Our Response to General Stanley McChrystal’s Initial Assessment of The War in Afghanistan

September 23, 2009
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director

We at WinTheGWOT.org have been silent for some months now realizing that our protests, exhortations, and other pleas to government stakeholders about the strategies for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued to fall upon deaf ears. One might even declare that we’ve said just about everything that we could in our attempts to convince our government and military planners to fight the wars differently. We have always advocated that the strategy be different if they truly expect to have a positive outcome.

It is understandable that President Obama should want to study the strategy for the war in Afghanistan, but incomprehensible that this did not happen long ago while he was campaigning or soon thereafter. Be that as it may, the fact that General McChrystal is now reviewing the strategy of the 8-year-old war is also completely beyond our understanding. Judging by the unclassified version of General McChrystal’s report leaked to the Washington Post, the current failure of our government and senior military leaders in Afghanistan verges upon dereliction of duty.

General McChrystal’s own words quoted from the report echo exactly what we and other subject matter experts have been saying since 2003; when we felt compelled speak out in response to the inept management of the wars by the Bush Administration. The report is some 60 pages long, but the “Commander’s Summary” is below, along with some specific quotes (complete with spelling errors) further on demonstrating how our government has completely mismanaged this effort to date.

The stakes in Afghanistan are high. NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan and President Obama's strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat at Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan have laid out a dear [dire] path of what we must do. Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or has insufficient capability to counter transnational terrorists - Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional stability.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (lSAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.


The document further details….

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

This is just now being realized? Why are we supporting a military led by Tajik officers when Pashtuns make up 42% of the Afghan population and twice that of the Tajiks (~23%)? Yet the document goes on…

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.

Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I believe to be true. However, this is a 'deeds-based' information environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk our credibility.

This is “counterinsurgency 101,” and the document goes on to explain in great detail how a counterinsurgency should be conducted specifically in Afghanistan. Good stuff, but something that was known and should have been implemented as a strategy shortly after we entered the country.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.

The ancient Greek playwright Aeschylus said it best, “In the Libyan fable it is told, that once an eagle, stricken with a dart; when he saw the fashion of the shaft, said, ‘By our own hand and not by others’ are we undone!”

It is not as though strategic and tactical guidance on how to fight this war have not been available. In 2007 Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James Amos (USMC), and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagel, along with the host of other subject matter experts wrote published the latest Army & Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency.

Unfortunately, as I wrote in my review of the FM “…this manual is technically correct and on target, but...it dives into the weeds quickly and goes into excruciating detail. It is a dry read for even the most enthusiastic counterinsurgents in us….”

However, if General McChrystal needs to educate President Obama and others he would do well to send them a copy of the excellent book on counterinsurgency “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” (also by Colonel Nagel).

In the end, modern information in the subject matter of unconventional warfare and insurgency has been available for more than a century. We do not believe that it is a matter of not knowing how to conduct this war. The real problem is that our government and military leaders simply do not have the political and professional fortitude to stand up and demand that it be done correctly.

Those few of us with firsthand experience in this type of war who’ve done what we can to make our case for conducting this war correctly are now simply standing by, our warnings unheeded, thinking “We told you so.”

Being right is absolutely no consolation considering the loss of life and treasure, and the dismal future that all this portends. In fact, most of us probably wish we hadn’t known. Beyond feeling helpless, I find myself feeling sick and disgusted.