



Visit www.WinTheGWOT.org to see our latest commentary, research, and activities.

Our Mission

Advocate and implement a winning strategy for the US global war on terror using the appropriate political, military, and social policies and tactics referred to as "unconventional warfare."

Our Activities

Provide in-depth research of relevant historic and current events to provide guidance to members of Congress, the Department of Defense, and other agencies on the efficacy and practical application of unconventional strategies for the Global War on Terror.

Work with members of Congress and other senior government officials to learn and apply the successful principals of counterinsurgency with particular emphasis on its socio-political aspects.

Advise members of Congress, senior government, and cabinet officials to redesign the Department of Defense and subordinate military services so that unconventional warfare becomes a core competency on par with US military supremacy in conventional warfare.

Winning the Global War on Terror: Unconventional Warfare *is the Exit Strategy*

Author

Matthew B. Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org, August 2006

Document Summary

This monograph is a high-level outline of the political and military strategy required to end the global war on terror with a positive outcome for the vast majority of the people affected by it. Conventional military operations designed to control or defeat insurgent and terrorist elements are insufficient for what is actually a global socio-political challenge. Specially trained and organized US military forces can spearhead this unconventional warfare effort and dramatically increase the likelihood of success compared the current conventional strategy of firepower and attrition. Unfortunately, these forces are underutilized, poorly understood by conventional military and civilian leaders, and merely play a supporting role to the conflict.

Von Clausewitz notwithstanding, any form of war is the outcome of political failure to deal with the root causes of conflict that occur at all levels of a given society. Government corruption, oppression, and simple neglect create unsatisfied populations with little hope and few alternatives. The longer the oppression and neglect are in place, the more extreme the populations' feelings of exclusion and the greater the popular support for an insurgency. Beyond attempting to separate the insurgent factions or bolster the military might of the host nation, the global war on terror must include significant investments in eliminating the key socio-political threats that result in popular support for the insurgents. The credibility required to accomplish this comes from long-term relationships at all levels of the society, and through commitment to creating responsive forms of representative government all the way to the grass roots level.

In order to end an insurgent threat, security must be established, human rights respected, ethno-religious diversity appreciated, and genuine opportunities for growth and prosperity created for those people who suffer the most. A proper strategy, spearheaded by the right leadership, and cooperating with other government and non-governmental agencies will dramatically improve the likelihood of a more lasting and prosperous peace for everyone concerned.

Biographical Sketch of the Author

Matthew B. Rowe served eight of his 11 years in the US Army with the Special Forces. While assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group, he advised the military and police forces of various countries during the “drug war” in Latin America in the early 1990’s. In this capacity, he worked to counter both the local insurgencies and the narco-traffickers that threatened stability, while promoting Human Rights, the Rights of the Accused, and government accountability. Prior to joining the Special Forces, he spent three years as a Military Policeman including an assignment to the 82nd Airborne Division. After receiving his Honorable Discharge, he was a security consultant to the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games and later a Venue Security Manager for the 1996 Olympic Beach Volleyball competition. He graduated *magna cum laude* with a BS in Government from Campbell University and later earned his MBA from the Mendoza College at the University of Notre Dame. He is now an internal business consultant and business cultural change agent and has worked for General Electric and other large US corporations. His focus has been on implementing and directing various Lean Six-Sigma business process improvement programs. During this time, he has continued his study of insurgent warfare and terrorism and has completed a manuscript for a novel about his experience as a *Green Beret* in Latin America.

Winning the Global War on Terror: Unconventional Warfare *is the Exit Strategy*

The Bush Administration has declared the war on terror "...a new kind of war, with a new kind of enemy."¹ In reality, we are fighting a very old kind of war and a very old kind of enemy; both points are anathema to our modern concepts of high-tech, rapidly concluded warfare. The US is currently the strongest conventional military power on earth. No rational nation can hope to win a direct conventional conflict with the US, and the folly of such a decision is clear from the devastating results of the first Gulf War. The US demonstrated its conventional power once again during the early stages of the war in Afghanistan when it destroyed the Taliban's conventional military and shook its leaders from national power. Nonetheless, these conventional victories failed to destroy the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Nor did they deal with the radical Islamic ideology or factional and ethnic threats to the newly constituted central governments—the very same issues that led to the former despots' gaining control of their countries in the first place.

Highly motivated, yet politically and militarily weaker groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban will not participate in the existing political systems and other rational mechanisms for change. Yet they still believe that violent force can influence and even remove their target governments from power. They choose relatively vulnerable targets and attack where the government is least prepared. Typically, by striking at isolated military outposts, and especially at lightly armed police forces, the insurgents can recover government weapons and equipment and gradually increase their fighting strength. Additionally, word begins to spread that the insurgents have enjoyed success against the government forces and popular support may grow as well. When the government response is to strengthen the more vulnerable targets the highly adaptable insurgents pick the next most exposed target and continue sending their message. They can choose to fight a protracted war that wears down the opposition, or they can eventually build up enough strength and popular support over time to confront the government forces directly. This strategy is the essence of insurgent warfare. Terrorism follows the same logic with the significant exception that targets are specifically non-military. The terrorists' goal is to goad the civilian population into pressuring its government or non-governmental champion into the desired response.² This strategy also greatly reduces the risk of direct confrontation with the superior military power of the target government.

We call these insurgent and terrorist strategies "unconventional (UW)" or "irregular warfare" which, has existed ever since one belligerent has had vastly superior political and military might compared to another. It is very important to note that hit and run "guerrilla warfare" is not necessarily an insurgency. The former is a military technique, and the latter is a political military strategy supported by guerrilla tactics. Either guerrilla warfare or insurgency can stand alone or receive funding and even direct military support from other governments or non-state actors.

¹ President George Bush quoted at the signing of H.R. 4613, The Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005.

² These are the author's definitions since terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare have multiple and inconsistent definitions. Many people use these words interchangeably, but in this monograph, they are separate but complimentary activities.

Established national borders often work to the insurgents' advantage by offering them refuge in a neighboring country that does not allow the counter insurgent forces to operate freely. When the neighboring government or population supports the insurgent cause as in the case of Iran and Iraq,³ the resulting political situation complicates the military response and risks escalation of the conflict.

A sound counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy does not imply that our military hunt down enemy targets and attack them with overwhelming force, which is the predominant US tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan. Often, our forces find it too difficult to tell the actual insurgents from the rest of the population—the very people we seek to help. This tactic is especially counter-productive when that overwhelming use of force results in unintentional casualties to non-combatants. At best, incidents like these erode the population's patience for the war effort. At worst, they drive more people to support the insurgents. Rather, a genuine COIN strategy more deeply examines and addresses the other internal threats to the existing or desired political state—the root causes of conflict that military power alone cannot change.

It is important to understand that the active terrorists and insurgents make up only a relatively small core group of actors: the extreme believers willing to fight and die for their causes. Immediately surrounding them are active supporters, who while not generally willing to join the fight will do so when pressed, and who offer other direct forms of intelligence, logistical, and communications support. Just outside of this group are the sympathizers, people who do not actively support the effort, but who believe in the cause and who at the very least will not do anything to impede the insurgents' efforts. Finally, neutral groups exist on the fringe of the insurgency. They don't take a side *per se* but try to go on living as best they can. Depending upon how well they are treated by the insurgents, or how badly their government treats them, they can easily be pushed into one of the other groups described above. It is also important to note that insurgents can operate effectively with or without the ideological support of the local populace. They can coerce the population to provide support as long as they are willing to accept the resentment that results from coercion. Alternatively, they can pay for support from internal or external sources for their operational needs.⁴ Therefore, the counterinsurgent strategy must focus on both the internal and external sources of support. Obviously, the insurgents are only secure as long as the outer layers of support are sufficient in size and motivation to help them—whatever the incentive.

An example of this scenario occurred in Peru during that country's war with the Shining Path Maoist guerrillas and other anti-government insurgent forces in the 1980's and 1990's. The insurgents would enter an isolated village and force the people there to provide food and shelter and hide caches of equipment or other supplies. Anyone who resisted the guerrillas would be tortured and/or killed. The insurgents would then move on to another location. The Peruvian military or police would arrive later and then abuse, arrest, and even kill members of the village for "supporting" the guerrillas. It was a difficult situation for the weakest members of Peruvian society who found themselves forced either to join the insurgents or to move

³ Katzman, Kenneth, *Iran's Influence in Iraq*, CRS Report for Congress, November 30, 2005, p. 5.

⁴ Wolf, Charles, Jr., *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities*, RAND Corporation, July 1965, p. 5.

to another location where government security forces had more control. According to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, "...there existed in Peru a systematic and selective practice of forced disappearances, carried out by agents of, or at least tolerated by, the Peruvian State."⁵ This activity was intended to weaken the insurgent threat and in many cases actually harmed non-combatants who had nothing to do with the various insurgent organizations. Additionally, in designated Peruvian emergency zones, the military commander had supreme authority and the power to prevent international agencies like the Red Cross, or even state judges and prosecutors, from entering their bases to investigate alleged abuses.⁶ Given this scenario, which is not unique to Peru, one has to wonder whom the civilian population considers the real terrorists—the insurgents or the government?

The objective of COIN is to win over the people who make up the outer layers of the insurgent support network. The government must establish both a consistently secure environment and realistic opportunities for its people to grow and prosper politically and economically. It can eliminate the factors that drive people to the fight in the first place by demonstrating that rational means of political change can work, and by eliminating oppression and neglect, reducing corruption, and providing for the social and political needs of its people. At the same time, members of the population who accept the support and security of the government must commit to resisting the insurgent effort. As the outer layers of the support are peeled away, the core group of insurgents has fewer places to hide and can be dealt with effectively.⁷

Beyond the radical Islamist ideology espoused by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats to the US, many Americans ask, "Why do they hate us so much?" The logic in American minds seems to focus on the "good things" that the US brings to the world, like democracy, international trade and technology, the on-going charitable support provided, and the emergency support provided during times of international crisis. A number of US military operations were even on behalf of predominantly Muslim populations: Lebanon in the early 1980's, Bosnia, Somalia, etc. In spite of these well-intentioned efforts and despite their success or lack thereof, for decades the US has remained the regular target of Islamic extremists. Most Americans sincerely believe that the US has facilitated and encouraged the benefits of free society around the world. However, due to obvious limitations on national resources, the US prioritizes its aid to foreign entities based upon its own interests first and local interests second. Although this may seem reasonable from the US perspective, this political short sightedness has often reached a level of outright disregard for the host nation's population.

For example, at the behest of various western governments, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other economic aid organizations heavily subsidized the government of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire even though they clearly understood how exceedingly corrupt his government was. Ostensibly, this financial aid reduced the risk of the Soviet Union establishing a stronger communist presence

⁵ Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, Report #112/00, Case 11.099, December 4, 2000, Section IV, par. 18.

⁶ Palmer, David Scott (Editor), *Shining Path of Peru*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 133.

⁷ See *On "Other War"*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2006, chapters 3-4.

on the African continent.⁸ However, continuing this economic aid and billions of dollars worth of debt forgiveness to the region no longer served the strategic interest of the west at the end of the cold war. Mobutu could no longer control his government without massive bribes, and by the 1990's Zaire spiraled into tremendous political instability, which in turn facilitated many years of bloody civil and tribal wars. Can there be any doubt that these victimized populations of failed African States will eventually look to the west as legitimate enemies and present us with our next regionally based terrorist threat?⁹

A retired Special Forces veteran working as a security contractor in Iraq for two years expressed great frustration at his employer's lack of understanding of UW, even from a very basic physical security perspective. His US civilian employers forbade him to interact with the local community surrounding an electrical power plant under repair by western technicians. They felt that his activities outside of the plant's perimeter were too risky. He countered that developing positive relationships with the local civilian leadership could actually improve security, but to no avail. On one occasion when he did speak to local leaders, they asked if he could arrange for them to use some construction equipment that was sitting idle for local civic projects they desperately needed. Unfortunately, his employer declined the request even when he offered to obtain cash for the fuel and labor. This clearly missed opportunity could have provided valuable local services, built important relationships and rapport, and begun eroding popular support for the insurgents in an area surrounding a vital national asset.¹⁰

Beyond the national and local political shortfalls described above, the current challenge facing the US military is that it possesses no truly strategic UW or COIN capabilities. We are not doing enough to improve the situation either. Our Special Operations Forces are used in very conventional ways, and this is especially true for the only US military unit designed specifically for this type of warfare—the Special Forces *Green Berets*. Rather than assigning them to work with affected populations to reduce the outer layers of the insurgent network, we have asked them to protect VIP's, provide targets for precision munitions, act as translators and advisors for coalition warfare, and conduct high risk hit and run raids against high value enemy targets. These are unquestionably conventional military tactics.

Our senior military and civilian leaders are products of previous wars that they can better understand: wars in which force-on-force strategies of attrition were the deciding factor and in which irregular warfare played a lesser role. Further, the general impatience and desire for quick results greatly reduce enthusiasm for irregular warfare, which takes a much longer-term and innovative approach to the threats. Conventional military forces alone are incapable of COIN; however, smaller, more nimble conventional forces can play a vital role in supporting the overall UW strategy. The greatest obstacle to US success is the difficulty in changing this key

⁸ Wrong, Michela, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo*, p. 195-202.

⁹ Dempsey, Thomas, *Counter Terrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 2006, p. 31.

¹⁰ Personal interview with "RM" in March 2006, a retired Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officer, who had just competed two years as a security contractor in Iraq.

leadership paradigm. Rather than forcing irregular forces to support conventional strategies, COIN requires that conventional forces must support the unconventional strategy. The irregular forces who are closer to the population and hence, closer to the insurgents should spearhead the effort. In other words, a more collaborative leadership dynamic must replace the current top-down command and control model with its multiple intermediate levels. Relatively junior leaders of the irregular forces operating locally can react instantly to opportunities as they arise, and provide critical operational intelligence and guidance to higher headquarters. In other words, they can operate in the very same flexible, adaptable, and local way that the insurgents do.

Few senior military leaders have any experience in irregular warfare, and they enjoy the support of only a handful of other subject matter experts who understand and advocate this type of warfare as a means to win the global war on terror. In spite of the significant amount of COIN analysis completed over the last 50-years by experienced counterinsurgents, strategic think tanks, and academia, there remains great institutional resistance to irregular warfare in the US civilian and military leadership. Hy S. Rothstein's book, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, describes these challenges in much more detail than the scope of this paper allows. However, a very recent and telling example of this general lack of UW understanding comes from a response by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, to a question posed by Senator John McCain. In August 2006, General Pace stated that he had not anticipated one year earlier that Iraq would currently be in danger of descending into civil war.¹¹

Unfortunately, many of the subject matter experts on UW operate in the relative periphery of our military and strategic planning, written off as theorists and idealists by the existing military and civilian leadership. This situation exists in part because so few people understand how to conduct irregular warfare, and in part, because of the fear of changes to the existing power structures that are implied. To change our existing military approach, some generals who understand unconventional strategy would replace other generals who only understand conventional strategy. In addition, conventional officers would have to compete with unconventional officers for funds, equipment, high quality troops, and legitimacy in an environment where the emphasis for promotion and success no longer rests upon traditional war fighting abilities. Refocusing the military on unconventional warfare is expensive and a direct challenge to the *status quo*. The same is true at the Department of Defense and within the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. The historic development of these organizations and the bureaucracy inherent in giant institutions are also powerful obstacles to change. Most experts on innovation and contingency theory agree that changes to large, inward-looking organizations are not likely to develop from within. To change these structures effectively, we must rely upon a bipartisan and innovative approach supported by the incoming administration and legislature.

The US must immediately come to grips with the proper way to fight this unconventional conflict. We cannot change the way the enemy has chosen to conduct

¹¹ Associated Press, *Top Military Officers Warn Of Iraq's Descent Into Civil War*, August 3, 2006.

the war, but we can choose the way we respond. We must significantly develop our UW capability and integrate it into a strategy that collaborates closely with host nation governments, non-governmental organizations, police forces, religious institutions, and even the businesses involved in reconstruction efforts. The leadership paradigm must emphasize creating professional and effective host nation police forces, trained in COIN and held to a high standard of public service. They require competent officers and the direct support of effective military forces. The goal of the strategy should be to create an environment of both long-term security and opportunities for prosperity.¹² This implies a stable government that respects human rights and is tolerant and even protective of ethnic and religious differences. Most importantly, this government must be transparent, resist corruption, and be responsive to the socio-political needs of its constituents in order to establish and maintain legitimacy. These needs are especially significant for those populations who have limited or no historical experience with representative forms of government. A military using tanks, helicopters, and house-to-house search and destroy missions cannot foster such legitimacy. Instead, dedicated, highly trained irregular forces working in tandem with key, non-military aid organizations must be on the ground, living and working with the local people, advising the governments at all levels, and promoting and supporting human rights at the grass roots level. Mechanisms for demonstrating the benefits of democracy and for exposing and effectively sanctioning abuses must also be in place.

An additional and significant constraint to the US capability for conducting successful COIN is the relatively small number of units trained in unconventional warfare and the limited amount of UW training that they actually receive. Currently, the US has approximately 5,000 operational Special Forces soldiers organized into seven regionally focused groups—two of which are not active duty. The United States Special Operations Command plans to increase the size of this force by one-third beginning in 2008.¹³ Furthermore, Special Forces troops only receive some 36-days of formal unconventional warfare training during the Special Forces Qualification Course in an exercise called *Robin Sage*. This is essentially a tactical level training exercise and the only formal unconventional training they receive.¹⁴ There are no advanced UW training opportunities in place, and Special Forces units rarely have the opportunity to train above the battalion level. When senior military commanders tasked the 5th Special Forces Group to head up the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan, the unit was not trained (or even doctrinally expected) to take this leading role and found itself unprepared. The group required an additional 120 military staff personnel from other services and agencies and struggled to develop the joint service operational ability and coordination required. Although ultimately successful, the development of the command staff took precious time away from planning actual Special Forces operations.¹⁵

¹² Long, Austin, *On "Other War" Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*, 2006, p. 71.

¹³ USSOCOM, *Posture Statement 2006*, p. 20.

¹⁴ Fox, David G., *A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces in the 21st Century*, US Army War College Strategy Research project, March 18, 2005, p. 6-7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4-5.

There are also plans to increase the size of the active duty Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, which are key supporting mechanisms for UW. Currently, about 75% of these units come from the reserve components. The Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, in cooperation other military branches and governmental agencies spearhead the effort to counter the insurgents' propaganda and informational operations—something the US has so far been very ineffective at in Iraq and Afghanistan, and something that Al-Qaeda has been exceptionally good at.¹⁶

History has shown that rather than a military operation, successful counterinsurgency has predominantly had more in common with large scale policing.¹⁷ Successful counter insurgent efforts have worked closely with host nation police and home guard forces to build trust and legitimacy with the disaffected portions of the local population. Conventional forces still played a role, but continuing the police analogy, the irregular warfare units were the local "beat cop" who could call in the conventional "SWAT Team" as appropriate. These "SWAT" forces provided the robust combat support required whenever the enemy insurgent force was located.

Another example of successful irregular warfare is that of US military advisors operating in volatile regions of the world; however, the title of "military advisor" is most certainly a misnomer. In the author's personal experience, not only did Special Forces advise the host nation government, military, and police on how to be more effective in executing combat and police operations, but they also advocated human rights, the rights of the accused, and played the role of an auditing and reporting agency. In return for continued US support to host nations, the Special Forces observed and reported on how well or how poorly they responded to the new, higher standards of behavior regarding the treatment of both their constituents and their enemies. Special Forces advisors ensured that military aid packages, including everything from boots to helicopter parts, were properly distributed and used for their intended purposes as opposed to ending up on the black market and lining some senior officers' or government officials' pockets. They had the ability to remind field commanders, often frustrated by the difficulty of using a conventional force to chase insurgents, that abuses would affect the flow of aid to their countries at a national level and drive more people to support the insurgency. I can assure you that no captain or colonel wants to explain to his superiors how his actions in the field put a stop to the tremendous amounts of aid coming from the United States.

Additionally, Special Forces have deployed on Civic Action missions with supporting host nation personnel to build clinics and schools, to repair road infrastructures, and to help provide for the social needs of populations traditionally ignored by their governments. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) perform the same important work with the important exception that they must evacuate or face dire consequences when the enemy threatens them. As a result, the local population they are trying to help is left to face the wrath of the insurgents and/or government forces, which effectively counteracts any good work completed. In Iraq, the

¹⁶ Hoffman, Bruce, RAND Corporation, *Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities*, US House of Representatives, February 16, 2006.

¹⁷ Corum, James S., *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2006, p. vi.

insurgent threat is delaying reconstruction efforts and has forced the reallocation of reconstruction funds for use in developing the Iraqi conventional security infrastructure. The insurgents are intimidating local workers and driving away critically needed foreign technicians.¹⁸ When combined with highly publicized government and business corruption scandals, this situation reduces any positive impact for the Iraqi people and does nothing to diminish popular sympathies for the insurgents. Further complicating this is the fact that sufficient resources are not going to the Iraqi police forces, those government representatives with the most direct contact with the Iraqi people on a daily basis.¹⁹

A proper unconventional strategy relies on irregular forces *and* NGO's to do the same good work, but does not leave the people traditionally caught in the middle at the mercy of the next group of thugs to arrive in the village. These irregular forces should be recruited from the local area and supported by outside forces as required. They can stay for the duration and have a stake in the local community that reinforces the benefit of proper behavior and discourages the abuse of power. Oversight via the US and other international bodies and aid organizations will facilitate the development of relationships of trust between the people and their government. Only by executing a strategy like this can we eliminate the fear, anger, and hopelessness that drive people to choose war and terrorism as the mechanism of change. By committing to work with the people and staying for as long as necessary, we can build trusting relationships and peel away the outer layers of the insurgency to expose the core group as the real threat it is to its own people. Once popular support for the core group has been eroded, they will have nowhere to go and can be effectively eliminated.

We cannot achieve these ends by focusing only at the national level and thinking in the short-term. We must work at all levels and plan to stay for as long as it takes. Nor can we promote human rights and transparency while simultaneously condoning torture, secret prisons, and closed military tribunals. We must be the epitome of what a free society, governed by a representative democracy, should be. As of this writing, the US and its allies are executing the war on terror in exactly the way our enemies would hope. Our efforts only serve to undermine our objectives and perpetuate the conditions that led to the regimes that were in power before and the current wars. It is not too late to change the strategy—meaningful and manageable opportunities exist to affect a more positive outcome. The dynamics are broad in scope and seriously challenge existing political and military conventions. As a result, we must drive changes from a non-partisan perspective and rely upon a truly innovative group of strategic planners. This implies significant participation of thought leaders from outside the current governmental and military bureaucracies as well. Now is the ideal time to launch the effort in order to engage the incoming administration, its cabinet officers, and legislators in order to move forward as quickly and efficiently as possible. Changing our COIN strategy to one that operates

¹⁸ Bowman, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, speaking before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing to Examine Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction, February 8, 2006, p. 8.

¹⁹ Corum, James S., *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2006, p. 38.

on the principles of unconventional warfare supported by the appropriate conventional forces is the only practical exit strategy for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the global war on terror. If we do not change our current strategy, we will continue to face a growing and significantly more dangerous insurgent and terrorist threat for years to come.

Strategic Changes Required for Winning the Global War on Terror

Unconventional Warfare is the only practical exit strategy for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war on terror. It is likely to be the predominant form of conflict that the US and its allies face in the 21st Century.

1. Shift the military and civilian leadership focus from a national security strategy emphasizing conventional military planning to that of an unconventional warfare approach supported by the appropriate conventional forces. Make the role of police and other local security forces more prominent, if not predominant in the strategy. Consider a significant leadership role for the US Department of Justice as well as the DOD.
2. Develop an in theater leadership structure that includes representatives from key government, security, and non-governmental stakeholder groups. This leadership structure should have a civilian at its head, i.e., the US Ambassador, who maintains close ties, and coordinates with senior host nation leaders and retains overall authority for the US war effort.
3. More precisely define the Global War on Terror and focus limited resources on the genuine and imminent threats to US national security, i.e., Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks supporting them or independently targeting the US.
4. Expand strategic US objectives in host nations beyond the national level and incorporate strategies at the sub-national level to ensure that US intervention policies directly or indirectly address the internal tensions and threats.
5. Spearhead the unconventional warfare strategy using irregular military forces on the ground living and working with well-trained host nation police and military units.
 - a. These forces—especially the police—must receive professional training in their basic duties as well as in the principles and techniques of unconventional warfare and intelligence gathering. Reliable local intelligence is the key to locating the insurgents and eliminating them effectively.
 - b. These forces must embrace a genuine service oriented ethic in order to foster trust and legitimacy with affected populations. Reliable intelligence predominantly comes from locals who support and trust the government, and often, the local police are the predominant representative of that government.
 - c. Teach and support the host nation governments to eliminate the root causes of popular support for insurgency and terrorism and to provide the long-term security their nations need to thrive. Hold them accountable for their actions.
6. Engage, coordinate, collaborate, and support the UN, other allies, NGO's, religious organizations, and even the business interests in the unconventional warfare strategy. Those entities that typically attempt to stand-alone or at least separate themselves from government and military forces must be taught the principles of unconventional warfare and their vital role in it.

Strategic Changes Required for the US Military

1. Consider separating unconventional warfare assets and appropriate supporting services from the current DOD structure and create the appropriate service secretary and structure to support it. Emphasize and expand the roles and responsibilities of other agencies like the US Department of Justice, USAID, the CIA, and others.
2. Create a joint military and non-military agency infrastructure capable of training, planning, preparing, and conducting unconventional warfare for the long-term that is required for success.
3. Eliminate conventional top down command and control structures, and enable the unconventional forces to assess the command and control needs for a given theater of operations. Provide the unconventional forces with access to coordinate directly with the national command authority, host nation governments, other militaries, and other agencies operating in the theater and locally.
4. Expand the roles and increase the numbers of active duty Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. These units are critical for the war of perception that affects the populace's motivation to support or tolerate insurgency and terrorism. Consider increasing the number of independent US Military Police battalions on active duty and providing advanced training in urban policing and unconventional warfare. Ideally, these select MP's would operate as advisors to host nation military and police forces and in direct support of the unconventional military commanders operating in the area.
5. Emphasize the recruiting, training, development, and progression of innovative unconventional warriors capable of operating with minimal supervision while relying upon clearly communicated strategic US and host nation objectives. Recruit, train, and condition these forces to conduct irregular warfare for extended periods, and to operate in specific geo-political regions for the majority of their careers.
6. Increase the amount of training in unconventional warfare theory, philosophy, and techniques for US unconventional troops. Create and advanced training opportunities for unconventional forces at all levels. Include appropriate non-military stakeholders to improve coordination across agencies.
7. Provide unconventional warfare training to key supporting US military units (Military Police, Engineers, Medical and Logistics units, etc.) that can provide vital military support while engaging in positive civil interactions with the host nation population and government forces.
8. Expand the educational mechanisms for irregular military forces to learn languages, cultures, political environments, histories, and the specific regional aspirations of the populations in which they will operate.