If I Were General Petraeus…
If I were General Petraeus I’d be pretty fed up with the Bush Administration and Congress…in fact, I’d be tired of all the politicians who still believe after all of these years that the war in Iraq can be won by military might alone. I’d be pretty fed up with the fact that no one is publicly articulating exactly what the conditions for US withdrawal are, and I be equally frustrated by the fact that I could not publicly state what the key milestones toward that end point and their estimated timelines are. I would want everyone to know how well I was progressing.
Why? Because like any good general—and General Petraeus is a good general, he knows full well that the key milestones and the estimated timelines for achieving them are critical to actually getting them done. At the very least, this can be done at a meaningful high level, but for whatever political reasons the Bush Administration has decided that this should remain a closely held secret. You can bet that if President Bush asked the generals for a timeline they would provide one pretty quickly. The administration claims that "arbitrary" timelines allow the enemy to know our plan and facilitates their attempts to foil it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any experienced leader understands that a plan must have a clearly defined end point, an owner who is responsible for it, and a due date—otherwise, it is just a fantasy. There can be nothing arbitrary about it.
The fact is that the goal of the plan and the key milestone objectives along the way can be better articulated, measured, and reported on without increasing the danger to its success. All one has to do is think about it and the goals should be obvious.
For example, the obvious strategic objectives are to create a stable government that enjoys a reasonable amount of credibility with some majority of the population regardless of ethnicity or region. In the US, it took from about 1774 to 1787 to ultimately create and ratify the US Constitution (we happened to be at war for a period of that time too). Slavery is one example of a huge compromise that had to be made for the sake of unity. Therefore, we cannot expect immediate perfection from Iraq, though we should not let the government off the hook with respect to Human Rights. Of course, this political task falls well outside the scope and capabilities of General Petraeus’s forces in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker should be responsible for driving this part of the strategy with support from the US State Department. We certainly need to hear the key milestones and estimated timeline for his strategy since it is the foundation of any success.
Another goal must be to establish a truly national military capable of defending Iraq from various threats. What is required here can be easily quantified and a timeline developed. All one has to do is estimate the numbers and types of troops and equipment required, and then estimate how long it will take to train and equip them. This assumes that all we intend to do is replace our own forces in Iraq and leave the rest up to the Iraqis. It is complicated by the fact that some serious integration of local factions must take place, but this portion of the plan can be articulated too. Further, this plan must be subordinate to, and support the overall political plan. General Petraeus even supervised the creation of the new Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on counterinsurgency which plainly states that “…political capacity is the exit strategy.”
So we find ourselves involved in helping establish local security in Iraq…something best left to the local police who also happen to need serious reorganization, integration, equipment, basic law enforcement training, and specialized training for counter-insurgency. Again, these needs can be quantified, a plan created, and a timeline estimated that does not threaten the plan’s success.
As we all know, the “Devil is in the details.” It is in these details that we find potential opportunities for our enemies to exploit. For example, we do not need to publish the graduation dates of new police officers, or who they are, or the curriculum they are taught with respect to COIN. We don’t need to publish how well they can shoot or the types of armor they wear or put in their vehicles. We don’t have to publish in advance where they will be stationed, or that we will also coordinate the movement of a new Iraqi army brigade into that same area that can support them. Some of these things can be kept secret and others can become public only once they are operational and it is too late for the enemy to interfere with them.
What we can report is how many troops we expect to have trained, equipped, and operational by certain dates, and subsequently we can then predict that a complimentary number of US troops are no longer necessary and can be withdrawn (though we don’t have to say who or how in advance). Either we make those planned dates, adjust them for good reason, or fail to meet them. It is that simple. Progress, obstacles, and reasonable changes can be publicly reported on and the people responsible held accountable.
But perhaps that is exactly what the Bush Administration fears. Given its blind acceptance that we will ultimately be successful, the Administration should not be at all concerned about reporting progress. With such confidence reporting should be easy. Failure, however, is still a very real possibility, and though quite tragic, it is no more than that—a failed plan, which could occur whether we report or not. The difference is that key milestones are predictors of success or failure. At worst, we would know that we are not making the progress we need to and could withdraw much earlier. At best we could demonstrate realistic progress or adjust the plan to changing events. This would improve morale, increase Iraqi faith in the effort, decrease resistance to it, and take a lot of pressure off of the people who are doing the hardest work.
It appears that the Bush Administration still fears failure and cannot risk making any failures along the way public—therefore, no timeline is forthcoming. Unfortunately, this also means that the people doing the work cannot be sure that they themselves are making any progress, which is especially difficult for soldiers living at high risk in the field. Soldiers rotating out of Iraq must settle for completing relatively vague or less important goals rather than citing the more significant contributions toward a better future state they are likely making, but cannot articulate. If I were General Petraeus and his troops I know I would be very frustrated at this political spinelessness—especially if I knew we were making progress and I wanted the support of the people I needed to complete the mission that so many people are blindly calling for us to halt.
______________
Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director
Why? Because like any good general—and General Petraeus is a good general, he knows full well that the key milestones and the estimated timelines for achieving them are critical to actually getting them done. At the very least, this can be done at a meaningful high level, but for whatever political reasons the Bush Administration has decided that this should remain a closely held secret. You can bet that if President Bush asked the generals for a timeline they would provide one pretty quickly. The administration claims that "arbitrary" timelines allow the enemy to know our plan and facilitates their attempts to foil it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any experienced leader understands that a plan must have a clearly defined end point, an owner who is responsible for it, and a due date—otherwise, it is just a fantasy. There can be nothing arbitrary about it.
The fact is that the goal of the plan and the key milestone objectives along the way can be better articulated, measured, and reported on without increasing the danger to its success. All one has to do is think about it and the goals should be obvious.
For example, the obvious strategic objectives are to create a stable government that enjoys a reasonable amount of credibility with some majority of the population regardless of ethnicity or region. In the US, it took from about 1774 to 1787 to ultimately create and ratify the US Constitution (we happened to be at war for a period of that time too). Slavery is one example of a huge compromise that had to be made for the sake of unity. Therefore, we cannot expect immediate perfection from Iraq, though we should not let the government off the hook with respect to Human Rights. Of course, this political task falls well outside the scope and capabilities of General Petraeus’s forces in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker should be responsible for driving this part of the strategy with support from the US State Department. We certainly need to hear the key milestones and estimated timeline for his strategy since it is the foundation of any success.
Another goal must be to establish a truly national military capable of defending Iraq from various threats. What is required here can be easily quantified and a timeline developed. All one has to do is estimate the numbers and types of troops and equipment required, and then estimate how long it will take to train and equip them. This assumes that all we intend to do is replace our own forces in Iraq and leave the rest up to the Iraqis. It is complicated by the fact that some serious integration of local factions must take place, but this portion of the plan can be articulated too. Further, this plan must be subordinate to, and support the overall political plan. General Petraeus even supervised the creation of the new Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on counterinsurgency which plainly states that “…political capacity is the exit strategy.”
So we find ourselves involved in helping establish local security in Iraq…something best left to the local police who also happen to need serious reorganization, integration, equipment, basic law enforcement training, and specialized training for counter-insurgency. Again, these needs can be quantified, a plan created, and a timeline estimated that does not threaten the plan’s success.
As we all know, the “Devil is in the details.” It is in these details that we find potential opportunities for our enemies to exploit. For example, we do not need to publish the graduation dates of new police officers, or who they are, or the curriculum they are taught with respect to COIN. We don’t need to publish how well they can shoot or the types of armor they wear or put in their vehicles. We don’t have to publish in advance where they will be stationed, or that we will also coordinate the movement of a new Iraqi army brigade into that same area that can support them. Some of these things can be kept secret and others can become public only once they are operational and it is too late for the enemy to interfere with them.
What we can report is how many troops we expect to have trained, equipped, and operational by certain dates, and subsequently we can then predict that a complimentary number of US troops are no longer necessary and can be withdrawn (though we don’t have to say who or how in advance). Either we make those planned dates, adjust them for good reason, or fail to meet them. It is that simple. Progress, obstacles, and reasonable changes can be publicly reported on and the people responsible held accountable.
But perhaps that is exactly what the Bush Administration fears. Given its blind acceptance that we will ultimately be successful, the Administration should not be at all concerned about reporting progress. With such confidence reporting should be easy. Failure, however, is still a very real possibility, and though quite tragic, it is no more than that—a failed plan, which could occur whether we report or not. The difference is that key milestones are predictors of success or failure. At worst, we would know that we are not making the progress we need to and could withdraw much earlier. At best we could demonstrate realistic progress or adjust the plan to changing events. This would improve morale, increase Iraqi faith in the effort, decrease resistance to it, and take a lot of pressure off of the people who are doing the hardest work.
It appears that the Bush Administration still fears failure and cannot risk making any failures along the way public—therefore, no timeline is forthcoming. Unfortunately, this also means that the people doing the work cannot be sure that they themselves are making any progress, which is especially difficult for soldiers living at high risk in the field. Soldiers rotating out of Iraq must settle for completing relatively vague or less important goals rather than citing the more significant contributions toward a better future state they are likely making, but cannot articulate. If I were General Petraeus and his troops I know I would be very frustrated at this political spinelessness—especially if I knew we were making progress and I wanted the support of the people I needed to complete the mission that so many people are blindly calling for us to halt.
______________
Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director
posted by Matt Rowe at 3:30 PM
1 Comments:
The hallmark of a real leader is communication. Both communication to subordinates and to the supporting public. Without this vital tool in the hands of a leader, his ability to garner support for a cause-and influence it transition into success-failure is inevitable. Communication is the key element that the Bush administration lacks. I agree with your assessment of the Iraq war in this regard. When I see the news and Brittany Spears is a top story- and underneath her photo on screen there is a scroll of the military casualties from Iraq or Aphganistan- I see a tremendous shift in US perspective on what is newsworthy. This is Bush's fault.
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