Some Early Predictions for the Iraq Progress Report

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
August 18, 2007

The American public, members of Congress, the media, and even our enemies are anxiously awaiting the Bush Administration’s September 15th progress report on Iraq. Obviously, much hangs in the balance of how well that report is received by the public and politicians from both sides of the aisle. Wrangling has already begun as to who will actually deliver the report either publicly or behind closed committee doors. The White House has proposed that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker do not give the congressional briefings, but that they be delivered by the secretaries of state and defense instead. This of course brings up questions of “spin” and other potential Administration manipulation of the report. Regardless of who actually delivers the reports to whom, we can be certain that it will be chock full of “progress” metrics. Unfortunately, these metrics will be knowingly used by all stakeholders to support their own predetermined estimates of our progress, and even those few who try to take an unbiased look at the situation will unwittingly be relying upon virtually useless metrics.

The progress report will contain things like the number of US troops in Iraq, the number of estimated enemy forces, the number of combat incidents like IED’s and enemy rocket attacks, and the number of US and enemy troops killed, captured, and injured. There will be charts on the cost and amounts of logistical supplies provided by the US and the amount of enemy weapons and other equipment captured or destroyed. There will certainly be data on how many Iraqi army forces we have trained and equipped, and intelligence experts will provide data on the sources and amount of external supplies, fighters, and other support slipping into Iraq from places like Iran and Syria. The report may even have some statistics providing an indication of the level of Iraqi popular support for the US strategy, and maybe even the numbers of Sunni extremists that have “come over” to our side of the conflict. Surely, it will be an exhaustive report since these are only a small sample of what it will likely contain.

The fact is, that in a war like that being fought in Iraq these numbers are not indicative of whether or not we are actually making progress toward a satisfactory conclusion. Rather, they are indicators of how well we are providing a limited amount of security for a limited amount of the Iraqi population—and only for the time being. They also indicate how well we are progressing in the creation of an Iraqi national army in the image of our own military, but that does not guarantee that this army will be any better prepared to bring the conflict to a satisfactory end.

Other metrics that the report may or may not contain, because General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker simply do not have the resources they need to affect them, are much more important quantifications of progress toward a desirable outcome. These metrics include things like how much of the basic infrastructure has been restored for the average Iraqi—both inside and outside of the areas impacted by the surge. That is, electricity, safe drinking water, access to healthcare and education, and reliable local police protection as well as other basic services.

All politics is local, because the root causes of happiness or unhappiness are local. As a result, the number of new jobs created locally, the effectiveness of local government, and the successful integration of the various ethnic, religious, and political factions into some form of functioning local bureaucracy are the keys to ending the conflict. All these issues are meaningful, manageable, and measurable with the right resources applied to them. Unfortunately, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker would undoubtedly agree that they do not have these resources. The current national Iraqi government and its fledgling army can do no more either since they are not effective at the local level and arguably pretty ineffective at the national level. In the simplest terms, the US army occupying Iraq cannot address the root cause of a civil conflict in Iraq regardless of whether or not we can temporarily increase security for a small portion of the country.

Expect a significant amount of data, metrics, and expert analysis from some of the most prestigious sources on the Iraq Progress Report—just don’t expect a significant amount of useful information regarding how we are putting a successful end to the war. Then brace yourselves as our political leaders, candidates, and media spin, and/or unwittingly use the report’s information to promote their own particular policies and campaign positions.

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