Overhaul of Iraqi Police “As Urged” by Panel Likely Not Enough
By Matthew B. Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
David S. Cloud’s August 30th New York Times article, Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police, points out one of the most important factors that could contribute to the stability and hope for the future of Iraq. Unfortunately, it only touches upon the reasons for the importance of the police to a positive outcome in the war.
According to the article, the commission was created by Congress “to study the Iraqi security forces and report its findings this fall.” They found that in spite of the fact that national police units played a key role in securing neighborhoods after army units cleared out the insurgents, the police have often demonstrated unchecked and counterproductive sectarianism. Additional challenges with supplies and equipment have exacerbated the problems and have rendered the national police ineffective at best or “openly allied with Shiite militants” at worst.
Without question, the first step as stated in the article is to remake the 26,000-officer national police force and purge it of corrupt individuals and militants. The panel, headed by General James Jones, “…concludes that the rampant sectarianism that has existed since the formation of the police force requires that its current units ‘be scrapped’ and reshaped into a smaller, more elite organization.” Unfortunately, what exactly this “more elite” organization would do is not reported.
We at WinTheGWOT.org have regularly pointed out that the shortcomings of the Iraqi police would come back to haunt us. This started at the beginning of the war and was later supported by research conducted in early 2006 and that was later submitted to Congress. It was reinforced in many of our commentaries and Op-Ed pieces like the December 21, 2006 commentary regarding the looming “Surge” in Iraq:
One could even argue that there is not much need for an Iraqi national army right now. That is what the US Army in Iraq is currently for, and if the US Army, as stated by General Petraeus himself, cannot win the war in Iraq by itself, what makes everyone think the Iraqi army can?
On the other hand, if the goal of the Iraqi army is to protect it from neighboring states, that’s fine, but the US can carry the bulk of that burden for now and refocus our efforts, treasure, and lives on rebuilding the national police who are the best placed forces for dealing with the internal threats. This also assumes that the government of Iraq will make progress toward reconciliation and establishing itself as a functional entity supported by some significant proportion of the Iraqi people—no small task there—and one that is also well out of the scope of the US and Iraqi armies.
We also pointed out that creating reliable Iraqi police can be done much more easily than most people believe. All of the training facilities are available in the US and abroad. Subject matter experts from the US Departments of Justice, State, and Defense are available. An initial corps of police professionals can be created at the FBI academy, for example, and at other large metropolitan police training centers. The initial group can be deployed as leaders throughout Iraq who have consistent training, equipment, and operating principles—and most importantly—the direct involvement and support of US and other allied police and military advisors. They can spearhead the transition to Iraqi provided security while being advised by professional counterinsurgents that are embedded with them full time and can help coordinate support from the military as needed.
Getting the police out of their current environments is a challenge since these men want to protect their families, but by working through local leaders we should be able to find an initial group willing to take the risk. No doubt that many moderate Iraqi citizens would step up to the plate if they really believed that the police as an institution were being reworked in some credible manner, and that the US and Iraqi armies would focus on supporting and protecting the police. While these officers train abroad in a safe environment, we can continue upgrading the Iraqi National Police Training Center and develop the police senior leadership and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (Justice) officials.
This first cohort of newly professionalized Iraqi police must be integrated in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Some of these officers can become the cadre at the Iraqi National Police Academy. Others must get back into their hometowns patrolling and interacting with the locals from all backgrounds to create the networks we need to better deal with the insurgents. As more and more professional police are generated the security load will naturally shift off of the US forces, but US forces will likely remain in Iraq for some time yet.
Purely from the police perspective, this implies that the US and the world must provide adequate advisors and resources to reorganize and even create the supporting Interior Ministry and judicial branches required to make the system work. Providing the resources, time, security, and personnel for a strategy like this would turn the US expenditures in Iraq into a long term investment rather than an unrecoverable short term “surge” expense.
If safety, security, and justice become more predominant in Iraq, and the Iraqi government works to keep it that way, international development, employment, and prosperity will follow. The support for the insurgencies will fade and the Iraqi army can then focus on dealing with the external threats that any army should.
Read more...
David S. Cloud’s August 30th New York Times article, Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police, points out one of the most important factors that could contribute to the stability and hope for the future of Iraq. Unfortunately, it only touches upon the reasons for the importance of the police to a positive outcome in the war.
According to the article, the commission was created by Congress “to study the Iraqi security forces and report its findings this fall.” They found that in spite of the fact that national police units played a key role in securing neighborhoods after army units cleared out the insurgents, the police have often demonstrated unchecked and counterproductive sectarianism. Additional challenges with supplies and equipment have exacerbated the problems and have rendered the national police ineffective at best or “openly allied with Shiite militants” at worst.
Without question, the first step as stated in the article is to remake the 26,000-officer national police force and purge it of corrupt individuals and militants. The panel, headed by General James Jones, “…concludes that the rampant sectarianism that has existed since the formation of the police force requires that its current units ‘be scrapped’ and reshaped into a smaller, more elite organization.” Unfortunately, what exactly this “more elite” organization would do is not reported.
We at WinTheGWOT.org have regularly pointed out that the shortcomings of the Iraqi police would come back to haunt us. This started at the beginning of the war and was later supported by research conducted in early 2006 and that was later submitted to Congress. It was reinforced in many of our commentaries and Op-Ed pieces like the December 21, 2006 commentary regarding the looming “Surge” in Iraq:
“The next strategy in Iraq must certainly provide for safety and security, but at the same time it must include efforts to establish justice and equality. This means that Iraq must have a reliable police force and supporting judicial system. Police forces also happen to be one of the best sources for potential counterinsurgent forces. Nobody can manage an insurgency better than local cops that have a stake in their communities. Foreign military forces and even Iraqis from other parts of the country simply do not have the family and friendship ties necessary to really understand what is going on in the local area.
Herein lays the dilemma. The Iraqi National Police as an institution is broken. The police are believed to be heavily infiltrated by sectarian extremists, who use their access to police information and resources as a means to actively and violently promote their causes. At the very least, they can look the other way as independent militias for which they have sympathies do the dirty work for them.”To have any hope of a positive outcome in Iraq, we must help them create reliable police forces. The US should focus its strategy on providing security while a new National Police force is recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed. These new and modern police need to be better paid, taught to respect Human Rights, tolerate diversity, promote equality, and protect the rights of the accused. They need national direction from a better organized Ministry of the Interior and the support of a functioning judicial system.
One could even argue that there is not much need for an Iraqi national army right now. That is what the US Army in Iraq is currently for, and if the US Army, as stated by General Petraeus himself, cannot win the war in Iraq by itself, what makes everyone think the Iraqi army can?
On the other hand, if the goal of the Iraqi army is to protect it from neighboring states, that’s fine, but the US can carry the bulk of that burden for now and refocus our efforts, treasure, and lives on rebuilding the national police who are the best placed forces for dealing with the internal threats. This also assumes that the government of Iraq will make progress toward reconciliation and establishing itself as a functional entity supported by some significant proportion of the Iraqi people—no small task there—and one that is also well out of the scope of the US and Iraqi armies.
We also pointed out that creating reliable Iraqi police can be done much more easily than most people believe. All of the training facilities are available in the US and abroad. Subject matter experts from the US Departments of Justice, State, and Defense are available. An initial corps of police professionals can be created at the FBI academy, for example, and at other large metropolitan police training centers. The initial group can be deployed as leaders throughout Iraq who have consistent training, equipment, and operating principles—and most importantly—the direct involvement and support of US and other allied police and military advisors. They can spearhead the transition to Iraqi provided security while being advised by professional counterinsurgents that are embedded with them full time and can help coordinate support from the military as needed.
Getting the police out of their current environments is a challenge since these men want to protect their families, but by working through local leaders we should be able to find an initial group willing to take the risk. No doubt that many moderate Iraqi citizens would step up to the plate if they really believed that the police as an institution were being reworked in some credible manner, and that the US and Iraqi armies would focus on supporting and protecting the police. While these officers train abroad in a safe environment, we can continue upgrading the Iraqi National Police Training Center and develop the police senior leadership and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (Justice) officials.
This first cohort of newly professionalized Iraqi police must be integrated in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Some of these officers can become the cadre at the Iraqi National Police Academy. Others must get back into their hometowns patrolling and interacting with the locals from all backgrounds to create the networks we need to better deal with the insurgents. As more and more professional police are generated the security load will naturally shift off of the US forces, but US forces will likely remain in Iraq for some time yet.
Purely from the police perspective, this implies that the US and the world must provide adequate advisors and resources to reorganize and even create the supporting Interior Ministry and judicial branches required to make the system work. Providing the resources, time, security, and personnel for a strategy like this would turn the US expenditures in Iraq into a long term investment rather than an unrecoverable short term “surge” expense.
If safety, security, and justice become more predominant in Iraq, and the Iraqi government works to keep it that way, international development, employment, and prosperity will follow. The support for the insurgencies will fade and the Iraqi army can then focus on dealing with the external threats that any army should.
Read more...
