WinTheGWOT.org

We Still Need a Better Plan for Afghanistan

2009-12-02T09:45:00.001-05:00

What exactly is an exit strategy in the military sense and specifically in Afghanistan? I’ll state that it is simply a set of conditions for deciding that combat operations are no longer required. Before we can end the war in any other way than by totally destroying an enemy we must have as clear objective. Since total destruction is out of the question for a number of reasons, then the US must declare what it is exactly that we hope to accomplish.

An exit strategy implies that we will execute a conditions based plan to some very objective. This plan should be time bound just like any other project/operation, and contrary to popular “political” opinion, the high level plan and time estimate can be published. The risk of enemy exploitation is in the details which do not have to be publicized. If you have a good plan, and you effectively execute it, and your time estimates are correct, you should be able to set a goal for leaving that does not help the enemy. Having said all that, you also have to be able to reasonably adjust for changes in the situation. As long as these changes make sense and you communicate them properly the public support will be there.

Unfortunately, every one of these (and other) military planning and operational principles have been violated by our generals and both the Bush and Obama Administrations. People may take offense that I hold our generals accountable and not just the two presidents, but the truth is clear. We have been at war for 8 years and we are just now figuring out a strategy? As a former counterinsurgent from the 1980’s and 1990’s I find this very hard to understand since a number of officers I worked closely with are now generals. Other senior officers with extensive counterinsurgency experience who have retired from the military have tried to make things clear as well, but to no avail. We lack for leadership and it will be our undoing in Afghanistan.

Good officers will tell you two important things: don’t just throw more and more troops at a problem, and don’t start any military operation without first figuring out what "mission accomplished" means.

It may not be too late to turn things around in Afghanistan, nut it does not appear that the current administration has any better leadership skills than the previous one. Simply doing the opposite of the Bush Administration will not bring success to the Obama Administration. We need better leadership, a clear objective, and a better plan.

Our Response to General Stanley McChrystal’s Initial Assessment of The War in Afghanistan

2009-09-23T09:07:00.009-04:00

September 23, 2009
By Matt Rowe, Executive Director

We at WinTheGWOT.org have been silent for some months now realizing that our protests, exhortations, and other pleas to government stakeholders about the strategies for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued to fall upon deaf ears. One might even declare that we’ve said just about everything that we could in our attempts to convince our government and military planners to fight the wars differently. We have always advocated that the strategy be different if they truly expect to have a positive outcome.

It is understandable that President Obama should want to study the strategy for the war in Afghanistan, but incomprehensible that this did not happen long ago while he was campaigning or soon thereafter. Be that as it may, the fact that General McChrystal is now reviewing the strategy of the 8-year-old war is also completely beyond our understanding. Judging by the unclassified version of General McChrystal’s report leaked to the Washington Post, the current failure of our government and senior military leaders in Afghanistan verges upon dereliction of duty.

General McChrystal’s own words quoted from the report echo exactly what we and other subject matter experts have been saying since 2003; when we felt compelled speak out in response to the inept management of the wars by the Bush Administration. The report is some 60 pages long, but the “Commander’s Summary” is below, along with some specific quotes (complete with spelling errors) further on demonstrating how our government has completely mismanaged this effort to date.

The stakes in Afghanistan are high. NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan and President Obama's strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat at Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan have laid out a dear [dire] path of what we must do. Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or has insufficient capability to counter transnational terrorists - Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional stability.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (lSAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.

The document further details….

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.

This is just now being realized? Why are we supporting a military led by Tajik officers when Pashtuns make up 42% of the Afghan population and twice that of the Tajiks (~23%)? Yet the document goes on…

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.

Many describe the conflict in Afghanistan as a war of ideas, which I believe to be true. However, this is a 'deeds-based' information environment where perceptions derive from actions, such as how we interact with the population and how quickly things improve. The key to changing perceptions lies in changing the underlying truths. We must never confuse the situation as it stands with the one we desire, lest we risk our credibility.

This is “counterinsurgency 101,” and the document goes on to explain in great detail how a counterinsurgency should be conducted specifically in Afghanistan. Good stuff, but something that was known and should have been implemented as a strategy shortly after we entered the country.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.

The ancient Greek playwright Aeschylus said it best, “In the Libyan fable it is told, that once an eagle, stricken with a dart; when he saw the fashion of the shaft, said, ‘By our own hand and not by others’ are we undone!”

It is not as though strategic and tactical guidance on how to fight this war have not been available. In 2007 Generals David Petraeus (USA) and James Amos (USMC), and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagel, along with the host of other subject matter experts wrote published the latest Army & Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency.

Unfortunately, as I wrote in my review of the FM “…this manual is technically correct and on target, but...it dives into the weeds quickly and goes into excruciating detail. It is a dry read for even the most enthusiastic counterinsurgents in us….”

However, if General McChrystal needs to educate President Obama and others he would do well to send them a copy of the excellent book on counterinsurgency “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” (also by Colonel Nagel).

In the end, modern information in the subject matter of unconventional warfare and insurgency has been available for more than a century. We do not believe that it is a matter of not knowing how to conduct this war. The real problem is that our government and military leaders simply do not have the political and professional fortitude to stand up and demand that it be done correctly.

Those few of us with firsthand experience in this type of war who’ve done what we can to make our case for conducting this war correctly are now simply standing by, our warnings unheeded, thinking “We told you so.”

Being right is absolutely no consolation considering the loss of life and treasure, and the dismal future that all this portends. In fact, most of us probably wish we hadn’t known. Beyond feeling helpless, I find myself feeling sick and disgusted.

No Good Choices? Some Choices Are Still Better than Others

2009-02-23T11:59:00.003-05:00

By Matt Rowe, February 3, 2009

I was dismayed to read the feature story “No Good Choices” by Lynn Vincent in the January 31, 2009 edition of “World Magazine.” The magazine is a source for conservative Christian thought and discussion. The story centered on a US Army Captain operating in Afghanistan who suspected that some of the local Afghans working with his unit might be working for the enemy too. CPT Hill’s battalion commander apparently dismissed these concerns when CPT Hill brought them to his attention. Obviously concerned for the safety of his troops and frustrated by this lack of response, CPT Hill took it upon himself to determine whether the suspected men were in fact operating with the enemy. Satisfied that his suspicions were correct, CPT Hill allegedly had the men detained and interrogated, which included physical abuse and included the firing of weapons in such a way as to convince them that they were being executed—very unchristian ways to behave even in a war.

Although I certainly agree that CPT Hill was placed in a difficult position, I have to take issue with the tone of the article, which appears to condone his actions. As a US Army Special Forces veteran of insurgent conflicts in Central and South America I can absolutely sympathize with CPT Hill feeling powerless at the likelihood of having spies operating close to and even within his organization. What I cannot condone are the actions he allegedly took and which are clearly in violation of Christian ethics, Human Rights, and military regulations.

Although the article does not provide enough information to determine the reasons for his battalion commander’s apparent inaction, at a minimum an investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 is probably warranted. If appropriate, the battalion commander should be held accountable for his part in not responding to the legitimate concerns and needs of a subordinate commander in the field.

Unfortunately, CPT Hill’s actions work exactly counter to the principles of counterinsurgency and fly in the face of our goal of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Contrary to what the media would have us believe, counterinsurgency is not an “impossible mission” nor is it even hard to understand. What makes it difficult to accomplish is the fact that there is no strategy for victory that can be accomplished by the military alone. This is because people do not pick up a weapon and fight their government without good reason. They typically have legitimate grievances like political, religious, or ethnic discrimination, abuse by government police or military forces, or simply the lack of basic security and social services, like healthcare, education, and meaningful employment.

In a nutshell, they lack hope for the future and for the futures of their children.

Of course, this desperate lack of hope can be exploited by political and/or religious opportunists or extremists, but this type of exploitation is more a matter of emotion or careful propaganda than the actual root causes of a conflict. As it has been made clear by the Army and Marine Corp Field Manual on Counterinsurgency—political capacity is the exit strategy for conflicts like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

CPT Hill’s position was extremely difficult, but his alleged actions and those of some of his troops serve only to exacerbate the actual and perceived issues at the root cause of the conflict. Terrorizing his prisoners drives more supporters into the arms of our enemies and contributes to the continuation of the war. The only way to counter the propaganda and manipulation by our enemy’s leadership is to be distinctly different—to be better than they are—even at increased risk to ourselves.

We must demonstrate that as Christians and free democratic people human rights, the rights of the accused, and the rule of just laws matter. We must help Afghanistan put political institutions and programs in place that recognize this fact and seek to meet the basic human needs of their constituents and provide realistic hope for their futures. Clearly this is something the US military cannot do by itself. Nonetheless, until we change this we will be just one more foreign occupier that offers nothing better to the oppressed people caught in the middle of the conflict, and we will continue to put soldiers like CPT Hill in the position to make some very bad choices.

"White Passage Red Sun" by Matt Rowe

2008-12-28T16:06:00.016-05:00

Managing Director, Matt Rowe, has published his first novel, "White Passage: Red Sun" about his experience as a US Army "green beret" operating in the "drug war" in Latin America.

Straight from the headlines, "White Passage: Red Sun" details the motivation behind US involvement in the drug war and accurately describes the tenuous relationship between the drug Cartels and various terrorist insurgencies. The exciting story explains the powerful influence of global political events on the “drug war” and exposes the inner workings of one of the most misunderstood conflicts of our time.

About the Story:

February 1989. Captain Brian Halloran and his Special Forces team deploy to a remote jungle valley in Peru to establish a base for training elite Peruvian counter-narcotics police. Not only are they threatened by violent narco-traffickers, but they face possible attack by the ruthless Shining Path insurgents operating in the valley. Making matters worse, they quickly realize that powerful political forces may be conspiring to ensure their mission fails.

A brilliant young guerrilla leader, Comrade Olivario, commands the most lethal force the insurgents have ever fielded. He must establish the Shining Path as the preeminent political power in the valley, and to do this he must eliminate every threat—including the Green Berets. The stakes are high, and Olivario's plan will not only decide who controls the valley, but very likely the fate of the woman he loves.

Reviews (More at Amazon):

“Good historical fiction often depicts reality better than traditional history. Matt Rowe reaches this level of literary excellence...A great read.”
- Colonel Hy S. Rothstein, US Army Special Forces (Ret.), Author of “Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare”

"This book brought back memories of what it was like to participate in Counter Drug Operations...Matt Rowe gets the details right about what it was like for Special Forces to operate against the Drug Cartels in this part of the world.”
- Sergeant First Class Robert Marchesello, US Army Special Forces (Ret.)

"Superb story, told with the authority of a Special Forces soldier who has been there...This exceptional book is highly recommended."

- Colonel Kevin M. Higgins, US Army Special Forces (Ret.), Former Commander 7th Special Forces Group.

Something New? Teaching military allies how to fight for themselves? Not really.

2008-10-19T08:35:00.011-04:00

Interestingly....this story by Peter Spiegel describes exactly how we saw the "drug war" and other insurgent conflicts should be managed in Latin America during the 1980's-90's. It is very much in line with what we've been advocating at WinTheGWOT.org.

It may surprise some of you that SOCOM would have to relearn and refocus on this type of "patient warfare." Nonetheless, keep in mind that two decades ago, only US Army Special Forces truly specialized in this type of conflict, and that they made up only a fraction of a percentage of the military. Add to this equation that 80% of these professionals were enlisted ranks and you should see how our senior generals would not have sufficient practical experience to understand the subtleties of this type of war. They have learned on the job, so to speak, and let's hope the government that controls the military learns the lessons as well. It might help them make better decisions about committing our troops to a particular conflict, as well as realize that it is much more of a political game than simply a force on force operation. -Matt Rowe
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LA Times (Oct 13) discusses new approach Green Berets are implementing. Teaching military allies how to fight for themselves

An amazing idea.

Indirect approach is favored in the war on terror

The U.S.' elite armed forces are still carrying out operations, but they're also using a new tactic: teaching military allies how to fight for themselves.
By Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer October 13, 2008

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLA. -- Weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, a small team of Green Berets was quietly sent to the Philippine island of Basilan. There, one of the world's most virulent Islamic extremist groups, Abu Sayyaf, had established a dangerous haven and was seeking to extend its reach into the Philippine capital.

But rather than unleashing Hollywood-style raids, as might befit their reputation, the Green Berets proposed a time-consuming plan to help the Philippine military take on the extremist group itself. Seven years later, Abu Sayyaf has been pushed out of Basilan and terrorist attacks have dropped dramatically.

"It's not flashy, it's not glamorous, but man, this is how we're going to win the long war," said Lt. Gen. David P. Fridovich, the Army officer who designed the Philippine program.

Fridovich is part of a quiet but significant transformation taking place within the most secret of the U.S. military's armed forces, the Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, which encompasses the Green Berets, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Delta Force and similar units from the Air Force and the Marines.

SOCOM Commander Adm. Eric T. Olson, who was appointed to the post in July 2007, is shifting emphasis away from the high-profile raids that were the hallmark of the early years of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.

Instead, Olson has stressed "indirect action": training friendly militaries to better fight terrorism and violent separatists within their own borders.In his first extended interview since becoming SOCOM leader, Olson acknowledged that secretive "direct action" operations remained "urgent and necessary."

But, he added: "They are not by themselves decisive in the long term."Olson is renowned within the tightly knit SOCOM world as leader of a team that in 1993 led trapped Army units out of a fierce firefight in Somalia's capital of Mogadishu, a rescue retold in the book "Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War." Shortly after that, he headed SEAL Team Six, the Navy's super-secret anti-terrorism unit.

An internal debate

Yet Olson has argued that headline-making U.S.-led attacks can be counterproductive, angering locals and undermining domestic leaders."We pride ourselves, for good reason, on our ability to respond to the sound of guns," Olson said in the interview at his headquarters on a sprawling Air Force base on the outskirts of Tampa, Fla.

"We also pride ourselves on our ability to move ahead of the sound of guns. If we can move ahead of the sound of guns, and prevent them, we're all better off."

The debate over whether American strategy should focus on direct or indirect action is a central point of contention within the Bush administration and among counter-terrorism experts at the Pentagon and the CIA, and the tensions are most acute in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Advocates of more frequent unilateral U.S. action there have bumped up against those urging "strategic patience" when dealing with the new government in Islamabad.

Olson declined to discuss his views on Pakistan, as did his subordinates at SOCOM headquarters who cited ongoing discussions among policymakers.

Pentagon officials familiar with internal debates said that Olson has not shied away from direct action in Pakistan when it is backed by solid intelligence. But he also has advocated for improvements in training and support for Pakistani forces so they could themselves better deal with militants, the officials said.

"He's a realist," said one former senior Pentagon official who worked closely with Olson on Pakistan issues. "Some of these guys are not realists. They want to do something just so it appears we're doing something."

Recent success

Supporters of Olson's approach point to progress in the Philippines and elsewhere. The dramatic rescue of 15 hostages by the Colombian military in July was similarly striking because that military has trained for years under U.S. Special Forces teams to combat the leftist rebel group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC.

The success of indirect action depends on strong, long-term ties to foreign militaries. But the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult to cultivate those relationships. Nearly 80% of Special Operations deployments go to the Middle East or central Asia, representing a "vacuum that's sucked away some of our forces from other countries," Olson said.

Olson also must contend with the fallout from pre-Sept. 11 U.S. sanctions against countries plagued by terrorism that barred the U.S. military from working with local armed forces.
"You can go ahead and figure out where those places might be, but there's opportunity we might have missed there," said Fridovich, who declined to name specific countries.
U.S. officials in the past punished Indonesia for military abuses in East Timor and targeted Pakistan for unauthorized nuclear testing.

Olson's views on strategy are especially significant because SOCOM has been given a central role in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. In a series of directives, culminating in the classified "CONPLAN 7500," the military's contingency plans for the global war on terrorism, SOCOM has become the Pentagon's lead agency for synchronizing planning among the military's regional commanders. (Olson has put Fridovich in charge of the synchronization effort.)

Slow progress

The role does not give SOCOM direct command of troops fighting in war zones; however, Olson and Fridovich help shape Pentagon priorities.In August, for instance, Olson was among a small group of American officers who secretly met on a U.S. aircraft carrier with top Pakistani military officials.

Even with their new power, SOCOM leaders acknowledge that others remain skeptical of the slow, persistent approach. But Olson said those opinions were changing, partly because of the success of new approaches in Iraq."I think there's much less institutional resistance now than there might have been a few years ago," Olson said.

"Reconcilable Differences" with Iran

2008-10-11T10:00:00.013-04:00

This is an interesting article addressing US foreign policy toward Iran written by Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Alterman provides some great food for thought regarding how to actually respond to Iran in a more flexible manner without compromising US interests. I have added a related note of a more historical nature at the end of this posting.
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The Arab Gulf States and the United States are adopting increasingly contradictory positions on Iran. Each side seems bent on undermining the other, potentially leading to precisely the outcome that each side is trying to prevent. Here’s how.

There is a strong tendency in the Gulf Arab states to try to co-opt adversaries. The most famous example may be King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud’s propensity for marrying the daughters of rival tribes of the Arabian Peninsula in the early twentieth century, but there are many others. The United Arab Emirates exists as a country in part because the richest emirate, Abu Dhabi, both subsidizes the other emirates and exercises a light hand over federal rule. The Saudi government responded to radicals’ 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in part by pouring money into the religious establishment, not only despite of, but indeed because of seemingly lukewarm support among leading clerics for the Saudi royal family. Just last spring, when Qatar brokered a Lebanese peace deal, rumors flew that the Qataris had paid off the adversaries. A well-placed Lebanese source told me that wasn’t true at all; instead, the Qataris had created a $5 billion investment fund and offered to let Lebanese leaders become partners—provided that the leaders resolved their differences under Qatari tutelage.

Money is not the Gulf states’ only tool, but it is a powerful one. Vital to its effectiveness is the idea that wealth be used not for a one-time payoff but as the beginning of an annuity. A one-time payment is merely a bribe, but creating a longer-term partnership is an investment in future good behavior—not just for years, but for decades.

This is not to say, of course, that the Gulf Arab states are above coercion. In particular, they have a history of cracking down on their own internal dissent, and they not so privately subsidized Saddam Hussein’s bloody war against Iran for the better part of a decade. But these states keenly appreciate the limits of their power, and the power of their wealth, in shaping the actions of others. Lacking the capacity to coerce Iran, they seek to co-opt it.

The United States often approaches matters differently. With a much broader array of concerns and a broader array of countries with which it is concerned, the U.S. predilection is often to fix problems rather than manage them indefinitely. The United States rarely goes out of its way to make mutual investment attractive; to many Americans, the desirability of economic partnerships with such a large and wealthy country as the United States is self-evident and need not be explained. The incentives are there for all comers, who are invited to compete on a level playing field.

More simply put, for many Americans the idea that every country in the world would want a close relationship with the United States is obvious.

Seen this way, the most powerful tool in the U.S. arsenal is not greater engagement, but the threat of less. The United States put restraints on trade with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War; now Cuba, North Korea, Iran and others remain under sanctions as punishment for their policies. It is with Iran, in particular, that the Gulf strategy and the U.S. strategy come into conflict. Iran has been the Gulf states’ neighbor for hundreds of years, and will be for hundreds more; they see little point in antagonizing such a powerful country so nearby. Rather than isolate Iran, they seek to deepen their ties with Iran so as to protect their interests and increase their leverage. In so doing, they attempt to make Iranian aggression unthinkable, much as the post-war order in Western Europe brought peace to the long bloody continent.

The United States seeks to isolate Iran, holding out the promise of closer ties as an incentive and the threat of warfare as a deterrent. U.S. policy tends to take Iranian unpredictability as a constant; Gulf policy tends to take it as a variable. While each side sees an underlying Iranian hostility and aggression, Iran’s neighbors are more optimistic about the possibility of redemption.

Each approach has its weaknesses. The drawback in the Gulf’s strategy is that, by itself, it creates few reasons for the Iranians to change their overt behavior. The drawback of the U.S. strategy is that as U.S.-Iranian bilateral ties weaken, so too do the incentives for Iran to reverse its behavior.

What is ironic about this growing divergence is that the Gulf states and the United States differ not in their goals, but rather in their means to achieve them. Equally ironic, those differences in means may provoke a crisis, as the United States considers coercing allied governments to adopt the U.S.-led isolation strategy through threats of its own, and those governments seek relief from U.S. pressure by undermining the U.S.-led isolation.

In point of fact, not only is there wisdom in both approaches, but they are far more effective if applied in coordination than if pursued in competition. Iran has not recklessly acted against its own interests, and greater engagement in the Gulf would indeed introduce more stability to the region. At the same time, Iran is in difficult financial straits despite high oil prices, and skillfully conditioning fiscal relief on a less impetuous foreign policy would calm regional fears significantly. The key to making these policies work in tandem is that the United States has to ensure that the offer to engage is credible, and Gulf states need to see their goal as influencing decision- making in Iran rather than merely paying protection money. Not only are the stakes too high for the United States to get this wrong; they are too high for U.S. allies in the Gulf as well.

—Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2008

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With respect to Reconcilable Differences, I find it interesting that a different American attitude is what led to the creation of the first US Navy, and that this attitude has significantly colored the US perspective of foreign relations ever since. The 18th Century Barbary pirates would have been happy to receive some form of tribute from the US just as the European powers had been paying to insure their own shipping from raids. Clearly, the US leaders at the time were not motivated by the thought of everyone wishing to have a relationship with the greatest world power—that would have been the British or French (who often paid tribute). Rather, the upstart Americans were outraged because they understood from experience that any tribute would never be enough.

Rightly or wrongly, the revolutionary Americans predominantly believed that no one should be allowed to push around a free people who had offered them no offense. Tributes were the norm, and have been in many societies for centuries, but flush with independence (internal foreign policy debate notwithstanding) this was simply too much for the new nation to bear. An absolutely terrific book on this subject is "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America and the Middle East 1776 to the Present" by Michael B. Oren.

Given the history of the US and the world since then, Dr. Alterman is right on the mark with regard to our current approach to foreign policy. Self righteousness has been both our greatest strength and our greatest weakness ever since. Unfortunately, we still have not learned when to apply it properly.

-Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director
WinTheGWOT.org

Winning The GWOT in a Paragraph

2008-07-14T08:05:00.005-04:00

People often ask us, "What exactly would you change about the current war on terror?"

Nonetheless, they rarely have the attention span or interest level to listen and discuss the issue in detail, so here is a concise, though admittedly simplified answer for them.

"The essential problems facing the world today are highly unlikely to be resolved by conventional military operations…especially when conventional military leaders imagine themselves to be operating in an unconventional manner. International and local political capacity, robust counterinsurgency operations led by local law enforcement agencies and supported by relatively limited military action is the answer.

Free the oppressed, respond to the needs of those who support the bad guys for lack of a better choice, and destroy those who do not accept rational political discourse as an alternative to violence against society."

Schisms Emerging Among Saudi Arabia's Islamists

2008-06-24T12:01:00.007-04:00

Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., Director, CSIS Middle East Program provides two documents that should be of interest to WinTheGWOT readers. The first is a summary of an unusually interesting talk at CSIS about the schisms emerging among Saudi Arabia's Islamists, and Congressional testimony Dr. Alterman delivered recently regarding Iran's activities in the Levant.

Video of the testimony is available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sub_mideast.asp.

Is A Day of Honor Too Much to Ask?

2008-05-24T08:17:00.003-04:00

Let Us Remember Them
By Colbert I. KingSaturday
Originally published in the Washington Post, May 24, 2008

Have I got news for you!

In honor of this weekend's great occasion, you can:

· Save an extra $50 on any purchase over $500 with a newspaper advertisement for teak, wicker or wrought-iron patio furniture.

· Get $40 off plus free delivery and interest-free financing on the purchase of treadmills, ellipticals and home gym equipment.

· Enjoy storewide savings and values through Monday, and get an extra 10 to 15 percent off with your shopping card or pass if you buy dress shirts, pleated or flat-front casual pants, handbags and cosmetics cases, camis, tanks and tees.

· Indulge in a sidewalk sale at a Virginia shopping area that features 110 premium outlet stores .

. . all because this is Memorial Day weekend.

Yes, here comes Memorial Day, another day off the job and the official beginning of the summer cookout season. The time to gas up the car, hit the road and go somewhere fun.

But, boo, this year there's a spoilsport in our midst -- an interloper out to ruin our shopping, barbecuing and traveling pleasures: price.

Prices are rising fast on just about everything we think we want or need. Gotta pay more for those hot dogs and sodas and potato chips. Filling the tank brings tears to the eyes, causes pressure to rise and teeth to gnash.

Well, what's an American to do?

Here's a thought. How about turning our attention back to the reason Memorial Day was created? In case some of you have forgotten -- or don't know -- Memorial Day is set aside to honor the men and women in uniform who gave their lives in service to their country.

As you lament the costs of vacationing, it's worth remembering the 4,563 American servicemen and women who won't be able to take advantage of those weekend holiday sales. Or join in backyard cookouts. Or go anywhere fun. Those 4,000-plus souls were killed after answering their country's call to leave home for Iraq and Afghanistan.

It's also worth reflecting on the fact that across the Potomac River at Arlington National Cemetery are tombstones for multitudes of veterans of past and present wars, fallen warriors buried over 600 acres of hallowed ground. Down on the Mall, not far from the Washington Monument, is a wall with the names of more than 58,000 Americans who lost their lives in the Vietnam War.

No road trips for them. Or picnics. Or family get-togethers. Maybe, if someone remembers, there will be a graveyard decoration, a flag, a flower, a note. In some places in America, here and there, maybe a parade. There will be fitting observances at Arlington Cemetery and on the Mall this weekend. But not in the minds of those looking for good sales.

I date myself, but when I was growing up, the holiday in the King household was called "Decoration Day," although that designation had been changed to Memorial Day many decades earlier. What can I say? In some households, old habits die hard.

In my day, it was also a time to decorate the graves of close family members, regardless of whether they wore the uniform. Grateful survivors knew they had sacrificed and given their all raising families and putting food on the table.

Okay, I have weighed in on this subject before. I'll probably do it again next year, if I'm still around. Because it is unseemly to race out of the house for door-buster sales, auto showrooms and the smoking grill when the day is set aside to honor those who gave their all.

Maybe it's a good thing that rising gas prices and hefty airfares are going to keep some people closer to home this year. Maybe, just maybe, there's something better to do than planning a getaway.

What's so wrong about remembering men and women who paid the ultimate price for decisions made by authorities whose paths they would never cross?

True, the dead are out of sight. But they shouldn't be out of mind. When alive, they heeded the call when others their age, and just as able-bodied, closed their ears and averted their gaze.

War took them from us without regard to race, creed, color, national origin, age, gender or sexual orientation.

On Memorial Day -- as every other day of the year -- they will be mourned by wives, husbands and lovers; parents; brothers; sisters; sons and daughters; cousins; nephews and nieces; neighbors; and that special group among the heartbroken -- grandparents.

The fallen deserve more. The nation, in whose name they died, has a debt to pay. Feed those cash registers and down those beers another time.

A day of honor is not too much to ask.

If I Were General Petraeus…

2008-04-08T15:30:00.008-04:00

If I were General Petraeus I’d be pretty fed up with the Bush Administration and Congress…in fact, I’d be tired of all the politicians who still believe after all of these years that the war in Iraq can be won by military might alone. I’d be pretty fed up with the fact that no one is publicly articulating exactly what the conditions for US withdrawal are, and I be equally frustrated by the fact that I could not publicly state what the key milestones toward that end point and their estimated timelines are. I would want everyone to know how well I was progressing.

Why? Because like any good general—and General Petraeus is a good general, he knows full well that the key milestones and the estimated timelines for achieving them are critical to actually getting them done. At the very least, this can be done at a meaningful high level, but for whatever political reasons the Bush Administration has decided that this should remain a closely held secret. You can bet that if President Bush asked the generals for a timeline they would provide one pretty quickly. The administration claims that "arbitrary" timelines allow the enemy to know our plan and facilitates their attempts to foil it. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any experienced leader understands that a plan must have a clearly defined end point, an owner who is responsible for it, and a due date—otherwise, it is just a fantasy. There can be nothing arbitrary about it.

The fact is that the goal of the plan and the key milestone objectives along the way can be better articulated, measured, and reported on without increasing the danger to its success. All one has to do is think about it and the goals should be obvious.

For example, the obvious strategic objectives are to create a stable government that enjoys a reasonable amount of credibility with some majority of the population regardless of ethnicity or region. In the US, it took from about 1774 to 1787 to ultimately create and ratify the US Constitution (we happened to be at war for a period of that time too). Slavery is one example of a huge compromise that had to be made for the sake of unity. Therefore, we cannot expect immediate perfection from Iraq, though we should not let the government off the hook with respect to Human Rights. Of course, this political task falls well outside the scope and capabilities of General Petraeus’s forces in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker should be responsible for driving this part of the strategy with support from the US State Department. We certainly need to hear the key milestones and estimated timeline for his strategy since it is the foundation of any success.

Another goal must be to establish a truly national military capable of defending Iraq from various threats. What is required here can be easily quantified and a timeline developed. All one has to do is estimate the numbers and types of troops and equipment required, and then estimate how long it will take to train and equip them. This assumes that all we intend to do is replace our own forces in Iraq and leave the rest up to the Iraqis. It is complicated by the fact that some serious integration of local factions must take place, but this portion of the plan can be articulated too. Further, this plan must be subordinate to, and support the overall political plan. General Petraeus even supervised the creation of the new Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on counterinsurgency which plainly states that “…political capacity is the exit strategy.”

So we find ourselves involved in helping establish local security in Iraq…something best left to the local police who also happen to need serious reorganization, integration, equipment, basic law enforcement training, and specialized training for counter-insurgency. Again, these needs can be quantified, a plan created, and a timeline estimated that does not threaten the plan’s success.

As we all know, the “Devil is in the details.” It is in these details that we find potential opportunities for our enemies to exploit. For example, we do not need to publish the graduation dates of new police officers, or who they are, or the curriculum they are taught with respect to COIN. We don’t need to publish how well they can shoot or the types of armor they wear or put in their vehicles. We don’t have to publish in advance where they will be stationed, or that we will also coordinate the movement of a new Iraqi army brigade into that same area that can support them. Some of these things can be kept secret and others can become public only once they are operational and it is too late for the enemy to interfere with them.

What we can report is how many troops we expect to have trained, equipped, and operational by certain dates, and subsequently we can then predict that a complimentary number of US troops are no longer necessary and can be withdrawn (though we don’t have to say who or how in advance). Either we make those planned dates, adjust them for good reason, or fail to meet them. It is that simple. Progress, obstacles, and reasonable changes can be publicly reported on and the people responsible held accountable.

But perhaps that is exactly what the Bush Administration fears. Given its blind acceptance that we will ultimately be successful, the Administration should not be at all concerned about reporting progress. With such confidence reporting should be easy. Failure, however, is still a very real possibility, and though quite tragic, it is no more than that—a failed plan, which could occur whether we report or not. The difference is that key milestones are predictors of success or failure. At worst, we would know that we are not making the progress we need to and could withdraw much earlier. At best we could demonstrate realistic progress or adjust the plan to changing events. This would improve morale, increase Iraqi faith in the effort, decrease resistance to it, and take a lot of pressure off of the people who are doing the hardest work.

It appears that the Bush Administration still fears failure and cannot risk making any failures along the way public—therefore, no timeline is forthcoming. Unfortunately, this also means that the people doing the work cannot be sure that they themselves are making any progress, which is especially difficult for soldiers living at high risk in the field. Soldiers rotating out of Iraq must settle for completing relatively vague or less important goals rather than citing the more significant contributions toward a better future state they are likely making, but cannot articulate. If I were General Petraeus and his troops I know I would be very frustrated at this political spinelessness—especially if I knew we were making progress and I wanted the support of the people I needed to complete the mission that so many people are blindly calling for us to halt.

______________
Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director

The Enemy Does Not Need Another 911 Type Attack

2008-03-07T09:23:00.003-05:00

According to a White House press release, President Bush commemorated the 5th anniversary of the Department of Homeland security by saying, "When this department was established following the September the 11th terrorist attacks, it was hard to imagine that we would reach this milestone without another attack on our homeland. For those of you who were here five years ago, you think back to that time -- I don't think we would have predicted that five years later there had not been another attack on us. And it's your vigilance and your hard work that have helped keep this country safe."

Although no one doubts the hard work that various agencies and individuals at DHS have put into securing our country, I think President Bush greatly over simplifies and overstates the level of security that we in the US currently feel. Let’s look at some assumptions. First, the President assumes that it took less than 6-years for the 911 terrorists to conceive, plan, recruit, prepare, and then execute their attacks on 911. It also assumes that the terrorists were simultaneously planning a follow-on attack of similar intensity. It is much more likely that the terrorists were planning how to avoid whatever form of retaliation the US came up with. Although one can look at the chronology of Islamic extremist attacks against the US and see a pattern of an attack every 3-5 years or so, the level of sophistication, planning, and execution of those attacks were primitive in comparison to 911. Only one of those attacks took place in the continental United States. As a result, one cannot say that we are overdue for another 911 style attack.

In fact, one could argue that from the terrorist point of view the 911 attack has been more successful than they could have ever hoped. Since the attack, the US has launched two counterinsurgency based wars relying upon woefully inexperienced and conventionally trained “cold war” military forces. These wars are unpopular around the world and to a significant degree right here at home. The cost of these wars is at the expense of future generations of Americans in terms of social security and Medicare, and no one can predict the future cost of injured and traumatized veterans over their lifetimes.

Our international reputation as the bastion of democracy, hope, and good will in the world has been damaged tremendously by a war predicated on misinformation and possibly outright lies. The inhumane actions at Abu Ghraib, the ruthless and counter-productive de-Baathification policy in Iraq, and the issues arising out of the treatment and due process of detainees at Guantanamo Bay have provided the world with examples of just how evil we can be. These short term and relatively extreme activities are generating more distrust and hatred in the world for the US…especially in the very countries from which the Islamic extremists originate.

At home we have come to the point where we actually debate the forms of torture we will allow instead of how we will prevent human rights abuses. We debate the level of government monitoring of private phone lines we will allow as opposed to protecting our Constitutional rights to privacy, and we have begun combining the intentionally separated security powers of various agencies…all in the name of increased security from future terrorist attacks. It is by taking advantage of conditions such as these that people like Saddam Hussein first came to power.

Financially, the US dollar is weak…weaker even than the Canadian dollar…the housing bubble has burst, and average homeowner equity has dropped below 50% for the first time since World War II. Manufacturing and technical jobs are leaving the US in droves, and the price of oil is through the roof. Whether or not the attack on 911 precipitated the burst of the housing bubble doesn’t matter. It only matters that our enemies believe it and that the US is feeling pain since 911 that we have not felt in decades.

The US sponsored NATO alliance is slowly weakening as its longtime member nations debate their roles and the strategy for the war in Afghanistan. Our moral position versus Russia and other former Soviet Bloc States has all but evaporated. US politicians and politics in general appear to be polarized more than ever, and the two major political parties have presidential front runners who advocate either an all out and dangerous withdrawal from Iraq or continuing on with more of the same flawed military based strategy.

Osama bin Laden and his supporters don’t need to attack the US again like they did on 911 since we are continuing to play right into their hands. In other words, we aren’t making them mad or desperate enough to attack us again. As perverse as this may sound, another attack on the US itself might actually be a sign that we were doing something right.

________________
Matthew B. Rowe
Executive Director

Waterboarding is Illegal: A Blind Step in the Right Direction

2008-02-19T14:30:00.002-05:00

The US Justice Department has finally indicated that the torture technique known as waterboarding has been eliminated from what is now legally allowed for use during prisoner interrogations.

"The set of interrogation methods authorized for current use is narrower than before, and it does not today include waterboarding," said Steven Bradbury, acting head Legal Counsel of the Justice Department. He added, "There has been no determination…that the use of waterboarding, under any circumstances, would be lawful under current law."

We must applaud this decision which appears to have been made based upon the moral outcry of many people in the US and the world. The decision comes in spite of some senior officials of the Bush Administration who fully support the use of this and other torture techniques. It is very discouraging that the impact of waterboarding and other forms of torture and Human Rights abuses are still not being considered with respect to their detrimental effect on the Global War on Terror.

It is important to understand that the actual perpetrators of terrorist and guerrilla attacks make up only a very small percentage of any society. The socio-political networks that help them consist of active supporters, sympathizers, and neutral people. By far, the largest proportions of people are in the sympathizer and neutral categories that need only ignore terrorist or guerrilla activities in order to support them. Every time the US allows a prisoner to be tortured, we decrease our rapidly weakening moral position in the eyes of the world. At best, this actually reduces the motivation for neutral portions of the population to stay neutral. At worst, this increases the ranks of active enemy supporters and sympathizers. In other words, the use of torture at the tactical level works against us at the strategic level.

The strategy for winning an insurgent conflict specifically requires that we win over the people to our cause. We can only win an insurgency if we can truly erode the enemy’s support networks by taking away his legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The catch is that legitimacy must be transferred over to the local government and any foreign governments/forces supporting it. If we are successful on both counts, the active insurgent eventually has nowhere to hide, nowhere to get support, and cannot continue the fight without great risk of compromise and destruction.

Until it becomes the norm for the US to shun any form of torture or Human Rights abuse, we will not gain any moral legitimacy in the eyes of the world—and especially in the eyes of our enemies and their supporters. For any form of genuine peace and stability to develop, the people must have the opportunity choose who they support based upon the basic needs, safety, and security that the government provides. Lasting peace and stability will not be established if they must base their choices upon which government they fear the least.

A Timeline For Withdrawal In Iraq Is Not A Threat To Success

2008-01-27T12:44:00.000-05:00

At a town hall meeting in a Florida retirement community, Senator and Presidential Candidate John McCain pointed out that he would like a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. Governor Mitt Romney has also stated that he too would support a timetable, but neither candidate has given much useful detail beyond that in public. Obviously, many people believe that the publication of a timetable is not prudent since it would somehow provide our enemies with the critical information they need to defeat us. Nothing could be further from the truth.

A timetable simply implies that on the road to a goal, a certain number of key milestones must be reached in a particular order and within a reasonable amount of time. In other words, a specific plan must be completed in a timely manner. These are usually best estimates given that no one can predict the future, and when unexpected events take place or the situation changes, the timetable/plan can be reasonably adjusted—or abandoned altogether should it be warranted.

People in the United States are most concerned with a time table for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. However, time tables would need to be developed for Iraqi civilian governments at the national and local levels and that include milestones not only for the formation of governments, but also for the provision and control of basic public health and safety services. Given the critical role of the Iraqi National Police in counterinsurgency, a specific timetable should be put in place for them as well.

Making this a bit more complicated, all of these timetables would have to be closely coordinated in order to support a viable national counterinsurgency strategy. Since no one could possibly address all of Iraq’s issues simultaneously and across all locations, the development of military security forces would have to be coordinated with the development of working local governments. In other words, a strategic plan would be required, and this would be supported by tactical plans at the local level—each with its own measurable milestones and goals.

It is these tactical plans and their individual details that must be kept from the enemy. It does the enemy no good to know that at the national level, we plan to have a specific number of Iraqi military and police units trained and replacing US units by a certain date. This is especially the case if the enemy is uncertain about which types of units we are training, how many of each type, where we are training them, or how long it will take. The picture becomes even more confusing to the enemy when they have to sift through our simultaneous efforts to create working national and local governments and police forces. Again, knowing the national level milestones and their due dates without having access to the detailed tactical/local efforts does the enemy no good at all.

One thing is for sure, a high level timeline and measurable milestones can be developed that are no threat to the success of the war. Complicated or not, having meaningful and manageable milestones would certainly make a difference to voters here in the US.

What Could Joe Donnelly Really Know?

2007-12-19T13:10:00.000-05:00

Tom Coyne’s AP article “Rep. Donnelly says Iraq situation better” published in the December 19, 2007 Indianapolis Star quotes Representative Joe Donnelly (D-IND) as stating "I feel we've made progress, and the other part is I feel we can see an end game in sight…It isn't we just keep plugging away in the hopes something will turn out right. General Petraeus is working a plan and we seem to be heading toward a place where the Iraqis can be self-sustaining and we'll have a smaller presence in the background."

The article goes on to point out that “Donnelly's findings were in stark contrast to his visit to Iraq last July…” Just exactly how does Representative Donnelly know all this? What unconventional military experience does he bring to the table to make so bold an independent assessment? All he can realistically do is agree with General Petraeus’s opinions, and don’t get me wrong, General Petraeus is high on my list of heroes, but even he had to learn this type of warfare On-The-Job. Where is the independent and informed assessment supported by experts on unconventional warfare not within General Petraeus’s and the Bush Administration’s sphere of influence?

Here are some interesting facts. The US military trains only about 5-7,000 Special Forces and other troops in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency who make careers out of this type of warfare. Out of a military of roughly 1.5 million, this means that less than 1% of our military forces know the subject in depth. Only about 2-4% of these soldiers consist of officers, so it should surprise no one that very, very few of them become general officers. This would seemingly explain many of our earlier blunders in the war.

These blunders were greatly compounded by a US State Department that has virtually no understanding of unconventional warfare. They simply do not get that the key factors in this type of war are its highly political nature and that it must be managed at the local level.

Now I offered my decade of unconventional warfare experience to Joe Donnelly about the time of his recent election and never even received so much as a polite, “No thank you.” Apparently my independent expertise and that of other respected authorities I can put Representative Donnelly in touch with were not necessary.

The AP also reports that Representative Donnelly would “…like to see the number of troops down to about 100,000 by the end of 2008, and by the end of 2009 be down to 30,000 to 45,000 troops working mostly as trainers and advisers.”

All that would be very nice, but just how did he come up with these numbers given that he has no real experience, and apparently no subject matter experts to guide him in his estimates?

Non-military Capacity Is the Exit Strategy

2007-11-19T18:25:00.000-05:00

According to the Washington Post, “The Army is struggling to retain experienced younger officers [mostly Captains and Majors]…who are leaving partly because…they are alienated from leaders who lack their combat experience.”

"They are leaving because no one is listening to them. They don't trust the people above them," states a two combat tour officer according to the Post.

Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates understands the critical need to retain and promote younger combat veterans, especially those who understand the lessons in irregular warfare that we are relearning and that had been lost after the Vietnam War.

To this end, the Army has summoned General David Petraeus home from Iraq to take part in officer promotion boards and ensure that more unconventional thinkers are given due consideration. These promotion characteristics are vital to the future effectiveness of the Army, given the unconventional threat we will likely face in the foreseeable future.

We at WinTheGWOT applaud the DoD leadership for embracing this change and understand firsthand how hard it is to change paradigms and cultural values that have existed since before the cold war. In our thesis, “Winning the Global War on Terror: Unconventional Warfare is the Exit Strategy,” we have advocated further strategic reorganizations of the DoD in detail. We also advocate that extensive reorganization take place in the political infrastructure that should be predominant during unconventional warfare…namely, in the Department of State.

Recent news stories have reported how senior DoS officials have voiced their concern about serving in Iraq due to the tremendous personal risk they face there. This attitude must be changed. One suggestion for developing more unconventionally minded Army officers has been to create a permanent unconventional warfare advisory corps to help develop the type of leader required in future conflicts.

"The people who would gravitate toward service in an Army advisory corps would be the type of adaptive, flexible leader skilled in unconventional warfare," the Post quotes LTC John Nagl, one of the principle authors of the latest Field Manual on counterinsurgency.

We would argue that the DoS develop a similar advisory and educational system for our ambassadors and other officials since the political component of unconventional warfare is so vital to success. Von Clausewitz notwithstanding, any form of war is the outcome of political failure to deal with the root causes of conflict that occur at all levels of a given society. Government corruption, oppression, and simple neglect create unsatisfied populations with little hope and few alternatives. The longer the oppression and neglect are in place, the more extreme the populations’ feelings of exclusion and the greater the popular support for an insurgency—even one fostered by relative extremist organizations like Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

Beyond attempting to separate the insurgent factions or bolster the military might of the host nation, the global war on terror must include significant investments in eliminating the key socio-political threats that result in popular support for the insurgents. The credibility required to accomplish this comes from long-term relationships at all levels of the society, and through commitment to creating responsive forms of representative government all the way to the grass roots level. In short, the US DoS must be as involved in the resolution of the conflict as the military is.

It is no coincidence that General Petraeus was the officer in charge of the creation of the latest “US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual” (FM 3-24). In the “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition” of that FM it states, in bold lettering and as a sub-section heading, “Non-military Capacity Is the Exit Strategy.”

At best, the military can buy only a temporary advantage and relative stability, as in the case of the “surge” in Iraq. This will last only as long as it takes the enemy to figure out how to change their tactics and reduce its effect. Right now it is a race to see if the Iraqi government can legitimize itself in the eyes of the Iraqi people before our temporary stability dries up. It could still go either way, but having a more unconventionally minded DoS would certainly have increased the odds in favor of success.

It Isn't HOW we Torture...It's THAT We Torture That Matters

2007-11-03T09:38:00.000-04:00

Attorney General nominee Michael B. Mukasey may have simply answered the question as many legal professionals are apt to do…by stating that a careful legal analysis is required for him to assess the legality of more severe forms of interrogation used by the CIA. Under most legal conditions, this is an appropriate answer. However, in terms of morality and ethics, Mukasey has failed. He clearly lacks political acumen as well, given the current political environment. The fact is that any form of torture is wrong regardless of its legality within USC Title 18. It is also useless. Expert interrogators, like retired army Major Ken Roberts, who commanded groups of interrogators in both Afghanistan and Iraq will tell you that torture simply does not work. Of course, there is no telling what the CIA really does…we only know what they want us to know, but they have yet to provide any reliable data indicating that whatever they are doing is successful. In its strictest definition, anything that we do to weaken a prisoner’s resolve is torture. The US should adopt this definition and outlaw torture.

As a Special Forces soldier operating in Latin America in the 1980’s and early 90’s I was taught that war is an outcome, not usually a cause for the actual conflict. I was taught that by eliminating or reducing the root causes of a conflict the war could be ended or prevented. This is especially the case in an insurgency where the combatants come from the populace, often bearing very legitimate grievances. It was our job to promote Human Rights, the Rights of the Accused, and enforce (through reporting) justice in general in the countries we operated. Of course we trained them to efficiently find and kill enemy insurgents and terrorists, but the emphasis was on avoiding any form of collateral damage. It increased the risk to the military forces we were supporting, of course, but it worked. It is upon the very same local political grievances that Islamic extremists now play to rally support for their otherwise relatively unpopular causes. Instead of trying to prevent the Human Rights abuses, the United States has actually begun promoting their use—justifying this due to the nature of the threat—exactly as those countries in Latin America once did.

For the United States to declare that Human Rights are now relative; that torture, unrestricted search and seizure, etc., are now standard operating procedures for our nation is to behave exactly like the enemies we claim to have some sort of moral superiority over. It plays into the hands of our enemies who use our own policies as focal points for their publicity efforts. They can truthfully point out that the difference between the US and Saddam Hussein is that we already have the most powerful army in the world and lot’s of weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush’s selection of this nominee indicates that he still does not understand how our nation’s morality and behavior impact how the insurgents generate sympathy for their cause and continue resisting. This is on top of the very real local grievances they have. The Bush Administration obviously does not understand—or perhaps, does not care about the political climate or opinions of the majority of Americans, either.

Who Shall We Invade Next?

2007-10-24T09:35:00.000-04:00

Again and again in news articles, opinions, letters to the editor, and other sources there is debate on the issue of whether the US should stay in Iraq or begin planning for our withdrawal. The two polarized and dominant political views have very clear and over simplified agendas….stay the course, or pull out. One almost never reads anything in the main stream press that discusses how we should be changing our overall strategy for Iraq and the global war on terror.

General Petraeus, the commander in Iraq, even helped write the manual on counterinsurgency. He of all people understands that anything he does in Iraq is merely a tactical battle in the overall global strategy against Islamic terror. He most certainly understands that we should be doing something very different than we are. In his counterisurgency manual a key point is emphasized, and we quote, "Nonmilitary capacity is the exit strategy."

Iraq is in a form of civil war, aggravated to some extent by foreign Jihadists and to a large extent by US actions and regional political issues. Many of the foreign actors who come to Iraq are not there to set up for some sort of great jihad against the US, though the Islamic extremist minority would have us believe that. Iran isn’t trying to influence the war in Iraq so that it can better support terrorists striking the US…it is there for its own political and religious advantage in the region. Al Qaeda would have us believe the opposite, but that simply does not make it so.

Recent estimates are that some 20-30,000 Iraqis are active in the insurgency (including militias). If one generously assumes that there are 100 Iraqis actively supporting each insurgent, then less than 12% of the total Iraqi population is involved in any meaningful way. Some 90% may be sympathetic, but they are not sympathetic enough to take real action. Otherwise, the 27 million Iraqis would have easily run our 165,000 troops out of the country by now. Nonetheless, too many of our precious defense resources are focusing on Iraq and not enough are being focused on the very real global threat.

We face a globally dispersed strategic war on terror. The terrorists and insurgents use guerrilla tactics…that is, they hit and they run. They are not going to let us win by defeating and destroying them in Iraq as long as they have somewhere safe to retreat to. Even if it became clear that we were somehow going to truly wrest control of Iraq through the use of our military might, the terrorists would simply move somewhere else. That's how they fight, after all. They hit when they have the advantage and they hide until they do.

Current discussions on the war in Iraq and the Global War on Terror are not strategic…they are tactical…and that limited line of thinking will not lead us to victory or safety. Until our political leaders (and would be leaders) begin to develop a truly strategic understanding of how to fight the global threat of Islamic extremists we are most certainly going to face the same level of threat that we have in the past.

Following the currently flawed line of strategic thought one has to ask, “Who shall we invade next?”

Is Nouri al-Maliki the Right Guy?

2007-09-25T20:13:00.000-04:00

According to a recent AP report about discussion between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, "The Iraqi prime minister owes his still-tenuous political survival in large part to staunch White House support, and Bush, even if dissatisfied with al-Maliki's leadership in some areas, recognizes there is virtually no alternative to replace him."

Given the lack of political progress that al-Maliki has made and that fact that there is no one in Iraq who shares his political platform close enough to replace him, wouldn't that indicate that we are supporting the wrong guy?

“The Elephant in the War Room”

2007-09-11T10:55:00.000-04:00

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director of WinTheGWOT.org
Originally published in the September 13th Washington Times.

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are providing testimony on progress in the war in Iraq even as significant debate continues regarding just how to assess developments in the war. Supporters and anti-war activists alike have plenty of information from reasonable sources to support their given positions. One major issue that appears to be lacking in most discussions is the disposition of sectarian militias, like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and their potential next steps.

According to various sources, the Mahdi Army consists of anywhere from to 10,000 to 60,000 fighters. The Iraq Study Group more than doubled that number. Even though al-Sadr and the US have signed a cease fire, some sources have quoted recent Department of Defense reports as indicating that the Mahdi Army has “replaced Al Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq."

Al-Sadr has recently called for his militia to cease its operations for six months in order reorganize, and ostensibly for him to regain control of the more radical elements in which he has had lesser influence. He may be able to do exactly that by justifying his call for a cease fire as a means to accelerate the US drawdown of forces in Iraq. Any US withdrawal is clearly conditioned upon increased security and stability. In other words, a significant reduction in sectarian combat operations against each other, and against US and Iraqi government forces.

Should other belligerents do likewise—such as the Badr Corps, which opposes the Mahdi Army—a very false sense of security and success could motivate a premature US withdrawal. This would provide sectarian forces with the maneuver room they need to conduct combat operations against each other and throw Iraq into greater chaos.

Even if the Iranians and other neighboring countries do not become “directly” involved, they will continue to provide supplies, funds, fighters, and safe havens to the militias of their choice. This will ensure that the conflict continues indefinitely and force Iraq’s 22 million citizens—most of whom are not currently combatants—to choose sides and become much more involved than the relatively small proportion that makes up the current militias.

Although General Petraeus’s safeguard and secure strategy has likely done what he said it would, it has not addressed the underlying root causes of the civil conflict in Iraq. If the single largest “unified” military force withdraws, Iraq will no longer have the very limited safety and security it appears to have today. General Petraeus is the first to say that the social and political root causes must be addressed in order for any success to sustain itself. To paraphrase him, the military alone cannot win the war in Iraq.

Until the US and the rest of the world begin applying as many resources to addressing these non-military root causes as they have to the overt military challenges, the war in Iraq will continue. Although the Iraqis are certainly responsible for their own social justice, the enormous level of US involvement means that it is clearly the responsibility of Ambassador Crocker and the US State Department to see that these root causes are addressed. This is where any assessment of progress in Iraq must truly focus. Unfortunately, most indications are that we are failing here, and in an appalling manner. Today, safety and security of any appreciable level in Iraq are only as certain as the US military’s ability to provide them—and that clearly has its operational and political limits.

Overhaul of Iraqi Police “As Urged” by Panel Likely Not Enough

2007-08-31T11:09:00.001-04:00

By Matthew B. Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org

David S. Cloud’s August 30th New York Times article, Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police, points out one of the most important factors that could contribute to the stability and hope for the future of Iraq. Unfortunately, it only touches upon the reasons for the importance of the police to a positive outcome in the war.

According to the article, the commission was created by Congress “to study the Iraqi security forces and report its findings this fall.” They found that in spite of the fact that national police units played a key role in securing neighborhoods after army units cleared out the insurgents, the police have often demonstrated unchecked and counterproductive sectarianism. Additional challenges with supplies and equipment have exacerbated the problems and have rendered the national police ineffective at best or “openly allied with Shiite militants” at worst.

Without question, the first step as stated in the article is to remake the 26,000-officer national police force and purge it of corrupt individuals and militants. The panel, headed by General James Jones, “…concludes that the rampant sectarianism that has existed since the formation of the police force requires that its current units ‘be scrapped’ and reshaped into a smaller, more elite organization.” Unfortunately, what exactly this “more elite” organization would do is not reported.

We at WinTheGWOT.org have regularly pointed out that the shortcomings of the Iraqi police would come back to haunt us. This started at the beginning of the war and was later supported by research conducted in early 2006 and that was later submitted to Congress. It was reinforced in many of our commentaries and Op-Ed pieces like the December 21, 2006 commentary regarding the looming “Surge” in Iraq:

“The next strategy in Iraq must certainly provide for safety and security, but at the same time it must include efforts to establish justice and equality. This means that Iraq must have a reliable police force and supporting judicial system. Police forces also happen to be one of the best sources for potential counterinsurgent forces. Nobody can manage an insurgency better than local cops that have a stake in their communities. Foreign military forces and even Iraqis from other parts of the country simply do not have the family and friendship ties necessary to really understand what is going on in the local area.

Herein lays the dilemma. The Iraqi National Police as an institution is broken. The police are believed to be heavily infiltrated by sectarian extremists, who use their access to police information and resources as a means to actively and violently promote their causes. At the very least, they can look the other way as independent militias for which they have sympathies do the dirty work for them.”

To have any hope of a positive outcome in Iraq, we must help them create reliable police forces. The US should focus its strategy on providing security while a new National Police force is recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed. These new and modern police need to be better paid, taught to respect Human Rights, tolerate diversity, promote equality, and protect the rights of the accused. They need national direction from a better organized Ministry of the Interior and the support of a functioning judicial system.

One could even argue that there is not much need for an Iraqi national army right now. That is what the US Army in Iraq is currently for, and if the US Army, as stated by General Petraeus himself, cannot win the war in Iraq by itself, what makes everyone think the Iraqi army can?

On the other hand, if the goal of the Iraqi army is to protect it from neighboring states, that’s fine, but the US can carry the bulk of that burden for now and refocus our efforts, treasure, and lives on rebuilding the national police who are the best placed forces for dealing with the internal threats. This also assumes that the government of Iraq will make progress toward reconciliation and establishing itself as a functional entity supported by some significant proportion of the Iraqi people—no small task there—and one that is also well out of the scope of the US and Iraqi armies.

We also pointed out that creating reliable Iraqi police can be done much more easily than most people believe. All of the training facilities are available in the US and abroad. Subject matter experts from the US Departments of Justice, State, and Defense are available. An initial corps of police professionals can be created at the FBI academy, for example, and at other large metropolitan police training centers. The initial group can be deployed as leaders throughout Iraq who have consistent training, equipment, and operating principles—and most importantly—the direct involvement and support of US and other allied police and military advisors. They can spearhead the transition to Iraqi provided security while being advised by professional counterinsurgents that are embedded with them full time and can help coordinate support from the military as needed.

Getting the police out of their current environments is a challenge since these men want to protect their families, but by working through local leaders we should be able to find an initial group willing to take the risk. No doubt that many moderate Iraqi citizens would step up to the plate if they really believed that the police as an institution were being reworked in some credible manner, and that the US and Iraqi armies would focus on supporting and protecting the police. While these officers train abroad in a safe environment, we can continue upgrading the Iraqi National Police Training Center and develop the police senior leadership and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (Justice) officials.

This first cohort of newly professionalized Iraqi police must be integrated in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Some of these officers can become the cadre at the Iraqi National Police Academy. Others must get back into their hometowns patrolling and interacting with the locals from all backgrounds to create the networks we need to better deal with the insurgents. As more and more professional police are generated the security load will naturally shift off of the US forces, but US forces will likely remain in Iraq for some time yet.

Purely from the police perspective, this implies that the US and the world must provide adequate advisors and resources to reorganize and even create the supporting Interior Ministry and judicial branches required to make the system work. Providing the resources, time, security, and personnel for a strategy like this would turn the US expenditures in Iraq into a long term investment rather than an unrecoverable short term “surge” expense.

If safety, security, and justice become more predominant in Iraq, and the Iraqi government works to keep it that way, international development, employment, and prosperity will follow. The support for the insurgencies will fade and the Iraqi army can then focus on dealing with the external threats that any army should.

Troops are Confronting Waste in Iraq?

2007-08-25T08:22:00.000-04:00

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
August 25, 2007

Today’s Washington Post has an article titled, Troops Confront Waste In Iraq Reconstruction, by Sudarsan Raghavan (read more below). The story provides an example of the difficulty that US troops are having monitoring and managing the expensive reconstruction contracts that have been awarded to Iraqi and other contractors.

The subtitle of the article is, Inexperience and Lack of Training Hobble Oversight, Accountability.

Of course it does. As we have written numerous times in past commentary, research, and have also expressed in discussions with members of congress and their staffs; the changing of a culture and reconstruction of a failing or failed state are far beyond the capabilities of the military alone. General Petraeus has stated as much, though he is often misquoted by the anti-war set as saying we can’t win at all. The article is pointed and ends with the heartbreaking irony faced by our troops who lack the appropriate support and expertise of civilian oversight that ought to come from the US State Department.

Troops Confront Waste In Iraq Reconstruction
Inexperience and Lack of Training Hobble Oversight, Accountability

By Sudarsan Raghavan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, August 25, 2007; A01

ISKANDARIYAH, Iraq -- Maj. Craig Whiteside's anger grew as he walked through the sprawling school where U.S. military commanders had invested money and hope. Portions of the workshop's ceiling were cracked or curved. The cafeteria floor had a gaping hole and concrete chunks. The auditorium was unfinished, with cracked floors and poorly painted walls peppered with holes.

Whiteside blamed the school director for not monitoring the renovation. The director retorted that the military should have had better oversight. The contract shows the Iraqi contractor was paid $679,000.

The story of the Vo-Tech Iskandariyah Industrial School illustrates the challenges of rebuilding Iraq. It also raises questions about how the military is managing hundreds of millions of dollars to fund such reconstruction, part of the effort to stabilize the country.

Senior officers and commanders insist cases like the Vo-Tech are isolated and are quickly addressed. But in this turbulent patch of Iraq south of Baghdad, ground commanders and civil affairs officers say the system is marked by inefficiency and waste and is vulnerable to corruption. Many Iraqi contractors are slow and unreliable. Some are dishonest. Meanwhile, inexperienced soldiers do their best to scrutinize millions of dollars in contracts and monitor projects they don't fully comprehend.

"I wish they had taught me how to spend money," said Staff Sgt. Christopher Barnes, of Charlie Company, 412th Civil Affairs Battalion.

U.S. generals say reconstruction projects can lure insurgents away from violence. They hope the Vo-Tech, this area's biggest project, will one day offer hundreds of Iraqis courses in computers, auto shop, welding and other trades. But nearly a year into the project, which will cost several million dollars to complete, there are only 32 students -- all enrolled in computer courses.

"We're trying to build as we go. We have to get people off the streets and not planting IEDs," said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, referring to roadside bombs. Lynch, the top U.S. commander for Task Force Marne, which operates south of Baghdad, said the school could enroll thousands of students in the not-too-distant future.

After he left the complex, Whiteside, 38, who graduated from Springbrook High School in Silver Spring, Md., stepped into his Humvee, still incensed.

"It's what happens when you're throwing money at the problems," he said.

Three Weeks' Training

A former infantry soldier, Barnes, 27, was studying at Fresno City College for a history degree when he decided to return to Iraq as a reservist. He joined a civil affairs unit. He said he received three weeks' training at Fort Dix, N.J., where he learned to deal with displaced civilians and administer humanitarian aid.

Navy Capt. Donald McMahon, the top civil affairs officer for Task Force Marne, said the training provided adequate preparation.

But Barnes and other soldiers here disagreed. For example, there was no training in drawing up contracts, handling bids or using worksheets, they said.

"I didn't learn a whole lot, actually," Barnes said. "It would have been nice if they had taught us the paperwork portion of it. Instead they focused on stuff we're not even doing here."

Another former infantry soldier, Staff Sgt. Benjamin Johnson, 27, of Saginaw, Mich., described the civil affairs training course as "vague."

"We didn't go over any CERP projects, which is what we're dealing with here," said Johnson, referring to the Commander's Emergency Response Program, the main reconstruction fund used by U.S. generals in their areas of operations.

"I felt a little cheated," Barnes said.

Files in Disarray

By April, both Barnes and Johnson were attached to Forward Operating Base Iskan, run by the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment. It's a few miles south of Iskandariyah, an industrial town nestled at the southern tip of an area known as the Triangle of Death. In this area, where Sunni and Shiite groups compete for influence, the military had embarked on dozens of projects, including cleaning streets and canals, building soccer fields and blood banks, and renovating telephone lines.

Four-person civil affairs teams, whose varied duties include handling economic issues and training Iraqi soldiers, are attached to each battalion on one-year rotations, sometimes less. Incomplete projects are handed off to the next team.

When Barnes and Johnson arrived, they found disorganized files. They had no copies of payment receipts, which totaled $7 million under the previous team. To learn the status of many ongoing projects, they had to speak with contractors and locals. "It wasn't done the way it should have been done," Barnes said. "We had to learn as we went how to do a project."

Some completed projects, they found, were not operational -- such as the medical clinic in a nearby village that the Iraqi government has not yet staffed. Some have to be fixed. "I know there have been other projects from past teams that are not working now, and we have to go and fix them and assess them and redo them," Johnson said.

Meanwhile, their three-man team -- they've been short-staffed since they arrived -- has 25 to 30 projects of its own to complete. The soldiers' duties also include attending meetings of the city council, agricultural union and other local groups.

"We kind of have to make do with what we have," said Sgt. Walter Jackson, 31, of Houston. "It's on-the-job training."

They try their best to go out and visit projects, said Johnson, but sometimes they are forced to ask other soldiers out on patrol, with no civil affairs training, to stop by projects "to take a few pictures and let us know what they think of it."

On a recent day, Johnson was scrutinizing a $250,000 contract to renovate a secondary school in Musayyib, a Shiite city south of Iskandariyah.

The Iraqi contractor was charging $50 per basketball and $30 per soccer ball. In Baghdad, top-of-the-line basketballs and soccer balls cost no more than $15.

Johnson's eyes went down the contract. Was hooking up a power cable to the city's power supply really going to cost $10,000? "I'm an ex-infantry guy. I don't know what this runs," Johnson said. "Maybe a cable like that costs a lot, but I really doubt it."

"If they are doing this to little stuff like basketballs, then how do I know they aren't cheating us on the big stuff, like the stuff I'm not qualified to assess?" he said.

Work Unfinished

The contract to refurbish several buildings of the vocational school was signed in September. It called for renovations to be completed in 60 days. In February, shortly after Whiteside's battalion took over responsibility for projects in the Iskandariyah area, he visited the complex. The project was supposed to be 40 percent complete, and the contractor had been paid for that portion. But it was not done.

The contractor assured them he would finish, Whiteside said.

On Feb. 25, the contractor and the school's director came to the base. They wanted an additional $400,000 to upgrade the project. The civil affairs team leader, Maj. James Ortoli, refused. In his report, he warned of the contractor and director: "I think they are both trying to scam money from Coalition Forces and should not be used in future projects. I told them that the work I saw when I visited the school was not to standard and I wouldn't entertain the thought of spending more money for their mistakes."

He recommended canceling the project if there was no improvement. Several weeks later, Whiteside revisited the site and said he felt progress was being made.

In April, Jackson visited the site. The project was supposed to be halfway done, but the site was still chaotic.

"I don't know what constituted them as halfway through," Jackson said. "It was also our first project we really dealt with. We didn't have a whole lot to go off of, especially as far as experience goes. This kind of stuff, it was all new to all of us."

By then, Sgt. Michael Cawley, a New England police officer, had taken over as team leader on the project. He was responsible for paying the remaining 50 percent. Satisfied with the work, on June 17 he made the final payment to the contractor.

On July 27, in the auditorium, Whiteside was angrily demanding an explanation from the school's director, Naseer al-Abbas. He wanted to know why the contractor had failed. "What was this guy doing? Why didn't he take the initiative?"

Abbas said, through an interpreter, that they had confronted the contractor numerous times but that he ignored them. He said Whiteside's soldiers should have done a better job in monitoring the school's progress, adding that the constant changeover of soldiers he dealt with didn't help matters.

Whiteside told him that civil affairs teams had been to the complex 10 times and demanded to know why Abbas hadn't complained to them.

Whiteside, speaking to a delegation of U.S. aid officials and a reporter, blamed the school director. "When there are no students and nothing going on, what was he doing? What are the 149 employees doing? What are they doing when the floor is falling apart? The answer to all of these questions is nothing."

"It's everybody's problem. It's the only way things are going to work here."

As the convoy left the school, Whiteside declared: "Like everything state-owned, it's fully manned, and not operational. If they are spending their own money, they would care."

'He Was in a Hurry'

The following day, Whiteside said that Cawley's final inspection of the school wasn't done properly. "He just screwed up. He was in a hurry," Whiteside said, adding that Cawley was facing pressure from his superiors to finish projects.

But Whiteside added that Cawley, who was on his second Iraq tour, was experienced. So much that he was promoted last month and now oversees a company of civil affairs soldiers. Whiteside said that he and his commander, Lt. Col. Robert Balcavage, also bore responsibility for what happened because they assigned Cawley to the school project and had to sign off on the final payment.

In a telephone interview, Cawley said he could not remember the last time he had visited the school, but said he felt he had done a good job. "I was able to get him to complete more than the scope of the work," Cawley said of the contractor. He declined to comment further.

Barnes's team has created a "continuity book" that lists all its projects with all the receipts -- to help the next team. But it still has to deal with past mistakes. On Aug. 10, Barnes met the contractor at the school and informed him that he needed to fix his shoddy work. Initially reluctant, the contractor agreed. As the convoy left the school, an explosively formed penetrator -- a sophisticated roadside bomb -- struck Barnes's Humvee, ripping it apart and wounding another soldier. Barnes survived.

Some Early Predictions for the Iraq Progress Report

2007-08-18T12:36:00.000-04:00

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org
August 18, 2007

The American public, members of Congress, the media, and even our enemies are anxiously awaiting the Bush Administration’s September 15th progress report on Iraq. Obviously, much hangs in the balance of how well that report is received by the public and politicians from both sides of the aisle. Wrangling has already begun as to who will actually deliver the report either publicly or behind closed committee doors. The White House has proposed that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker do not give the congressional briefings, but that they be delivered by the secretaries of state and defense instead. This of course brings up questions of “spin” and other potential Administration manipulation of the report. Regardless of who actually delivers the reports to whom, we can be certain that it will be chock full of “progress” metrics. Unfortunately, these metrics will be knowingly used by all stakeholders to support their own predetermined estimates of our progress, and even those few who try to take an unbiased look at the situation will unwittingly be relying upon virtually useless metrics.

The progress report will contain things like the number of US troops in Iraq, the number of estimated enemy forces, the number of combat incidents like IED’s and enemy rocket attacks, and the number of US and enemy troops killed, captured, and injured. There will be charts on the cost and amounts of logistical supplies provided by the US and the amount of enemy weapons and other equipment captured or destroyed. There will certainly be data on how many Iraqi army forces we have trained and equipped, and intelligence experts will provide data on the sources and amount of external supplies, fighters, and other support slipping into Iraq from places like Iran and Syria. The report may even have some statistics providing an indication of the level of Iraqi popular support for the US strategy, and maybe even the numbers of Sunni extremists that have “come over” to our side of the conflict. Surely, it will be an exhaustive report since these are only a small sample of what it will likely contain.

The fact is, that in a war like that being fought in Iraq these numbers are not indicative of whether or not we are actually making progress toward a satisfactory conclusion. Rather, they are indicators of how well we are providing a limited amount of security for a limited amount of the Iraqi population—and only for the time being. They also indicate how well we are progressing in the creation of an Iraqi national army in the image of our own military, but that does not guarantee that this army will be any better prepared to bring the conflict to a satisfactory end.

Other metrics that the report may or may not contain, because General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker simply do not have the resources they need to affect them, are much more important quantifications of progress toward a desirable outcome. These metrics include things like how much of the basic infrastructure has been restored for the average Iraqi—both inside and outside of the areas impacted by the surge. That is, electricity, safe drinking water, access to healthcare and education, and reliable local police protection as well as other basic services.

All politics is local, because the root causes of happiness or unhappiness are local. As a result, the number of new jobs created locally, the effectiveness of local government, and the successful integration of the various ethnic, religious, and political factions into some form of functioning local bureaucracy are the keys to ending the conflict. All these issues are meaningful, manageable, and measurable with the right resources applied to them. Unfortunately, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker would undoubtedly agree that they do not have these resources. The current national Iraqi government and its fledgling army can do no more either since they are not effective at the local level and arguably pretty ineffective at the national level. In the simplest terms, the US army occupying Iraq cannot address the root cause of a civil conflict in Iraq regardless of whether or not we can temporarily increase security for a small portion of the country.

Expect a significant amount of data, metrics, and expert analysis from some of the most prestigious sources on the Iraq Progress Report—just don’t expect a significant amount of useful information regarding how we are putting a successful end to the war. Then brace yourselves as our political leaders, candidates, and media spin, and/or unwittingly use the report’s information to promote their own particular policies and campaign positions.

A War the Pentagon is Not Structured to Win

2007-08-07T21:32:00.000-04:00

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org

In their July 24th New York Times Op-Ed, “A War the Pentagon Can't Win," former National Security Council staff members Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon eloquently describe why US military forces are not capable of precise and swift counter-terrorist raids required to be effective in the Global War on Terror (click on "Read More..." below to see their Op-Ed). The sad truth is that our military is still overwhelmingly conventional in its strategic and tactical outlook and the majority of the 50,000 or so members of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are conventionally trained support units. Benjamin and Simon correctly point out that the CIA’s paramilitary units were in a better position to strike at the Taliban in Afghanistan than the US military.

The coordinated operations of the CIA and the US Army 5th Special Forces Group in Afghanistan are covered in Hy Rothstein’s book, “Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.” This book is an excellent source for understanding where and how our military is deficient in its ability to fight the war on terror. In essence, our SOF units have become too much like their conventional parent militaries—overly risk averse, too dependent upon high-tech equipment, and having to navigate through far too many layers of conventional thinking military leadership in order to get anything done.

Hy should know…he is a retired Special Forces Colonel with 30-years active service who now teaches at the Naval Post Graduate School. He offers some “relatively” inexpensive ways to fix the problems pointed out in Benjamin and Simon’s Op-Ed. For example, we could put the existing SOF units into their own branch of military service with the required operational, training, and support mechanisms. This would break them of their bad conventional habits and develop an entire service culture focused on counter-terrorism and unconventional warfare.

This may sound extreme to some, but consider the trillions we spent on the cold war to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. We created the preeminent and most expensive military on the planet. The threat we face now is made up of people who know better than to try to stand toe-to-toe with our military. We need to restructure and refocus our military in order to successfully respond to the threat. Until we do, our military responses to terrorism will remain too slow, too expensive, and too predictable, and will continue to generate more unnecessary ”collateral” casualties, hostility, and enemies than they eliminate.

A War the Pentagon Can't Win
By DANIEL BENJAMIN AND STEVEN SIMON
Originally published in The New York Times Opinion Editorial of July 24, 2007

As the National Intelligence Estimate issued last week confirms, a terrorist haven has emerged in Pakistan's tribal belt. And as recent revelations about an aborted 2005 operation in the region demonstrate, our Defense Department is chronically unable to conduct the sort of missions that would disrupt terrorist activity there and in similarly ungoverned places.

These are perhaps the most important kind of counterterrorism missions. Because the Pentagon has shown that it cannot carry them out, the Central Intelligence Agency should be given the chance to perform them.

The story of the scrubbed 2005 operation illustrates why the Pentagon is incapable of doing what needs to be done. The preparations for the mission to capture or kill Al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, appear to have unfolded like others before it. Intelligence was received about a high-level Qaeda meeting. A small snatch or kill operation was to be carried out by Special Operations. But military brass added large numbers of troops to conduct additional intelligence, force protection, communications and extraction work.

At that point, as one senior intelligence official told this newspaper, ''The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan,'' and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pulled the plug.

To those of us who worked in counterterrorism in the 1990s, this sequence of events feels like the movie ''Groundhog Day.'' Similar decision-making led to the failure to mount critical operations on at least three occasions during the Clinton administration. The most notable was the effort to get the Pentagon to conduct a ground operation against the Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan beginning in late 1998.

The Clinton White House repeatedly requested options involving ground forces that could hunt and destroy terrorists in Afghanistan. Repeatedly, senior military officials declared such a mission ''would be Desert One,'' referring to the disastrous 1980 effort to free American hostages in Iran. When the Pentagon finally delivered a plan, the deployment envisioned would have been sufficient to take and hold Kabul but not to surprise and pin down a handful of terrorists.

But the Zawahri stand-down is even more telling. It occurred four years into the global war on terrorism, when the basic questions about the nature of the Qaeda threat had been settled and the nation, in the oft-intoned phrase of the Bush administration, was said to be always ''on the offensive.'' Moreover, it happened on the watch of Donald Rumsfeld, the most dominating secretary of defense in memory, who overruled military planners routinely as he micromanaged the deployment to Iraq. Perhaps his attention was focused on the growing mess in that country, but even Mr. Rumsfeld, who viewed special forces as the keystone of a transformed 21st-century American military, could not keep on track a mission that would have stunned Al Qaeda.

Highly mobile, highly lethal counterterrorism operations are clearly possible. Israel scored victories with raids in Entebbe, Uganda; Tunis; and Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1970s and 1980s. Other countries, like Germany, have carried out similar operations, like the Mogadishu raid of 1977 that freed passengers on a Lufthansa plane hijacked to Somalia by the Baader-Meinhof gang. An operation in Pakistan's tribal areas -- setting aside the issue of whether this could politically upend President Pervez Musharraf -- would be extremely difficult. But it is hard to believe it is impossible.

Since the Desert One debacle, the United States has poured vast resources into its special forces. The Special Operations Command budget has nearly doubled since 2001, and it is expected to grow 150 percent over five years. The command includes more than 50,000 troops, the equivalent of three or four infantry divisions. The best of them -- Delta Force and the Navy Seals -- have developed into highly skilled unconventional forces.

Yet fear of failure and casualties has meant they are seldom, if ever, deployed for such counterterrorism operations. In theory, the best place in the government for small-scale missions to be planned and executed is the Pentagon, because snatch or kill teams should be plugged into a larger military support team. The reality, unfortunately, is that they can't be plugged in without being bogged down.

Senior officers, trained to understand the American way of war to mean overwhelming force and superior firepower, view special ops outside a war zone as something to be avoided at all cost. This has been true even in lower-risk efforts to capture war criminals in the Balkans. The record demonstrates that our military is simply incapable of adapting its culture to embrace such operations. The Pentagon should just stop planning for missions it won't launch.

While the C.I.A. doesn't have an unblemished record, its counterterrorism operations have shown more promise than the Pentagon's. The agency has already had some successes operating in ungoverned spaces. In the first reported attack in such a region, a C.I.A.-operated Predator drone launched a missile that killed a Qaeda lieutenant in Yemen in 2002. Since then the Predator has been used to strike Al Qaeda at least eight times, although with limited success. At least initially, the trigger in these attacks was pulled by C.I.A. operatives, not soldiers.

The record of a small, vulnerable C.I.A. paramilitary force in Afghanistan in 2001 was more impressive. The group's audacious reconnaissance work and direction of local warlords in action against the Taliban provided the most significant battlefield success of the post-9/11 period. Without this risky, cold-start intervention, the American troops that followed the agency into Afghanistan would have gone in blind and worried more about their flanks than about Al Qaeda.

The agency's history of ill-conceived covert political operations from the 1950s through the 1970s may cause some to worry. That agency, however, no longer exists. Congressional hearings and legislation, as well as fear of casualties, have given the clandestine service its own case of risk aversion, though it seems less severe than the Pentagon's.

We have failed in Pakistan, and are failing in Iraq, to achieve a primary aim of our counterterrorism policy: preventing Al Qaeda from acquiring safe havens. Our military has shown itself to be a poor instrument for fighting terrorism, and there are now thousands of jihadists who weren't in Iraq at the time of the 2003 invasion. When the inevitable American drawdown occurs, we will need a way to keep the terrorists off balance in Iraq and to disrupt the conveyor belt that is already moving fighters to places like Lebanon, North Africa and Europe.

With new leadership at both the C.I.A. and the Defense Department, the Bush administration has a chance to fix this problem. The missing ingredient for success with the most important kind of counterterrorism missions is not courage or technical capacity -- our uniformed personnel are unsurpassed -- but organizational culture. With a small fraction of the resources that Pentagon has for special operations, the C.I.A. could develop the paramilitary capacity we profoundly need.

Daniel Benjamin, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Steven Simon, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, were members of the National Security Council staff from 1994 to 1999.

An Interesting Political Commentary

2007-07-31T07:13:00.000-04:00

We at WinTheGWOT.org know that Senator Lugar is much more principled than the author of the article below gives him credit for. However, as a general discussion of the partisan politicial positioning affecting our ability to successfully deal with the war on terror, the commentary is fairly well written and worth your consideration.
-Matt Rowe

Senators and Generals
By Kimberly Strassel
Originally published in the July 20th Wall Street Journal

When Indiana Sen. Richard Lugar broke with President Bush on Iraq last month, he was hailed by antiwar groups as brave. When the Republican this week bucked Democrats and refused to vote for an immediate troop withdrawal, he was hailed by conservatives as wise. Mr. Lugar might well be both brave and wise, but before he's any of those things he's a politician.

And it's politics, not principle, that explains the seeming disconnect this week between the growing number of Republican senators who loudly distance themselves from the war, yet refuse to join Democrats in their antiwar votes. As Mr. Lugar, New Mexico's Pete Domenici and Ohio's George Voinovich, all successively bailed on the surge, the headlines built it up as a great Republican Rift, a "turning point" in the war, which would finally deliver Harry Reid the votes he needed for withdrawal.

Instead, Mr. Reid got a fizzling 52 ayes for withdrawal this week, and not a one from Republicans who'd so recently and forcefully criticized the war. The few senators who crossed to Mr. Reid's side were primarily those who'd long been griping about the war, say Nebraska's Chuck Hagel. The rest of the GOP war apostates were MIA.

Confusing as this might seem, it's also precisely what many of those Republican breakaways intended from the start. Mr. Domenici, New Hampshire's John Sununu, Minnesota's Norm Coleman -- all are panicked about next year's election and desperately want Iraq off the table. But political retreat is no easy thing.

One the one hand, they are under intense pressure to start placating independents and other voters unhappy with the course of the war. Anti-war groups are making it as hot as possible, with a coalition of liberal groups launching a summer-long blitz against key Republican senators who are vulnerable in next year's election, demanding they support withdrawal. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee has joined in, running ads, like one in Mr. Coleman's Minnesota, that show footage of bloody Iraq combat and that suggest if he doesn't abandon the current strategy he will be responsible for further combat deaths.

This explains the recent wave of GOP defections, encapsulated by Mr. Domenici's speech that slammed the Iraqi government for not doing enough, called for a "redirection of U.S. military policy in Iraq," and demanded legislation "to create conditions by which American combat troops can be removed." Mr. Domenici's message to war critics: I feel your anger.

On the other hand, few of these Republicans feel free to completely jump ship. That's because for every home-state independent unhappy with Iraq, there is a home-state conservative who agrees with the president that a precipitous withdrawal is a grave mistake. These voters have largely stuck with Mr. Bush and continue to harbor disdain for the cut-and-run crowd.

That much has been obvious in the fortunes of senators such as Oregon's Gordon Smith. He decided to get out ahead of the political crush, and broke ranks with Mr. Bush and his Iraq policy last year. This turn-tailing won him marks with certain independents, and a pass on some of the more vitriolic campaigning by antiwar groups. Yet Mr. Smith's overall approval rating has nonetheless fallen in the state. His base is none too pleased with his actions.

The recent flurry of action-inaction by certain GOP senators is instead about laying the groundwork for September. They're putting President Bush on notice, with a goal of mau-mauing him into changing course. Come September, they hope Gen. David Petraeus will deliver a cautiously optimistic report to Congress, making the case the situation has improved. Mr. Bush could then propose his own pre-emptive troop drawdown. Not the immediate pullout demanded by Democrats, of course, but a slower withdrawal, over the next 18 months.

In this way, they can take credit for moving Mr. Bush into winding down the war. They'd not only please war critics, but provide themselves cover with the base, since they'd simply be backing Mr. Bush's own plan.

Don't underestimate the number of senators pushing for this outcome. At least a dozen or so who are up for re-election next year, who have so far publicly held tight in their support for Mr. Bush's surge, are in the back room demanding the White House throw them a political bone in September.

What happens then? For now, the White House can claim mini-victory. Its near-term goal was always to squeak through the summer without binding legislation, giving the surge time to show gains. It has now accomplished that goal: Mr. Reid has appeased his antiwar left with his all-night Iraq pajama party, and is calling it quits on further Iraq-related amendments. House Minority Leader John Boehner meanwhile manfully convinced his own caucus to sit tight in July, losing only four members to recent withdrawal legislation.

Nervous Republicans are nonetheless forcing Mr. Bush into a corner this September. If the president is principled -- as he has been unfailingly with regards to the war so far -- he will predicate his next move purely upon the military situation in Iraq. Gen. Peter Pace recently said the surge had resulted in a "sea change" in Iraq's security situation, but that's still a long way from suggesting Iraqis are able to hold the gains so painfully won by U.S. troops. And honest withdrawal -- one truly linked to Iraqi success -- might yet be years in the offing.

Mr. Bush's party is instead requiring he act on their own artificial political deadlines -- which take no account of the ground situation in Iraq, but instead count backward from November 2008. What they fail to understand is that their own strategy is just as politically perilous as sticking with Mr. Bush. Should they win the day and force the administration into a premature pullout, they risk taking the blame for any ugly Iraqi outcome: Genocide, a regional blow-up, a stronger al Qaeda that follows our troops back home. No comment from any of these Machiavellis as to how any of this helps them in next November.

Shaky Republicans might instead consider that the best political scenario next year would be to present voters with an Iraq that is beginning to function successfully, and to take credit for having the vision and fortitude to back the U.S. military through in its mission. A mission, by the way, that most of them voted for in 2002. Then they could be wise, and brave -- and principled.

Administration Officials Need to Come Clean with a Meaningful and Manageable Plan for Iraq that Americans Can Support

2007-07-13T08:53:00.000-04:00

By Matt Rowe, Executive Director, WinTheGWOT.org

Our political leaders and senior military commanders need to come clean with us about the war in Iraq. It should be obvious by now that overly confident positions and regular statements about progress and potential progress in the war are no longer acceptable to the American people. We have all but lost complete faith in anything we hear, and the well timed “reminders” from Bush Administration officials about the threat from Al Qaeda are no longer effective. US involvement in the war in Iraq must still be ended in some positive way—likely by a complete or partial withdrawal of US troops over a significant period of time, but the Administration must present the world with a meaningful and manageable plan going forward—a plan that is free of lofty rhetoric and fear mongering. The same is true for the war in Afghanistan. Americans do not need to be threatened into support—we need to be convinced that the expense in lives and treasure is worthwhile.

In Bob Woodward’s July 12, 2007 Washington Post article, CIA Said Instability Seemed 'Irreversible' he quotes CIA Director Michael V. Hayden on November 13, 2006 giving the following statement to the Iraq Study Group, "…the inability of the [Iraqi] government to govern seems irreversible," and Hayden went on to say that he could not "…point to any milestone or checkpoint where we can turn this thing around." Being even more direct, Hayden stated, "The government is unable to govern…we have spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a government that is balanced, and it cannot function."

There appears to be some disparity amongst various members and staff of the ISG who listened to Hayden as to how starkly he presented the situation in Iraq, but most seem to agree that he was very somber in his assessment. According to Woodward, “In the eight months since the interview, neither Hayden nor any other high-ranking administration official has publicly described the Iraqi government in the uniformly negative terms that the CIA director used in his closed-door briefing.”

Of course this is the same Administration that left General Peter Pace, USMC, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs even after he stated in early August of 2006 that just one year earlier he never would have expected Iraq to devolve into a civil war. If he really believed that, then he was the only person to be surprised by the situation.

General David Petraeus, the ground commander in Iraq who is probably the best man for the job, believes that he can end the war given enough time and both military and Iraqi political support. He has made it clear that only the successful application of both political and non-military aspects of Iraqi society can end the civil conflict there. The US military can only attempt to stabilize the country long enough for that to take place, but under no circumstances can the military do it alone. Of course, this assumes that the Iraqis eventually decide to reconcile.

Unfortunately, General Petraeus will not likely have what he needs given the political situation in the US and the intensity of the ongoing hostilities between Iraqi factions. It appears that recently retired Army General John Abizaid, who would have been General Petraeus’ boss, saw this writing on the wall. Abizaid is of middle-eastern descent, speaks fluent Arabic, and had operated flawlessly in Iraq at various levels of command. He had also spent time in Lebanon as the Operations Officer for a UN Observation Group. General Abizaid is even alleged to have gone so far as to threaten to retire if he were not chosen to be the commander of CENTCOM, rather than accept a much more senior staff position in Washington from then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He was very likely the best officer for the job, and Rumsfeld apparently conceded, but nonetheless, it was probably too late to accomplish what he really needed to. Abizaid may have realized that nothing he could do would counter the ineptitude of the Bush Administration, and one of our most talented generals who could be effectively supporting General Petraeus right now, simply retired from active duty—a tremendous loss to the war effort.

It is time for our political leaders and senior military commanders to step up and call the situation as they really see it—as it really is—and not in the overly optimistic terms they feel necessary to maintain morale and political support. Americans are tougher than that, and they need the truth. Americans and more and more of their political representatives have irrevocably lost faith in the Administration owing to its officials providing consistently bad and difficult to swallow situational assessments. It is still possible to end the war in Iraq in some successful way, but we have to win back the support of the Iraqi people—and that will take time. Thus, in order to get the time we need, we must first win back the trust of the American people by changing their perception via the truth and an understandable plan that is meaningful and manageable.