly waiting for the optimal time to launch their own version of “Tet.” Surely, they will do this when they judge US popular support for the war to be at its lowest point. When else would a smaller weaker army attack a stronger and bigger army?
I am a huge fan of General Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, but his argument that the surge strategy should not be judged until all 28,500 additional troops are in place and have had time to exert their influence on the ground seems out of place with his otherwise very clear understanding of counterinsurgency. How long can we keep the US troop levels this high while the enemy simply waits us out? Providing more security for the Iraqi government does not encourage them to work toward a compromise. On the contrary, it protects them while they hold out for their own more immediate interests.
On the other hand, actually reducing their sense of security in Baghdad may prove a more effective means of getting them to move toward peace in the shorter term, though the violence levels would likely increase during that time as well. We cannot sustain this “surge” force indefinitely. Our resources will eventually run dry, but it is much more likely that US patience will run out well before that time. Once this happens, the Iraq civil war will escalate further and various factions will be forced to fight to the end—or work toward an eventual compromise. If outside forces, like Iranian Shiites use that time to build up their own strength, they will sweep in and decide the war once and for all. Just like the North Vietnamese Army did in 1975. The biggest mistake in Viet Nam was the transition of responsibility for safety and security and the conduct of the war from the South Vietnamese to predominantly US troops fighting on their behalf.
So what should we do in Iraq?
To end the war, we must pressure the Iraqi government to create the political reconciliation measures that will appeal to the various factions and get them to come to the peace table. The country’s oil revenues must be fairly distributed, a workable constitution is required, and bringing more of the banned Baath political party back into public sector jobs would be major movement in the right direction. We must also deny them the safety and security from which they are dragging out the current conflict. The level of internal violence may actually increase in the near term, but the current level of US troops can work to contain the war in Iraq and prevent neighboring countries from supporting their own interests or getting more involved.
Once the level of violence affects the Iraqi political leaders that are currently holding out in the “Green Zone” and other safe areas provided by US troops, they will feel the pressure to work toward a livable compromise. The same threat of greater violence and risk would work against the will of the insurgents and pressure them to compromise as well. Then it becomes a race to see whether the US can keep troops in country long enough to contain the civil war, or whether the Iraqis can sustain their internecine fighting until the US pulls out.
My own bet is that the US and its forces can outlast the Iraqi factions. However, if all we do is station our military in Iraq and allow them to fight indefinitely, the US populace will grow sufficiently weary and call for our withdrawal. It will be another instance of the US never losing a major decisive battle to the enemy, and it will be another instance in which it really didn’t matter.
Read more...
